1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 TIMOTHY P. DEMARTINI, et al., 2:14-cv-02722-DJC-CKD (PS) 12 Plaintiffs, 13 v. ORDER 14 MICHAEL J. DEMARTINI, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiffs and counterdefendants Timothy and Margie DeMartini (“plaintiffs”) move the 18 court to modify the scheduling order for this case to allow them to bring a motion for summary 19 judgment directed to the defenses and counterclaims of defendants, Michael J. DeMartini and 20 Renate DeMartini (“defendants”). (ECF No. 498.)1 The court finds this matter appropriate for 21 decision without oral argument under Local Rule 302(g) and vacates the hearing set to take place 22 on September 11, 2024. For the reasons set forth below, the motion is granted. 23 I. Background 24 Plaintiffs filed this action in the Superior Court of California and defendants removed to 25 the United States District Court for the District of Nevada on September 16, 2014. (ECF No. 1.) 26
27 1 Because defendants proceed without counsel, this matter is before the undersigned pursuant to Local Rule 302(c)(21). See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). In addition, the presiding district judge 28 referred this motion to the undersigned. (ECF No. 505.) 1 The case was transferred to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California 2 on November 20, 2014. (ECF No. 27.) 3 Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint alleges a partnership and property dispute between 4 the parties and three causes of action as follows: (1) partition of co-owned real property located at 5 12757, 12759, and 12761 Loma Rica Drive, Grass Valley, California; (2) breach of contract 6 concerning payment on a promissory note jointly executed by the parties; and (3) dissolution of a 7 partnership formed by the parties to improve upon and manage real property owned by the 8 partnership at 12731 Loma Rica Drive, Grass Valley, California. (ECF No. 75.) Plaintiffs’ third 9 cause of action for dissolution of partnership relating to the 12731 Loma Rica Drive property was 10 severed and remanded to state court. (ECF Nos. 214, 224.) 11 Defendants assert three counterclaims in the operative second amended answer: (1) 12 declaratory relief that the parties have been in a partnership since 1974 to pool resources and 13 operate various businesses; (2) breach of an oral partnership contract by plaintiffs in 2014; and (3) 14 defamation by plaintiffs in 2014. (ECF No. 104.) On December 20, 2017, the court granted 15 summary judgment in plaintiffs’ favor on defendants’ counterclaims. (ECF Nos. 232, 267.) 16 The case proceeded to a jury trial on plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim only and the jury 17 returned a verdict for plaintiffs. (ECF No. 335.) Following a bench trial on plaintiffs’ partition 18 claim, the court issued an interlocutory judgment of partition on May 30, 2018, ordering the 19 property to be partitioned in kind. (ECF No. 361.) 20 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed summary judgment on defendants’ breach of 21 partnership contract counterclaim, finding dismissal of this claim was improperly premised on an 22 alleged breach of the global partnership instead of breach of the oral partnership agreement 23 formed in the 1970s. (ECF No. 455 at 3-5.) The Ninth Circuit also reversed summary judgment 24 on defendants’ defamation counterclaim, finding the court erred in granting summary judgment 25 on defendants’ defamation per se claim. (Id. at 5-6.) 26 The Ninth Circuit also vacated the judgment on the plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim 27 and remanded for a new trial on the breach of contract claim, finding the court improperly 28 excluded partnership and mitigation evidence which likely tainted the jury’s verdict. (ECF No. 1 455 at 6-8.) No trial date has been set for the trial and retrial of this action. 2 Following remand from the Ninth Circuit, this case was stayed until March 13, 2024. 3 (ECF No. 483.) When the stay was lifted, defendants moved for reconsideration of portions of the 4 order lifting the stay. (ECF No. 489.) On June 5, 2024, the court denied the motion for 5 reconsideration. (ECF No. 497.) 6 On July 2, 2024, plaintiffs filed the present motion requesting modification of the 7 scheduling order to allow plaintiffs to file a motion for summary judgment, or partial summary 8 judgment, addressed to defendants’ breach of partnership contract and defamation counterclaims. 9 (ECF No. 498.) Defendants oppose the motion and plaintiffs filed a reply. (ECF Nos. 501, 503.) 10 II. Legal Standard 11 Unless a different time is set by local rule or the court orders otherwise, a party may file a 12 motion for summary judgment at any time until 30 days after the close of all discovery. Fed. R. 13 Civ. P. 56. 14 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b), the court must issue a scheduling order 15 setting deadlines for filing motions, among other events. “[G]ood cause” is required for 16 modification of a court’s pretrial scheduling order. Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4). “Rule 16(b)’s ‘good 17 cause’ standard primarily considers the diligence of the party seeking the amendment.” Johnson 18 v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 609 (9th Cir. 1992). While the focus of the inquiry 19 is upon the moving party’s reasons for seeking modification, prejudice to the party opposing the 20 modification may support denial of the motion. (Id.) 21 III. Discussion 22 Plaintiffs move to modify the scheduling order, and specifically the dispositive motion 23 deadline, to allow them to file a motion for summary judgment or for partial summary judgment 24 addressed to the breach of partnership contract and defamation counterclaims. (ECF No. 498.) 25 Plaintiffs argue the Ninth Circuit raised “new issues” when reversing summary judgment, 26 including as to the “oral partnership formed in the 1970s” and the surviving portion of 27 defendants’ third counterclaim, defamation per se. (Id. at 6.) Plaintiffs argue they acted with 28 diligence because they moved to extend the dispositive motion deadline upon the first reasonable 1 opportunity to do so upon remand “after the Court of Appeals raised these new issues.” (ECF No. 2 498 at 6.) Plaintiffs argue there is no prejudice to defendants since no trial or pretrial conference 3 dates have been set and because the modification of the deadline would equally allow both sides 4 to bring a dispositive motion if they so choose. (Id.) 5 Defendants oppose the motion. (ECF No. 502.) They argue (1) plaintiffs failed to meet 6 and confer and omitted relevant facts; (2) a magistrate judge lacks jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 7 636(b)(1)(A) to adjudicate post-trial matters without the consent of the parties; and (3) no basis or 8 authority supports amending the scheduling order post-trial. (ECF No. 501.) 9 At the outset, plaintiffs adequately met and conferred prior to filing the motion. 10 Defendants indicated they would not agree to an amendment of the current scheduling order. (See 11 ECF No. 498 at 13.) 12 In addition, modifying the scheduling order is within a magistrate judge’s authority.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 TIMOTHY P. DEMARTINI, et al., 2:14-cv-02722-DJC-CKD (PS) 12 Plaintiffs, 13 v. ORDER 14 MICHAEL J. DEMARTINI, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiffs and counterdefendants Timothy and Margie DeMartini (“plaintiffs”) move the 18 court to modify the scheduling order for this case to allow them to bring a motion for summary 19 judgment directed to the defenses and counterclaims of defendants, Michael J. DeMartini and 20 Renate DeMartini (“defendants”). (ECF No. 498.)1 The court finds this matter appropriate for 21 decision without oral argument under Local Rule 302(g) and vacates the hearing set to take place 22 on September 11, 2024. For the reasons set forth below, the motion is granted. 23 I. Background 24 Plaintiffs filed this action in the Superior Court of California and defendants removed to 25 the United States District Court for the District of Nevada on September 16, 2014. (ECF No. 1.) 26
27 1 Because defendants proceed without counsel, this matter is before the undersigned pursuant to Local Rule 302(c)(21). See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). In addition, the presiding district judge 28 referred this motion to the undersigned. (ECF No. 505.) 1 The case was transferred to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California 2 on November 20, 2014. (ECF No. 27.) 3 Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint alleges a partnership and property dispute between 4 the parties and three causes of action as follows: (1) partition of co-owned real property located at 5 12757, 12759, and 12761 Loma Rica Drive, Grass Valley, California; (2) breach of contract 6 concerning payment on a promissory note jointly executed by the parties; and (3) dissolution of a 7 partnership formed by the parties to improve upon and manage real property owned by the 8 partnership at 12731 Loma Rica Drive, Grass Valley, California. (ECF No. 75.) Plaintiffs’ third 9 cause of action for dissolution of partnership relating to the 12731 Loma Rica Drive property was 10 severed and remanded to state court. (ECF Nos. 214, 224.) 11 Defendants assert three counterclaims in the operative second amended answer: (1) 12 declaratory relief that the parties have been in a partnership since 1974 to pool resources and 13 operate various businesses; (2) breach of an oral partnership contract by plaintiffs in 2014; and (3) 14 defamation by plaintiffs in 2014. (ECF No. 104.) On December 20, 2017, the court granted 15 summary judgment in plaintiffs’ favor on defendants’ counterclaims. (ECF Nos. 232, 267.) 16 The case proceeded to a jury trial on plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim only and the jury 17 returned a verdict for plaintiffs. (ECF No. 335.) Following a bench trial on plaintiffs’ partition 18 claim, the court issued an interlocutory judgment of partition on May 30, 2018, ordering the 19 property to be partitioned in kind. (ECF No. 361.) 20 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed summary judgment on defendants’ breach of 21 partnership contract counterclaim, finding dismissal of this claim was improperly premised on an 22 alleged breach of the global partnership instead of breach of the oral partnership agreement 23 formed in the 1970s. (ECF No. 455 at 3-5.) The Ninth Circuit also reversed summary judgment 24 on defendants’ defamation counterclaim, finding the court erred in granting summary judgment 25 on defendants’ defamation per se claim. (Id. at 5-6.) 26 The Ninth Circuit also vacated the judgment on the plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim 27 and remanded for a new trial on the breach of contract claim, finding the court improperly 28 excluded partnership and mitigation evidence which likely tainted the jury’s verdict. (ECF No. 1 455 at 6-8.) No trial date has been set for the trial and retrial of this action. 2 Following remand from the Ninth Circuit, this case was stayed until March 13, 2024. 3 (ECF No. 483.) When the stay was lifted, defendants moved for reconsideration of portions of the 4 order lifting the stay. (ECF No. 489.) On June 5, 2024, the court denied the motion for 5 reconsideration. (ECF No. 497.) 6 On July 2, 2024, plaintiffs filed the present motion requesting modification of the 7 scheduling order to allow plaintiffs to file a motion for summary judgment, or partial summary 8 judgment, addressed to defendants’ breach of partnership contract and defamation counterclaims. 9 (ECF No. 498.) Defendants oppose the motion and plaintiffs filed a reply. (ECF Nos. 501, 503.) 10 II. Legal Standard 11 Unless a different time is set by local rule or the court orders otherwise, a party may file a 12 motion for summary judgment at any time until 30 days after the close of all discovery. Fed. R. 13 Civ. P. 56. 14 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b), the court must issue a scheduling order 15 setting deadlines for filing motions, among other events. “[G]ood cause” is required for 16 modification of a court’s pretrial scheduling order. Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4). “Rule 16(b)’s ‘good 17 cause’ standard primarily considers the diligence of the party seeking the amendment.” Johnson 18 v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 609 (9th Cir. 1992). While the focus of the inquiry 19 is upon the moving party’s reasons for seeking modification, prejudice to the party opposing the 20 modification may support denial of the motion. (Id.) 21 III. Discussion 22 Plaintiffs move to modify the scheduling order, and specifically the dispositive motion 23 deadline, to allow them to file a motion for summary judgment or for partial summary judgment 24 addressed to the breach of partnership contract and defamation counterclaims. (ECF No. 498.) 25 Plaintiffs argue the Ninth Circuit raised “new issues” when reversing summary judgment, 26 including as to the “oral partnership formed in the 1970s” and the surviving portion of 27 defendants’ third counterclaim, defamation per se. (Id. at 6.) Plaintiffs argue they acted with 28 diligence because they moved to extend the dispositive motion deadline upon the first reasonable 1 opportunity to do so upon remand “after the Court of Appeals raised these new issues.” (ECF No. 2 498 at 6.) Plaintiffs argue there is no prejudice to defendants since no trial or pretrial conference 3 dates have been set and because the modification of the deadline would equally allow both sides 4 to bring a dispositive motion if they so choose. (Id.) 5 Defendants oppose the motion. (ECF No. 502.) They argue (1) plaintiffs failed to meet 6 and confer and omitted relevant facts; (2) a magistrate judge lacks jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 7 636(b)(1)(A) to adjudicate post-trial matters without the consent of the parties; and (3) no basis or 8 authority supports amending the scheduling order post-trial. (ECF No. 501.) 9 At the outset, plaintiffs adequately met and conferred prior to filing the motion. 10 Defendants indicated they would not agree to an amendment of the current scheduling order. (See 11 ECF No. 498 at 13.) 12 In addition, modifying the scheduling order is within a magistrate judge’s authority. 13 Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary[,] … a judge may designate a magistrate judge to hear and determine any pretrial 14 matter pending before the court, except a motion for injunctive relief, for judgment on the pleadings, for summary judgment, to dismiss or 15 quash an indictment or information made by the defendant, to suppress evidence in a criminal case, to dismiss or to permit 16 maintenance of a class action, to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and to involuntarily dismiss an 17 action. [….] 18 28 U.S.C.A. § 636(b)(1)(a). By local rule in this district court, magistrate judges are authorized to 19 “perform all duties permitted” by 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). See Local Rule 302. To determine 20 whether a motion is within a magistrate judge’s authority under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), a court 21 looks “to the effect of the motion” to determine whether it is properly characterized as 22 “dispositive or non-dispositive of a claim or defense of a party.” United States v. Rivera- 23 Guerrero, 377 F.3d 1064, 1068 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Mitchell v. Valenzuela, 791 F.3d 1166, 24 1168 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding that dispositive matters in this context includes those that are 25 analogous to the ones listed in section 636(b)(1)(A)). 26 Here, defendants do not argue the motion to modify the scheduling order is dispositive in 27 any way. Instead, defendants focus on the “post-trial” nature of this case and use of the language 28 “any pretrial matter” in 28 U.S.C.A. § 636(b)(1)(a). As set forth above, though, the key inquiry is 1 the effect of the motion. See Rivera-Guerrero, 377 F.3d at 1068; Mitchell, 791 F.3d at 1168. 2 Moreover, the assigned district judge has referred the instant motion to the undersigned for 3 resolution. (ECF No. 505.) Under section 636(b)(3), “a magistrate judge may be assigned such 4 additional duties as are not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States.” 28 5 U.S.C.A. § 636(b)(3). 6 Thus, the undersigned considers defendants’ reasons for seeking modification and 7 diligence in doing so. See Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609. The court’s last scheduling order provided as 8 follows: “Discovery shall be completed by February 22, 2017” and “All pretrial motions, except 9 motions to compel discovery, shall be completed by June 7, 2017.” (ECF No. 146.) Plaintiffs met 10 these deadlines. Plaintiffs brought the present motion seeking to file a further dispositive motion 11 less than a month after the court resolved the motion for reconsideration of the order lifting the 12 stay. Plaintiffs’ position is that allowing a further dispositive motion will summarily dispose of 13 defendants’ counterclaims. 14 The court may allow successive motions for summary judgment. See Martinez v. High, 91 15 F.4th 1022, 1027 (9th Cir. 2024); Hoffman v. Tonnemacher, 593 F.3d 908, 911-12 (9th Cir. 16 2010). Good cause to do so here exists for the purpose of potentially narrowing the issues for trial 17 and helping to expedite disposition of the action. See, e.g., Bates v. Richardson, No. 18-CV-30- 18 CJW-MAR, 2022 WL 17685117, at *3 (N.D. Iowa Mar. 3, 2022) (allowing successive dispositive 19 motion based, in part, on the potential to narrow issues or eliminate the need for trial). 20 Defendants argue granting the motion would substantially prejudice them because this 21 case was initiated in 2014 and has already been through summary judgment and trial on one or 22 more claims over the years. Bare allegations of prejudice are unpersuasive. Defendants do not 23 make a colorable showing that modifying the scheduling order to allow further dispositive 24 motions will cause substantial prejudice or harm. 25 Instead, all parties and the court will be better served by further dispositive motion 26 proceedings, which may narrow the issues for trial. See, e.g., Bates, 2022 WL 17685117, at *3 27 (noting it would be a considerable waste of resources of the court and the parties to try issues that 28 could potentially be resolved through successive dispositive motion practice). Good cause exists 1 | to allow further dispositive motion practice, which is not foreclosed by the Ninth Circuit’s 2 || directions on remand and could assist in the efficient resolution of this matter. 3 IV. Conclusion and Order 4 In accordance with the above, IT IS ORDERED as follows: 5 1. Plaintiffs’ motion to amend the scheduling order (ECF No. 498) is granted. 6 2. The hearing set to take place on September 11, 2024, is vacated. 7 3. The scheduling order is modified to allow the filing of dispositive motions noticed to 8 be heard no later than November 6, 2024, under the procedure of Local Rule 230. 9 | Dated: August 27, 2024 □□ / del a 10 CAROLYN DELANEY 11 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 12 13 DeMartinil4ev2722.dsox 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28