(PS) Coelho v. Alvarado-Gil

Opinion

KELLEY COELHO, Case No. 2:24-cv-2181-DC-JDP (PS) Plaintiff, v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS MARIE ALVARADO-GIL, et al. Defendants. Plaintiff has filed a motion for temporary restraining order. For the reasons discussed below, I recommend that plaintiff’s motion be denied.1 Background Plaintiff brings this civil rights complaint against State Senator Marie Alvarado-Gil and her Chief of Staff Vanessa Bravo. ECF No. 16. In the first amended complaint, plaintiff alleges that she attended Turlock Police Department’s June 2024 press conference about the release of two sexually violent predators. Id. at 2, 7, 14. Plaintiff and another individual were escorted out of the press area during a press conference without cause. Id. Plaintiff claims that defendants’ actions violated her First, Fourth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Id. at 5-6. Plaintiff argues in her request for temporary injunctive relief that she has experienced

1 The district judge referred this motion to the undersigned. ECF No. 35. retaliation and harassment, including: Public statements and social media posts from individuals believed to be politically aligned with Defendant, attacking Plaintiff’s reputation and credibility. Efforts to intimidate Plaintiff’s supporters and associates, discouraging them from engaging with Plaintiff’s campaign or business. Coordinated interference with Plaintiff’s child’s education and safety by community members and school officials allegedly connected to Defendant. ECF No. 34 at 2. Plaintiff also states that her daughter has been subjected to “bullying, targeting, and retaliation in her educational environment, allegedly instigated or encouraged by individuals politically or personally aligned with Defendant.” Id. Plaintiff further argues that defendants have engaged in “political collusion and misuse of influence” and “emotional and professional harm.” Id. at 2-3. Plaintiff seeks by way of relief and order prohibiting defendant and her agents from: Engaging in further harassment, retaliation, or intimidation of Plaintiff and her family. Making public or private statements intended to harm Plaintiff’s reputation or safety. Contacting Plaintiff directly or indirectly. Id. at 5. Legal Standards A temporary restraining order, as with any preliminary injunctive relief, is an extraordinary remedy that is never awarded as of right. See Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008). The standards that govern temporary restraining orders are “substantially similar” to those that govern preliminary injunctions. Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1159 n.3 (9th Cir. 2017). To obtain injunctive relief, plaintiff must show (1) likelihood of success on the merits; (2) likelihood of irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) that the balance of equities tips in her favor; and (4) that an injunction is in the public interest. Winter, 555 U.S. at 20. “The first factor under Winter is the most important— likely success on the merits.” Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 740 (9th Cir. 2015). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b) provides that: (a)(1) Notice. The court may issue a preliminary injunction only on notice to the adverse party. . . . . (b)(1) Issuing Without Notice. The court may issue a temporary restraining order without written or oral notice to the adverse party or its attorney only if: (A) specific facts in an affidavit or a verified complaint clearly show that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant before the adverse party can be heard in opposition; and (B) the movant’s attorney certifies in writing any efforts made to give notice and the reasons why it should not be required. In addition, this court’s Local Rules impose specific requirements for the issuance of a temporary restraining order. Local Rule 231 requires “actual notice to the affected party and/or counsel” except in “the most extraordinary of circumstances.” Local Rule 231(a). “Appropriate notice would inform the affected party and/or counsel of the intention to seek a temporary restraining order, the date and time for hearing to be requested of the Court, and the nature of the relief to be requested.” Id. Further, Local Rule 231 requires the court to consider “whether the applicant could have sought relief by motion for preliminary injunction at an earlier date without the necessity for seeking last-minute relief by motion for temporary restraining order.” Local Rule 231(b). If the court finds that there was undue delay in seeking injunctive relief, the court may deny the requested temporary restraining order on those grounds. Id. Denial of plaintiff’s motion is appropriate on procedural grounds. Plaintiff has not demonstrated that she provided notice to defendants, as required by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the court’s Local Rules. “Courts regularly deny temporary restraining orders where movants fail to comply with procedural requirements, including where the movants are pro se plaintiffs.” Brewer v. Loancare, LLC, No. 2:25-CV-01157-DC-CSK (PS), 2025 WL 1400288, at *2 (E.D. Cal. May 14, 2025); see Reno Air Racing Ass’n, Inc. v. McCord, 452 F.3d 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2006) (discussing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 and noting that “courts have recognized very few circumstances justifying the issuance of an ex parte [temporary restraining order]”); Abdel-Malak v. Doe, No. 5:20-cv-00322-CJC-KK, 2020 WL 5775818, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 2020) (denying temporary restraining order sought by a pro se plaintiff for failure to satisfy Rule 65(b)’s “strict requirements”); Tri-Valley CAREs v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 671 F.3d 1113, 1131 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Denial of a motion as the result of a failure to comply with local rules is well within a district court’s discretion.”). Apart from the notice issue, the motion suffers from unreasonable delay. Plaintiff waited nearly nine months after the filing of her original complaint to move for a temporary restraining order, further demonstrating that the injury alleged is not so immediate as to justify an ex parte temporary restraining order. Plaintiff has had sufficient time to seek “relief by motion for preliminary injunction at an earlier date without the necessity for seeking last minute relief by motion for temporary restraining order.” Local Rule 231(b); see Occupy Sacramento v. City of Sacramento, 2:11-cv-2873-MCE, 2011 WL 5374748, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2011) (denying an application for a temporary restraining order due to twenty-five-day delay in seeking that relief); Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Steele Ins. Agency, Inc., No. 2:13-cv-0784-MCE, 2013 WL 1819988, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 2013) (denying an application for a temporary restraining order due to a six- month delay in seeking that relief). Plaintiff’s motion is also substantively defective. A temporary restraining order “is appropriate when it grants relief of the same nature as that to be finally granted.” Pac. Radiation Oncology, LLC v. Queen’s Med. Ctr., 810 F.3d 631, 636 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing De Beers Consol. Mines v. United States, 325 U.S. 212, 220 (1945)). While new allegations of misconduct may support additional claims against a defendant, “they do not support preliminary injunctions [or temporary restraining orders] entirely unrelated to the conduct asserted in the underlying complaint.” Id. (citing De Beers Consol. Mines, 325 U.S. at 220) (alteration added). Thus, “there must be a relationship between the injury claimed in the motion for injunctive relief and the conduct asserted in the underlying complaint.” Id. This relationship is sufficiently strong if the temporary relief sought “would grant ‘relief of the same character as that which may be granted finally.’” Id. (quoting De Beers Consol. Mines, 325 U.S. at 220). Absent this nexus, the court “lacks authority to grant the relief requested.” Id. The crux of plaintiff's first amended complaint is that her removal from the press area at then June press conference violated her First, Fourth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. contrast, here, plaintiff argues that defendant and others affiliated with her are harassing and intimidating plaintiff and her family. While I make no determinations on the sufficiency of those allegations, they are too far removed from the allegations in first amended complaint to warrant temporary injunctive relief. Accordingly, the court “lacks authority to grant the relief requested,” Pac. Radiation Oncology, 810 F.3d at 636, and I will recommend that plaintiff's motion for temporary restraining order be denied. Accordingly, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that plaintiff's motion for injunctive relief, ECF No. 34, be DENIED. These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(). Within fourteen days of service of these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Any such document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations,” and any response shall be served and filed within fourteen days of service of the objections. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Yist, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). Ir Is SO ORDERED. Dated: _ May 20, 2025 ssn (oto. ya 53 JEREMY D. PETERSON UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE