1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 DONNELL BLEDSOE, No. 2:19-cv-02553-TLN-CKD PS 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER AND 14 JUDGE GUILIANI, et al., FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 15 Defendants. (ECF No. 2) 16 17 I. Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed in Forma Pauperis is Granted 18 Plaintiff is proceeding in this action pro se. Plaintiff has requested authority pursuant to 19 28 U.S.C. § 1915 to proceed in forma pauperis. This proceeding was referred to this court by 20 Local Rule 302(c)(21). 21 Plaintiff has submitted the affidavit required by § 1915(a) showing that plaintiff is unable 22 to prepay fees and costs or give security for them. Accordingly, the request to proceed in forma 23 pauperis is granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). 24 The federal in forma pauperis statute authorizes federal courts to dismiss a case if the 25 action is legally “frivolous or malicious,” fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, 26 or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. 27 § 1915(e)(2). 28 /// 1 II. Recommendation That Plaintiff’s Claims Against All Four Defendants be Dismissed Without Leave to Amend 2 3 A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 4 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227–28 (9th 5 Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an 6 indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 7 490 U.S. at 327. 8 In order to avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must contain more than 9 “naked assertions,” “labels and conclusions,” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause 10 of action.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–57 (2007). In other words, 11 “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 12 statements do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). Furthermore, a claim 13 upon which the court can grant relief has facial plausibility. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A 14 claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw 15 the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 16 at 1949. When considering whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted, 17 the court must accept the allegations as true, Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007), 18 and construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, see Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 19 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). 20 Plaintiff names four defendants in his complaint: San Joaquin County Superior Court 21 Judges Guiliani and Ronald Northup, District Attorney Stacey Derman, and San Joaquin County 22 Public Defender Christina Martinez. Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that Judge Guiliani was biased 23 against him (ECF No. 1 at 3), Judge Northup is liable as a supervisor (ECF No. 1 at 2), that 24 District Attorney Stacey Derman “bribed [plaintiff] into taking a strike in exchange for the 25 alternative work program” (ECF No. 1 at 2), and that Public Defender Christina Martinez violated 26 his constitutional rights (ECF No. 1 at 1.) Plaintiff further asserts he is entitled to diplomatic 27 immunity and that he is immune from prosecution. (ECF No 1 at 2.) Plaintiff attaches several 28 exhibits to his complaint related to grievances filed in jail. (See ECF No. 1 at 11-16.) 1 Plaintiff’s claims against all four defendants are vague and conclusory, but even viewing 2 the allegations in the light most favorable to plaintiff these four defendants are immune from suit 3 and should therefore be dismissed without leave to amend. 4 Regarding plaintiff’s allegations against Judge Guiliani and Judge Northup, “[j]udges are 5 immune from damage actions for judicial acts taken within the jurisdiction of their courts. . . . 6 Judicial immunity applies ‘however erroneous the act may have been, and however injurious in 7 its consequences it may have proved to the plaintiff.’” Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075 8 (9th Cir. 1986) (quoting Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 199–200 (1985)). A judge can lose 9 his or her immunity when acting in clear absence of jurisdiction, but one must distinguish acts 10 taken in error or acts that are performed in excess of a judge’s authority (which remain absolutely 11 immune) from those acts taken in clear absence of jurisdiction. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 12– 12 13 (1991) (“If judicial immunity means anything, it means that a judge ‘will not be deprived of 13 immunity because the action he took was in error . . . or was in excess of his authority’” (quoting 14 Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978))). Thus, for example, in a case where a judge 15 actually ordered the seizure of an individual by means of excessive force, an act clearly outside of 16 his legal authority, he remained immune because the order was given in his capacity as a judge 17 and not with the clear absence of jurisdiction. Id.; see also Ashelman, 793 F.2d at 1075 (“A judge 18 lacks immunity where he acts in the clear absence of jurisdiction . . . or performs an act that is not 19 judicial in nature.”). 20 Based on plaintiff’s complaint and the documents attached to it, it appears plaintiff seeks 21 monetary relief from both state court judges for actions taken within their jurisdiction—handling 22 a family court matter and criminal matter both involving defendant. Such actions are 23 quintessential examples of judicial acts. Therefore, the defendant judges are immune from this 24 suit, “however erroneous the act[s] may have been.” Ashelman, 793 F.2d at 1075. Plaintiff’s 25 proper course of action to redress any alleged erroneous rulings by the defendant judges was to 26 address those rulings in state court. In sum, plaintiff’s claims against Judge Guiliani and Judge 27 Northup should be dismissed without leave to amend. 