(PS) Bonds v. Diana

District Court, E.D. California·Decided July 2, 2025·No. 2:25-cv-01635·Unknown

Opinion

ALBERT BONDS, Jr., No. 2:25-cv-01635-DAD-SCR Plaintiff, v. ORDER JOHN V. DIANA, et al., Defendants. Plaintiff is proceeding pro se in this matter, which is referred to the undersigned pursuant to Local Rule 302(c)(21) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Plaintiff has filed a request for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) and has submitted a declaration including a statement of income and assets and averring he is unable to pay the costs of this proceeding. The motion to proceed IFP will therefore be granted. However, for the reasons provided below, the Court finds Plaintiff’s complaint is legally deficient and will grant Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint. A. Legal Standard The federal IFP statute requires federal courts to dismiss a case if the action is legally “frivolous or malicious,” fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). In reviewing the complaint, the Court is guided by the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are available online at www.uscourts.gov/rules- policies/current-rules-practice-procedure/federal-rules-civil-procedure. Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the complaint must contain (1) a “short and plain statement” of the basis for federal jurisdiction (that is, the reason the case is filed in this court, rather than in a state court), (2) a short and plain statement showing that plaintiff is entitled to relief (that is, who harmed the plaintiff, and in what way), and (3) a demand for the relief sought. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Plaintiff’s claims must be set forth simply, concisely and directly. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1). Forms are available to help pro se plaintiffs organize their complaint in the proper way. They are available at the Clerk’s Office, 501 I Street, 4th Floor (Rm. 4-200), Sacramento, CA 95814, or online at www.uscourts.gov/forms/pro-se-forms. A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court will (1) accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint, unless they are clearly baseless or fanciful, (2) construe those allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and (3) resolve all doubts in the plaintiff’s favor. See Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327; Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954, 960 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 564 U.S. 1037 (2011). The court applies the same rules of construction in determining whether the complaint states a claim on which relief can be granted. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (court must accept the allegations as true); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974) (court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff). Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by lawyers. Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94. However, the court need not accept as true legal conclusions, even if cast as factual allegations. See Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). A formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action does not suffice to state a claim. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). To state a claim on which relief may be granted, the plaintiff must allege enough facts “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the deficiencies in the complaint and an opportunity to amend, unless the complaint’s deficiencies could not be cured by amendment. See Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1213 (9th Cir. 2012). B. The Complaint Plaintiff’s complaint is three-pages long and names four defendants in the caption: John Diana, Deborah Taylor, Diana Law Group, and Tim Hudson. ECF No. 1 at 1. Plaintiff does not describe the Defendants other than to say he “brings this complaint against Defendants Tim Hudson and his attorney.” Id. Plaintiff asserts two state law claims: breach of contract and “property negligence.” Id. Plaintiff’s complaint alleges there is diversity of citizenship jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, but he does not allege the citizenship of any party. Id. at 2. Plaintiff alleges the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, but then pleads more specific damages of $11,000 for “storage and negligence fees”; “4yrs $300 month”; and $20,000 for attorney fees. Id. Plaintiff also states that he “requests removal of Probate Case #PR24-00051 from the Superior Court of California, Solano County.” Id. at 2. Plaintiff seeks declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief. Id. at 3. Plaintiff alleges that he entered into a contract with all Defendants concerning an estate. The terms or requirements of the contract are not pled. ECF No. 1 at 1. Plaintiff’s negligence claim appears directed at Defendant Hudson and he allege Hudson has not maintained the property and has mold in the closet. Id. at 2. Plaintiff states the property is not for sale and he has been in possession of the home since 2021. Id. C. Analysis The complaint does not sufficiently plead a basis for federal jurisdiction. Plaintiff does not plead the citizenship of the parties. Plaintiff alleges specific damages that do not exceed $75,000. He pleads $11,000 + (48 months at $300 month, which equals $14,400) + $20,000 = $45,400. Plaintiff and all Defendants must be citizens of different states for diversity jurisdiction. See Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 68 (1996) (diversity jurisdiction requires “complete diversity of citizenship” where “the citizenship of each plaintiff is diverse from the citizenship of each defendant.”). Plaintiff also appears to be improperly attempting to remove a state probate matter to federal court. See Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 311-12 (2006) (“Thus, the probate exception reserves to state probate courts the probate or annulment of a will and the administration of a decedent’s estate; it also precludes federal courts from endeavoring to dispose o

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