(PS) Butler v. County of Shasta

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: August 28, 2025
• Docket: 2:25-cv-01339
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 JENNIFER NICOLE BUTLER, Case No. 2:25-cv-01339-TLN-CSK 11 Plaintiff, 12 v. ORDER GRANTING IFP REQUEST AND GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND 13 SACRAMENTO COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT, et al., (ECF Nos. 1, 2) 14 Defendants. 15 16 Plaintiff Jennifer Nicole Butler is representing herself in this action and seeks 17 leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915.1 (ECF No. 2.) 18 Plaintiff’s application in support of the IFP request makes the required financial showing. 19 Accordingly, the Court grants Plaintiff’s IFP request. 20 I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT 21 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), the court must screen every in forma pauperis 22 proceeding, and must order dismissal of the case if it is “frivolous or malicious,” “fails to 23 state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief against a 24 defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Lopez v. Smith, 25 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (2000) (en banc). A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an 26 arguable basis either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). In 27 1 This matter proceeds before the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, Fed. R. 28 Civ. P. 72, and Local Rule 302(c). 1 reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court accepts as true the factual 2 allegations contained in the complaint, unless they are clearly baseless or fanciful, and 3 construes those allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Neitzke, 490 4 U.S. at 327; Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954, 960 5 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 564 U.S. 1037 (2011). 6 Pleadings by self-represented litigants are liberally construed. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 7 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2010) (liberal construction appropriate even post–Iqbal). 8 However, the court need not accept as true conclusory allegations, unreasonable 9 inferences, or unwarranted deductions of fact. Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 10 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981). A formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action does 11 not suffice to state a claim. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007); 12 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 13 To state a claim on which relief may be granted, the plaintiff must allege enough 14 facts “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A 15 claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court 16 to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 17 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the deficiencies in the 18 complaint and an opportunity to amend unless the complaint’s deficiencies could not be 19 cured by amendment. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130-31; Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 20 F.3d 336, 339 (9th Cir. 1996). 21 II. THE COMPLAINT 22 Plaintiff brings this Section 1983 action against the following thirteen (13) 23 defendants in their official and individual capacities: Shasta County, Shasta County 24 Sheriff’s Department, Shasta County Sheriff Michael L. Johnson, Shasta County Sheriff 25 Deputy Molly Robert, Shasta County Sheriff Deputy Joshua Hambly, Shasta County 26 District Attorney Stephanie A. Bridgett, Tehama County, Tehama County District 27 Attorney, City of Redding, Redding Police Department, Redding Police Chief Brian 28 Barner, Redding Police Officer Nicholas E. Dalby, and Redding Police Officer Ryan 1 Frank. Compl. ¶¶ 5-17 (ECF No. 1). 2 The Complaint alleges what appears to be three separate, unrelated incidents 3 against three different groups of defendants: Tehama County, Shasta County, and City 4 of Redding. First, on December 17, 2012, Defendant Tehama County District Attorney 5 allegedly maliciously prosecuted Plaintiff for failing to appear in court in violation of the 6 Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. ¶ 25. Plaintiff alleges she missed a November 7 13, 2012 court date, but did not do so on purpose. Id. On April 22, 2013, Defendant 8 Tehama County District Attorney allegedly falsified a plea bargain for the failure to 9 appear charge, “placing Plaintiff on probation without her knowledge” in violation of the 10 Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. ¶ 26. Plaintiff alleges that because she was 11 unaware “of these proceedings and the sentencing,” she “had no awareness of the need 12 to check in with probation,” leading to the issuance of a warrant by the Defendant 13 Tehama County District Attorney. Id. ¶ 27. Plaintiff alleges the warrant led to her 14 employment termination. Id. 15 Second, on October 8, 2022, Defendants Shasta County Sheriff Deputies Roberts 16 and Hambly allegedly violated Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment right “by executing an 17 unlawful search and seizure of Plaintiff's private property, entering the property through a 18 closed fence without a search warrant, without consent, and absent exigent 19 circumstances.” Compl. ¶ 18. Defendants Roberts and Hambly allegedly used excessive 20 force, tackling Plaintiff to the ground and placing handcuffs tightly on her. Id. ¶ 19. 21 Defendants Roberts and Hambly “pressure[ed] and coerc[ed] victim Bruce Henderson 22 Miller to make a false identification of Plaintiff” in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, 23 and used this information to falsely imprison and arrest Plaintiff. Id. ¶¶ 21-22. The 24 Complaint alleges that on October 5, 2023, Defendant Shasta County District Attorney 25 Bridgett filed charges against Plaintiff without probable cause in violation of the Fourth 26 and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. ¶ 23. 27 Third, the Complaint further alleges that on January 23, 2024, Defendants 28 Redding Police Officers Dalby and Frank used excessive force on Plaintiff when they 1 “yanked” her out of the vehicle, slammed her against the vehicle, and placed handcuffs 2 tightly on her. Id. ¶ 24. 3 As relief, Plaintiff seeks $5 million in compensatory damages and $10 million in 4 punitive damages. Compl. ¶¶ 37-39. 5 III. DISCUSSION 6 The Complaint alleges the following claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983: (1) an 7 unlawful search and seizure claim against Defendants Shasta County Sheriff Deputies 8 Roberts and Hambly based on a October 8, 2022 incident in violation of the Fourth 9 Amendment (Id. ¶¶ 18, 35); (2) an excessive force claim against Defendants Roberts 10 and Hambly during the October 8, 2022 incident (Id. ¶¶ 19, 36); (3) a false imprisonment 11 claim on October 8, 2022 against Defendants Roberts and Hambly based on their 12 coercion of a victim to falsely identify Plaintiff in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment 13 (Id. ¶¶ 21-22); (4) a false arrest claim on October 8, 2022 against Defendants Roberts 14 and Hambly based on the same victim coercion in violation of the Fourteenth 15 Amendment (Id. ¶¶ 21-22); (5) a malicious prosecution claim against Defendant Shasta 16 County District Attorney Bridgett occurring on October 5, 2023 in violation of the Fourth 17 and Fourteenth Amendments (Id. ¶ 23); (6) a malicious prosecution claim against 18 Defendant Tehama County District Attorney for a failure to appear in court in violation of 19 the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments occurring in November 2012 - April 2013 20 (Compl. ¶¶ 25-27); and (7) an excessive force claim against Defendants Redding Police 21 Officers Dalby and Frank during a January 23, 2024 encounter (Id. ¶ 24). The Complaint 22 alleges the malicious prosecutions by Shasta and Tehama Counties were “in retaliation 23 for Plaintiff's threat to file legal recourse against the County, the County Family Court, 24 and Child Protective Services.” Compl. ¶ 31. The Complaint further alleges that the local 25 government entity defendants (Shasta County, Tehama County, Shasta County Sheriff’s 26 Department, and the Redding Police Department) “failed to adopt clear policies and 27 failed to train on these policies.” Id. ¶ 32. 28 / / / 1 A. Section 1983 Standards 2 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “provides a cause of action for the deprivation of any rights, 3 privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.” 4 Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (internal quotation marks 5 omitted). “Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights but merely provides a 6 method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 7 266, 271 (1994) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). To state a cognizable 8 § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right protected by the Constitution 9 and laws of the United States, and that the alleged deprivation was committed by a 10 person who acted under color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see also Florer v. 11 Congregation Pidyon Shevuyim, N.A., 639 F.3d 916, 921 (9th Cir. 2011). An individual 12 defendant is not liable on a civil rights claim unless the facts establish the defendant's 13 personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation or a causal connection between 14 the defendant's wrongful conduct and the alleged constitutional deprivation. See Hansen 15 v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 645 (9th Cir. 1989); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743-44 (9th 16 Cir. 1978). “A supervisor is only liable for constitutional violations of his subordinates if 17 the supervisor participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and 18 failed to act to prevent them. There is no respondeat superior liability under section 19 1983.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). That is, a plaintiff may not sue 20 any official on the theory that the official is liable for the unconstitutional conduct of his or 21 her subordinates. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. 22 B. Municipal Liability (Monell Claims) 23 Plaintiff names five municipal entity defendants: Shasta County, Shasta County 24 Sheriff’s Department, Tehama County, City of Redding, and Redding Police Department. 25 See Compl. “In order to establish municipal liability [under Monell], a plaintiff must show 26 that a ‘policy or custom’ led to the plaintiff’s injury.” Castro v. County of Los Angeles, 833 27 F.3d 1060, 1073 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (quoting Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City 28 of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)). To impose liability under Monell, a plaintiff must 1 show that (1) she was deprived of a constitutional right; (2) the municipality has a policy; 2 (3) the policy amounts to deliberate indifference to plaintiff's constitutional rights; and 3 (4) the policy is the moving force behind the constitutional violation. Anderson v. Warner, 4 451 F.3d 1063, 1070 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Oviatt v. Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470, 1474 (9th 5 Cir. 1994)). The complaint must identify the particular policy that plaintiff alleges caused 6 his constitutional injury. See Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 681 (9th Cir. 7 2002); see also Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011) (under § 1983, local 8 governments are responsible only for “their own illegal acts,” and therefore to impose 9 liability on a local government, plaintiffs must prove that an “action pursuant to official 10 municipal policy” caused their injury) (citations omitted). Further, the policy at issue must 11 be the result of a decision of a person employed by the entity who has final decision or 12 policymaking authority. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. There must be a direct causal link 13 between the policy or custom and the injury, and a plaintiff must be able to demonstrate 14 that his injury resulted from a permanent and well-settled practice. Anderson, 451 F.3d 15 at 1070. 16 Here, the Complaint does not sufficiently allege facts to support a Monell claim 17 against any of the municipal defendants. Besides naming the City of Redding as a 18 defendant, the Complaint makes no specific allegations against the City of Redding. See 19 Compl. As to the remaining four municipal defendants, the Complaint makes the 20 following conclusory allegation: “Defendants County of Shasta, County of Tehama, 21 Shasta County Sheriffs Department, Redding Police Department failed to adopt clear 22 policies and failed to train on these policies, both the awareness of the policies and how 23 to implement those policies causing Plaintiffs Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to be 24 egregiously violated.” Compl. ¶ 32. Such conclusory allegations are insufficient to state a 25 Monell claim. See Western Mining Council, 643 F.2d at 624. Therefore, the claims 26 against all entity defendants (Shasta County, Shasta County Sheriff’s Department, 27 Tehama County, City of Redding, and Redding Police Department) are dismissed 28 without prejudice. 1 C. Unrelated Claims: Tehama County and Redding Defendants 2 As described above, the Complaint alleges claims against three different groups 3 of defendants: Shasta County (claims one through five), Tehama County (claim six), 4 and City of Redding (claim seven). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20(a) provides that 5 all persons may be joined in one action as defendants if “any right to relief is asserted 6 against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the 7 same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences” and “any 8 question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9 20(a)(2); see also George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Unrelated claims 10 against unrelated defendants belong in different suits”). If unrelated claims are 11 improperly joined, the court may dismiss them without prejudice. Fed. R. Civ. P. 21; see 12 also Michaels Building Co. v. Ameritrust Co., 848 F.2d 674, 682 (6th Cir. 1988) (affirming 13 dismissal under Rule 21 of certain defendants where claims against those defendants 14 did not arise out of the same transaction or occurrences, as required by Rule 20(a)). 15 Where parties have been misjoined, the court may dismiss a party or sever the 16 claims against that party. Fed. R. Civ. P. 21. “[D]istrict courts who dismiss rather than 17 sever must conduct a prejudice analysis, including ‘loss of otherwise timely claims if new 18 suits are blocked by statutes of limitations.’” Rush v. Sport Chalet, Inc., 779 F.3d 973, 19 975 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting DirecTV, Inc. v. Leto, 467 F.3d 842, 846-47 (3d Cir. 2006)). 20 Because 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not have its own statute of limitations, district courts 21 apply California’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions and California’s laws 22 regarding equitable tolling, except to the extent any of these laws is inconsistent with 23 federal law. See Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 927 (9th Cir. 2004). California’s statute 24 of limitations for personal injury actions is two years. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 335.1; 25 Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 954-55 (9th Cir. 2004). 26 Here, the Complaint’s primary allegations focus on the October 2022 incident 27 involving the Shasta County defendants (claims one through four) and a October 2023 28 prosecution (claim five). The Complaint’s claims against the other two sets of defendants 1 are not related factually, by date, or by involved parties. 2 First, the malicious prosecution claim against Defendant Tehama County District 3 Attorney based on conduct from November 2012 - April 2013 (claim five) is unrelated 4 based on the underlying facts and parties allegedly involved. See Compl. ¶¶ 25- 5 27. Further, because the Complaint does not state a cognizable claim against Defendant 6 Tehama County District Attorney or Defendant Tehama County, the Court finds that 7 severance is inappropriate. It is also unclear whether this claim is brought against the 8 head of the office (the District Attorney), or against a non-supervisory and unnamed 9 individual. To the extent the claim is alleged against the Tehama County District 10 Attorney, the Complaint fails to sufficiently plead a Section 1983 where the Complaint 11 does not sufficiently allege supervisory liability. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. To the extent 12 this claim is brought against an unnamed, non-supervisory individual, the Complaint’s 13 allegations are insufficient to put prospective defendants on notice of their alleged 14 actions or omissions that Plaintiff claims violate her federal rights. The Court further 15 notes that the Complaint alleges malicious prosecution for Plaintiff’s failure to appear, 16 while also alleging that Plaintiff did actually fail to appear in court. See Compl. ¶ 25. The 17 Court further notes that Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim based on conduct from November 18 2012 - April 2013 is untimely by approximately ten years. 19 Second, the excessive force claim against Defendants Redding Police Officers 20 Dalby and Frank arising out of a January 2024 encounter (claim seven) are not related to 21 the October 2022 incident involving Shasta County Sheriff’s Deputies. Compare Compl. 22 ¶ 24, with id. ¶¶ 18, 21-23. In addition, given the two year statute of limitations for § 1983 23 claims (even without any potential equitable tolling), Plaintiff will not be prejudiced by the 24 dismissal of these unrelated January 2024 claims, without prejudice, from this action. 25 Accordingly, the Court dismisses without prejudice Plaintiff’s unrelated claims 26 against Defendant Tehama County District Attorney (claim six) and against Defendants 27 Redding Police Officers Dalby and Frank (claim seven). Plaintiff may elect to file her 28 § 1983 excessive force claim against Dalby and Frank based on the January 23, 2024 1 incident in a separate lawsuit. Plaintiff is warned that unless the two year statute of 2 limitations is tolled, any such lawsuit must be filed by January 23, 2026. As to the 3 malicious prosecution claim against Defendant Tehama County District Attorney, Plaintiff 4 should only re-file this claim in a separate lawsuit if Plaintiff can sufficiently plead facts to 5 overcome the time bar, facts to establish supervisory liability, and facts alleging the 6 required elements of a malicious prosecution claim. 7 D. Claims Against Shasta County Defendants 8 The Complaint alleges five Section 1983 claims against the Shasta County 9 Defendants: (1) a Fourth Amendment unlawful search and seizure claim against 10 Defendant Deputies Roberts and Hambly based on the October 8, 2022 incident (Compl. 11 ¶¶ 18, 35); (2) a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim against Roberts and Hambly 12 during the October 8, 2022 incident (Id. ¶¶ 19, 36); (3) a false imprisonment claim 13 October 8, 2022 against Roberts and Hambly based on their coercion of a victim to 14 falsely identify Plaintiff (Id. ¶¶ 21-22); (4) a false arrest claim October 8, 2022 against 15 Defendants Roberts and Hambly based on this same coercion (Id. ¶¶ 21-22); and (5) a 16 malicious prosecution claim against Defendant Shasta County District Attorney Bridgett 17 for “filing charges without probable cause and continuing to pursue charges” on or about 18 October 5, 2023 (Id. ¶ 23). 19 The Complaint was filed on May 12, 2025. Compl. The alleged search, seizure, 20 arrest, and imprisonment occurred on October 8, 2022. Under the two-year limitations 21 period for Section 1983 claims, Plaintiff had until October 8, 2024 to file her Section 22 1983 claims based on this incident. See Mills v. City of Covina, 921 F.3d 1161, 1166 (9th 23 Cir. 2019) (Section 1983 claims for unlawful stop and detention, false arrest, and false 24 imprisonment accrued on the date the search was conducted and plaintiff was arrested); 25 Jones, 393 F.3d at 927; Maldonado, 370 F.3d at 954-55; Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 335.1. 26 The Complaint does not allege any facts to suggest equitable tolling. See Compl. 27 Therefore, the Section 1983 claims based on the October 8, 2022 incident are untimely 28 (claims one through four) and are dismissed as time barred. See Lopez v. City of Santa 1 Ana, 698 F. App'x 401 (9th Cir. 2017) (affirming dismissal of pro se plaintiff’s Section 2 1983 and 1985 claims for false arrest and false imprisonment as untimely where they 3 were filed more than two years after the claims accrued). Because it is conceivable that 4 Plaintiff may be able to allege facts to justify equitable tolling or some other tolling of the 5 limitations period (e.g., statutory tolling for an individual who is imprisoned on a criminal 6 charge during the limitations period, etc.), the Court will dismiss these claims without 7 prejudice. The Court notes that if Plaintiff amends in an effort to plead cognizable claims, 8 the amended complaint must plead additional facts, including facts regarding tolling of 9 the limitations period; whether there was probable cause for the search, seizure, arrest, 10 and/or imprisonment; and facts regarding the alleged imprisonment (e.g., when plaintiff 11 was released, etc.). 