28 Next, plaintiff named defendant District Attorney Stacey Derman. The United States 1 Supreme Court has held that “in initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State’s case, the 2 prosecutor is immune from a civil suit for damages under § 1983.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 3 409, 431 (1976). Such absolute immunity applies “even if it leaves ‘the genuinely wronged 4 defendant without civil redress against a prosecutor whose malicious and dishonest action 5 deprives him of liberty.’” Ashelman, 793 F.2d at 1075 (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 427). Thus, 6 Derman is immune from suit and plaintiff’s claims against her should be dismissed without leave 7 to amend. 8 Finally, regarding San Joaquin County Public Defender Christina Martinez, “[t]o state a 9 claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and 10 laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person 11 acting under color of state law.” West v.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 DONNELL BLEDSOE, No. 2:19-cv-02553-TLN-CKD PS 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER AND 14 JUDGE GUILIANI, et al., FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 15 Defendants. (ECF No. 2) 16 17 I. Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed in Forma Pauperis is Granted 18 Plaintiff is proceeding in this action pro se. Plaintiff has requested authority pursuant to 19 28 U.S.C. § 1915 to proceed in forma pauperis. This proceeding was referred to this court by 20 Local Rule 302(c)(21). 21 Plaintiff has submitted the affidavit required by § 1915(a) showing that plaintiff is unable 22 to prepay fees and costs or give security for them. Accordingly, the request to proceed in forma 23 pauperis is granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). 24 The federal in forma pauperis statute authorizes federal courts to dismiss a case if the 25 action is legally “frivolous or malicious,” fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, 26 or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. 27 § 1915(e)(2). 28 /// 1 II. Recommendation That Plaintiff’s Claims Against All Four Defendants be Dismissed Without Leave to Amend 2 3 A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 4 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227–28 (9th 5 Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an 6 indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 7 490 U.S. at 327. 8 In order to avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must contain more than 9 “naked assertions,” “labels and conclusions,” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause 10 of action.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–57 (2007). In other words, 11 “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 12 statements do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). Furthermore, a claim 13 upon which the court can grant relief has facial plausibility. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A 14 claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw 15 the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 16 at 1949. When considering whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted, 17 the court must accept the allegations as true, Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007), 18 and construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, see Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 19 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). 20 Plaintiff names four defendants in his complaint: San Joaquin County Superior Court 21 Judges Guiliani and Ronald Northup, District Attorney Stacey Derman, and San Joaquin County 22 Public Defender Christina Martinez. Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that Judge Guiliani was biased 23 against him (ECF No. 1 at 3), Judge Northup is liable as a supervisor (ECF No. 1 at 2), that 24 District Attorney Stacey Derman “bribed [plaintiff] into taking a strike in exchange for the 25 alternative work program” (ECF No. 1 at 2), and that Public Defender Christina Martinez violated 26 his constitutional rights (ECF No. 1 at 1.) Plaintiff further asserts he is entitled to diplomatic 27 immunity and that he is immune from prosecution. (ECF No 1 at 2.) Plaintiff attaches several 28 exhibits to his complaint related to grievances filed in jail. (See ECF No. 1 at 11-16.) 1 Plaintiff’s claims against all four defendants are vague and conclusory, but even viewing 2 the allegations in the light most favorable to plaintiff these four defendants are immune from suit 3 and should therefore be dismissed without leave to amend. 4 Regarding plaintiff’s allegations against Judge Guiliani and Judge Northup, “[j]udges are 5 immune from damage actions for judicial acts taken within the jurisdiction of their courts. . . . 6 Judicial immunity applies ‘however erroneous the act may have been, and however injurious in 7 its consequences it may have proved to the plaintiff.’” Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075 8 (9th Cir. 1986) (quoting Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 199–200 (1985)). A judge can lose 9 his or her immunity when acting in clear absence of jurisdiction, but one must distinguish acts 10 taken in error or acts that are performed in excess of a judge’s authority (which remain absolutely 11 immune) from those acts taken in clear absence of jurisdiction. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 12– 12 13 (1991) (“If judicial immunity means anything, it means that a judge ‘will not be deprived of 13 immunity because the action he took was in error . . . or was in excess of his authority’” (quoting 14 Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978))). Thus, for example, in a case where a judge 15 actually ordered the seizure of an individual by means of excessive force, an act clearly outside of 16 his legal authority, he remained immune because the order was given in his capacity as a judge 17 and not with the clear absence of jurisdiction. Id.; see also Ashelman, 793 F.2d at 1075 (“A judge 18 lacks immunity where he acts in the clear absence of jurisdiction . . . or performs an act that is not 19 judicial in nature.”). 20 Based on plaintiff’s complaint and the documents attached to it, it appears plaintiff seeks 21 monetary relief from both state court judges for actions taken within their jurisdiction—handling 22 a family court matter and criminal matter both involving defendant. Such actions are 23 quintessential examples of judicial acts. Therefore, the defendant judges are immune from this 24 suit, “however erroneous the act[s] may have been.” Ashelman, 793 F.2d at 1075. Plaintiff’s 25 proper course of action to redress any alleged erroneous rulings by the defendant judges was to 26 address those rulings in state court. In sum, plaintiff’s claims against Judge Guiliani and Judge 27 Northup should be dismissed without leave to amend. 28 Next, plaintiff named defendant District Attorney Stacey Derman. The United States 1 Supreme Court has held that “in initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State’s case, the 2 prosecutor is immune from a civil suit for damages under § 1983.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 3 409, 431 (1976). Such absolute immunity applies “even if it leaves ‘the genuinely wronged 4 defendant without civil redress against a prosecutor whose malicious and dishonest action 5 deprives him of liberty.’” Ashelman, 793 F.2d at 1075 (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 427). Thus, 6 Derman is immune from suit and plaintiff’s claims against her should be dismissed without leave 7 to amend. 8 Finally, regarding San Joaquin County Public Defender Christina Martinez, “[t]o state a 9 claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and 10 laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person 11 acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988) (citations omitted). “[A] 12 public defender does not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer’s traditional 13 functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.” Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 14 312, 325 (1981). Because plaintiff’s allegations appear to pertain to Christina Martinez acting in 15 her capacity as an attorney during the course of her criminal proceedings, assuming she was 16 plaintiff’s assigned public defender, she was not acting under color of state law. This means that 17 plaintiff cannot bring a claim against her under § 1983. In fact, there is no claim specifically 18 addressing Christina Martinez in plaintiff’s complaint beyond his assertion that she “violated [his] 19 constitutional rights.” (See ECF No. 1 at 1.) Furthermore, any potential claims for legal 20 malpractice do not come within the jurisdiction of the federal courts. Franklin v. Oregon, 662 21 F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir. 1981). Plaintiff therefore cannot maintain an action against Christina 22 Martinez and his claims against her should be dismissed without leave to amend. 23 III. Leave to Amend Futile 24 If the court finds that a complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim, the court 25 has discretion to dismiss with or without leave to amend. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126– 26 30 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Leave to amend should be granted if it appears possible that the 27 defects in the complaint could be corrected, especially if a plaintiff is pro se. Id. at 1130–31; see 28 also Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995) (“A pro se litigant must be given 1 | leave to amend his or her complaint, and some notice of its deficiencies, unless it is absolutely 2 | clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.” (citing Noll v. 3 | Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987))). However, if, after careful consideration, it is 4 | clear that a complaint cannot be cured by amendment, the court may dismiss without leave to 5 | amend. Cato, 70 F.3d at 1105-06 (affirming dismissal and finding the plaintiffs “theories of 6 | liability either fall outside the limited waiver of sovereign immunity by the United States, or 7 | otherwise are not within the jurisdiction of the federal courts”). 8 The undersigned finds that, as set forth above, defendants Judge Guiliani, Judge Ronald 9 | Northup, District Attorney Stacy Derman, and San Joaquin County Public Defender Christina 10 | Martinez are immune from liability and the complaint does not identify a waiver of immunity. As 11 || it appears amendment would be futile, the undersigned recommends that this action be dismissed 12 | as to these four defendants without leave to amend. 13 | IV. Conclusion 14 It is HEREBY ORDERED that: 15 1. Plaintiff's request to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) is GRANTED. 16 Additionally, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that: 17 1. Plaintiff's complaint be DISMISSED without leave to amend. 18 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 19 | assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(). Within fourteen days 20 | after being served with these findings and recommendations, the parties may file written 21 | objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 22 | “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” The parties are advised that 23 | failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District 24 | Court’s order. Martinez v. YIst, 951 F.2d 1153 (th Cir. 1991). 25 | Dated: 26 | Dated: January 23, 2020 bh rdf ht / {a— 7 CAROLYN K DELANEY 28 |) 16 bledsoe2553 ifp.nolto UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE