(PS) Ben-Oni v. Wood

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JOSIAH MALCHIEL ISRAEL BEN-ONI, No. 2:24-cv-02769-DJC-JDP 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 14 TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND JONATHAN LUKE WOOD, et. al., MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY 15 INJUNCTION Defendants. 16 17 18 Pending before the Court is a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”) 19 and a Motion for Preliminary Injunction (“PI”) filed by pro se Plaintiff Joseph Malchiel 20 Israel Ben-Oni on October 8, 2024. (TRO Mot. (ECF No. 3); PI Mot. (ECF No. 2); 21 Compl. (ECF. No. 1.)) For the reasons stated below, the Court DENIES both Motions. 22 Plaintiff seeks to prohibit Defendants, Jonathan Luke Wood, and Associated 23 Students, Incorporated (“ASI”), from imposing fee increases and proceeding with the 24 construction of an athletic stadium. (TRO Mot. at 3; PI Mot. at 5.) He also seeks to 25 enjoin Defendants from enforcing ASI Operating Rule 200.6. (TRO Mot. at 3; PI Mot. 26 at 5.) 27 //// 28 //// 1 I. Background 2 In the TRO Motion and the PI Motion, Plaintiff alleges that his First and 3 Fourteenth Amendment rights are violated by Defendants’ implementation of a $508 4 fee increase set to occur in Fall 2025 and a $96 increase that took place in Fall 2023, 5 the planned construction of new athletic stadium, and the ongoing enforcement of 6 ASI Operating Rule 200.6.1 (TRO Mot. at 5; PI Mot. at 5.) Plaintiff claims the financial 7 burden of the fees and constructing the stadium will hinder students’ access to 8 educational opportunities, compromise the quality of their academic experience and 9 suppress student engagement. (TRO Mot. at 4; PI Mot. at 4.) He also argues that ASI 10 Operating Rule 200.6 disenfranchises marginalized groups on campus by restricting 11 their ability to sign petitions based on arbitrary eligibility criteria. (TRO Mot. at 2; PI 12 Mot. at 3.) These arguments are clarified in Plaintiff’s Complaint 2, where he states that 13 he was unable to sign, or create, a petition of recall for the President and Vice 14 President of ASI. (Compl. ¶ 5.) These two individuals then participated in a 15 committee where the fee increases were approved. (Id. ¶ 9.) The Complaint also 16 alleges that the stadium, although stated to come from “dedicated funds for athletics,” 17 places a burden on students because Defendants have imposed other athletics- 18 related fees on students. (Id. ¶ 36.) 19 Plaintiff makes several claims. First, he argues that the fee increase was 20 approved through a process depriving students of their rights to democratic 21 participation in governance. (TRO Mot. at 2; PI Mot. at 3.) Specifically, he alleges that 22 ASI Operating Rule 200.6 directly chills the ability to participate in petitions, in 23 violation of the First Amendment. (TRO Mot. at 3, PI Mot. at 3.) He also alleges a 24 violation of the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause because the rule

25 1 According to Plaintiff, ASI Operating Rule 200.6 “stipulates that students must have participated in 26 prior elections to be eligible to sign future petitions.” (Compl. ¶ 6.) 27 2 Plaintiff mentions in the Complaint that there is an “Exhibit A” that includes documented communications sent to President Wood and other university officials. They do not appear to have 28 been attached. However, the documents would not have changed the Courts analysis. (Compl. ¶ 23.) 1 disproportionately impacts certain student groups (TRO Mot. at 3, PI Mot. at 3,) and a 2 violation of the Due Process Clause because the rule is ambiguous. (TRO Mot. at 3.) 3 Lastly, Plaintiff argues that Defendants demonstrated deliberate indifference to the 4 discriminatory impact of ASI Operating Rule 200.6. (PI Mot. at 3.) 5 II. Legal Standard 6 The Court will construe the Motions liberally because Plaintiff is proceeding pro 7 se. See Bernhart v. Los Angeles County, 339 F.3d 920, 925 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Courts 8 have a duty to construe pro se pleadings liberally, including pro se motions as well as 9 complaints.”). To obtain preliminary injunctive relief, Plaintiff must show (1) likelihood 10 of success on the merits; (2) likelihood of irreparable harm in the absence of 11 preliminary relief; (3) that the balance of equities tips in his favor; and (4) that an 12 injunction is in the public interest. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 13 (2008); see Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co. v. John D. Bush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th 14 Cir. 2001) (noting the standards for a PI and a TRO are “substantially identical”).3 15 III. Discussion 16 A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits 17 The first Winter factor, likelihood of success on the merits, is considered the 18 most important where a plaintiff brings a constitutional claim. Baird v. Bonta, 81 F.4th 19 1036, 1041 (9th Cir. 2023). For the reasons below, it does not appear that Plaintiff has 20 stated a viable constitutional violation. As an initial matter, the Court is not aware of, 21 nor has Plaintiff provided, any authority suggesting a constitutional right of students to 22 participate in the approval of university fees such that his claim would be successful.4 23

24 3 The Ninth’s Circuit’s “sliding scale” approach does not apply here because it does not appear that the 25 balance of hardships tip sharply in Plaintiff’s favor. See Friends of the Wild Swan v. Weber, 767 F.3d 936, 942 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 26 4 The Supreme Court has held that students may opt-out of mandatory university fees where the 27 university distributed money in a “viewpoint discriminatory” manner. See Rosenberger v. Rectors & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828 (2005). However, Plaintiff has not made those allegations 28 here. 1 Plaintiff’s argument that the fee increase is unconstitutional because of ASI Operating 2 Rule 200.6 also fails for the reasons below. 3 i. First Amendment Claim 4 Under the First Amendment, as incorporated to the states through the 5 Fourteenth Amendment, “Congress shall make no law… abridging the freedom of 6 speech… or the right of people to peacefully assemble.” U.S. CONST. Amend. I. The 7 Supreme Court has long held that the First Amendment applies to state colleges and 8 universities. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972). Plaintiff argues he is likely to 9 succeed because ASI Operating Rule 200.6 chills his speech by infringing on his 10 ability to participate in petitions, which is a fundamental aspect of democratic 11 governance within the state university. (See PI Mot. at 1.) 12 Although the issue of signing a petition involves expressive conduct, the First 13 Amendment allows for the implementation of reasonable time, place, and manner 14 restrictions on speech in a public forum. See Flores v. Bennett, 635 F. Supp. 3d 1020, 15 1031 (E.D. Cal. 2022). Assuming, without determining, that a public forum is involved, 16 it is unclear from the record whether the rule is improper.5 From the summary of ASI 17 Operating Rule 200.6 provided to the Court, it does not appear that the rule is 18 viewpoint-discriminatory or content-based such that it would be an improper 19 restriction. Additionally, there is not enough information on the record to determine 20 whether the eligibility criteria are in fact “arbitrary” or if there is a government interest 21 being furthered. See NRA v. City of Los Angeles, 441 F. Supp. 3d 915, 931 (C.D. Cal. 22 2019) (using the text of the challenged ordinance to determine whether a First 23 Amendment claim was likely to succeed on the merits). It also has not been shown 24 that student voices are in fact silenced by the Rule itself. Therefore, Plaintiff has not 25 26

27 5 In both traditional and designated public fora, “the government may impose reasonable, time, place and manner restriction on speech, but content-based restrictions must be viewpoint neutral and satisfy 28 strict scrutiny review.” Koala v. Kholsa, F.3d 887, 900 (9th Cir. 2019). 1 established a colorable First Amendment claim, let alone shown a likelihood of 2 success on the merits. 3 ii. Equal Protection Claim 4 Under the Equal Protection Clause, the state may not discriminate against 5 classes of people in an “arbitrary or irrational” way or with the “bare . . . desire to harm 6 a politically unpopular group.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 7 439 (1985). Plaintiff argues his claim is likely to succeed because ASI Operating Rule 8 200.6 disproportionately affects transfer, international and undocumented students 9 leading to unequal treatment in accessing university processes. (TRO Mot. at 3; PI 10 Mot. at 3.) First, transfer students are not a protected class that would receive 11 heightened scrutiny. Even for allegations made about alienage, Plaintiff has not 12 shown a discriminatory intent behind establishing ASI Operating Rule 200.6 such that 13 a viable Equal Protection Claim could be successful, even under strict scrutiny. See 14 Hernandez v. N.Y., 500 U.S. 352, 372–373 (1991). 15 iii. Due Process Claim 16 In the TRO Motion, Plaintiff alleges that ASI Operating Rule 200.6 is ambiguous, 17 thereby providing inadequate notice to students about their eligibility to engage in 18 university governance. (TRO Mot. at 3.) However, without the text of the rule, the 19 Court cannot determine whether there are issues of vagueness. Therefore, this claim 20 is not likely to succeed on the merits. 21 iv. Deliberate Indifference to Constitutional Violations 22 In the PI Motion, Plaintiff argues that Defendants displayed deliberate 23 indifference to the discriminatory impact of ASI Operating Rule 200.6 thereby 24 perpetuating the harm. (PI Mot. at 3.) Typically, the claim of deliberate indifference 25 arises in the Eight Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment context involving the 26 relationship between prison guards and prisoners. Here, Plaintiff has not shown, 27 through facts or case law, how his claim is like recognized instances of deliberate 28 indifference. Furthermore, Plaintiff has not stated any sort of harm, as the 1 discriminatory impact of a rule alone is typically not enough to be a constitutional 2 violation. See Vill. of Arlington Height v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 3 (1977). Therefore, Plaintiff’s claim is not likely to succeed. 4 B. Likelihood of Irreparable Harm 5 Plaintiff has also not established a likelihood of irreparable harm in the absence 6 of preliminary relief.6 While Plaintiff seeks to enjoin enforcement of ASI Operating 7 Rule 200.6, the fee increase, and the construction of the stadium (see TRO Mot. at 3; PI 8 Mot at 5,) he has not shown that any of these harms are imminent. See Friends of the 9 Wild Swan, 767 F.3d at 946. Specifically, Plaintiff has not demonstrated how the Fall 10 2025 fee increase or the construction of the stadium immediately impacts students’ 11 access to education beyond a potential future economic harm. Nor has he shown that 12 ASI Operating Rule 200.6 creates an imminent harm. His allegations solely concern 13 past harm and hypothetical, future injuries that do not suffice. See Hollywood v. Pub. 14 Storage Inc., No. 18-cv-01822-JGB-GJS, 2018 WL 6003557, at * 2 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 4, 15 2018) (denying motion for ex parte temporary restraining order due to lack of 16 evidence showing “temporal urgency such that immediate and irreparable harm will 17 occur if there is any delay in obtaining relief.” (citation omitted)). 18 C. Balance of Hardships and Public Interest 19 Even if Plaintiff had raised a “serious legal question” such that the Ninth Circuit’s 20 sliding scale approach would be appropriate, the balance of hardships does not “tip 21 sharply” in Plaintiff’s favor. See Cottrell, 632 F.3d at 1131. In the absence of this 22 preliminary relief, it does not appear that the harm to Plaintiff, who has not stated a 23 claim likely to succeed, would outweigh the hardship to Defendants, who would have 24 to cease construction plans, potentially change programming as the result of a loss of 25 26

27 6 Plaintiff’s TRO Motion cites the standard as a “possibility of irreparable harm.” (TRO Mot. at 2.) This is not the correct standard but even under that analysis, Plaintiff’s motion still fails. See Winter, 555 U.S. at 28 20. 1 | fees, and alter a university rule. For similar reasons, it does not appear that the public 2 | interest is served by an injunction in this instance. 3 None of this is to say that Plaintiff will be unable to state a cause of action. The 4 | Court only finds that at this early stage Plaintiff has not shown a need for preliminary 5 | relief. Thus, Plaintiff's Motions must be denied as he failed to meet at least one of the 6 | four Winter factors. See Dish Network Corp., v. F.C.C., 653 F.3d 771, 776 (9th Cir. 7 | 2011) (“To warrant a preliminary injunction [the movant] must demonstrate that it 8 | meets al! four of the elements of the preliminary injunction test established in Winter . . 9 | .” (emphasis added)). 10 D. Conclusion 11 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for Temporary 12 | Restraining Order (ECF No. 3) and Motion for Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 2) are 13 | DENIED. This matter is referred to the assigned Magistrate Judge for all further 14 | pretrial proceedings. 15 16 17 IT 1S SO ORDERED. 18 | Dated: _October 11, 2024 “Darel A CDbnetto Hon. Daniel alabretta 9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28