12 The Section 1983 malicious prosecution claim against Defendant Bridgett (claim 13 five) is timely. The Complaint alleges: “On or about the 5th day of October 2023, 14 Defendant Bridgett willfully, intentionally, and knowingly violated Plaintiffs Fourth and 15 Fourteenth Amendments rights by filing charges without probable cause and continuing 16 to pursue charges whereby Defendant's actions equate to malicious prosecution.” 17 Compl. ¶ 23. Though timely, these allegations are conclusory and insufficient to plead a 18 malicious prosecution claim. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The 19 Complaint fails to allege facts regarding required elements for a malicious prosecution 20 claim including facts about the underlying prosecution, whether the prosecution 21 terminated in Plaintiff’s favor, and whether Defendant Bridgett prosecuted Plaintiff to 22 deny her a specific constitutional right. See Thompson v. Clark, 596 U.S. 36, 39 (2022) 23 (holding that the “favorable termination of the underlying criminal prosecution” element of 24 a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim “need only show that the criminal prosecution 25 ended without a conviction,” not “that the criminal prosecution ended with some 26 affirmative indication of innocence”); Mills, 921 F.3d at 1169 (affirming dismissal of 27 § 1983 malicious prosecution claim). For example, it is unclear from the Complaint what 28 underlying conduct Plaintiff was prosecuted for, though the organization of the Complaint 1 suggests the prosecution was related to the October 8, 2022 arrest. See Compl. The 2 Court dismisses the malicious prosecution claim against Defendant Bridgett with leave to 3 amend. 4 E. Leave to Amend 5 Although the Federal Rules adopt a flexible pleading policy, even a pro se 6 litigant’s complaint must give fair notice and state the elements of a claim plainly and 7 succinctly. Jones v. Community Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984). In 8 light of Plaintiff’s pro se status, and because it is at least conceivable that Plaintiff could 9 allege additional facts to state Section 1983 claims against Defendants Roberts, Hambly, 10 and Bridgett, the Court finds it appropriate to grant Plaintiff an opportunity to amend the 11 Complaint. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130-31 (indicating that prior to dismissal, the court 12 is to tell the plaintiff of deficiencies in the complaint and provide an opportunity to cure if 13 it appears at all possible the defects can be corrected). 14 If Plaintiff elects to file an amended complaint, this new pleading shall allege facts 15 establishing the existence of federal jurisdiction and must contain a short and plain 16 statement of Plaintiff's claim. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. The allegations of the complaint 17 must be set forth in sequentially numbered paragraphs, with each paragraph number 18 being one greater than the one before, each paragraph having its own number, and no 19 paragraph number being repeated anywhere in the complaint. Each paragraph should 20 be limited “to a single set of circumstances” where possible. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b). 21 Forms are available to help plaintiffs organize their complaint in the proper way. They 22 are available at the Clerk's Office, 501 I Street, 4th Floor (Rm. 4-200), Sacramento, CA 23 95814, or online at www.uscourts.gov/forms/pro-se-forms. 24 The amended complaint must not require the court and the defendants to guess 25 at what is being alleged against whom. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th 26 Cir. 1996) (affirming dismissal of a complaint where the district court was “literally 27 guessing as to what facts support the legal claims being asserted against certain 28 defendants”). The amended complaint must not require the court to spend its time 1 | “preparing the ‘short and plain statement’ which Rule 8 obligated plaintiffs to submit.” /d. 2 | at 1180. The amended complaint must not require the court and defendants to prepare 3 || lengthy outlines “to determine who is being sued for what.” /d. at 1179. 4 Plaintiff is informed that the court cannot refer to a prior complaint or other filing in 5 | order to make the amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that an 6 || amended complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. As a 7 || general rule, an amended complaint supersedes prior complaint(s), and once the 8 || amended complaint is filed and served, any previous complaint no longer serves any 9 | function in the case. Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 927 (9th Cir. 2012). The 10 || amended complaint should be titled “First Amended Complaint.” 11 | IV. CONCLUSION 12 In accordance with the above, IT |S ORDERED that: 13 1. Plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) is GRANTED; 14 2. Plaintiffs Complaint (ECF No. 1) is DISMISSED without prejudice with 15 leave to amend; and 16 3. Plaintiff shall have 30 days from the date of this order to file an amended 17 complaint that complies with the instructions provided above. If Plaintiff 18 fails to timely comply with this order, the undersigned may recommend that 19 this action be dismissed. 20 21 | Dated: August 28, 2025 Cc (i s □□ 22 CHI SOO KIM 93 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 24 || csk/butl.1339.25 ifp 25 26 27 28 12