(PS) Bell v. Sacramento Housing and Redevelopment Agency

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: February 25, 2022
• Docket: 2:20-cv-02539
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 DELTHENIA BELL, et al., Case No. 2:20-cv-02539-TLN-JDP (PS) 12 Plaintiffs, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS THAT DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO 13 v. DISMISS BE GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART 14 HOUSING AUTHORITY OF SACRAMENTO, et al., ECF No. 24 15 Defendants. OBJECTIONS DUE WITHIN 14 DAYS 16

17 18 Plaintiffs seek to bring suit for denial of down payment assistance, their landlord’s failure 19 to repair air conditioning, and denial of due process while seeking to extend a Family Self- 20 Sufficiency (“FSS”) contract. ECF No. 16. Defendants move to dismiss for failure to state a 21 claim. ECF No. 24. I recommend that defendants’ motion be granted in part and denied in part. 22 I first address certain preliminary matters. Defendants ask the court to take judicial notice 23 of the Homebuyer Program information on the Sacramento Housing and Redevelopment Agency 24 website. Plaintiffs’ complaint both discusses the information provided on that website and 25 attaches some materials from it. On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a court “may 26 take into account documents whose contents are alleged in a complaint and whose authenticity no 27 party questions, but which are not physically attached to the [plaintiffs’] pleading” and may “treat 28 such a document as part of the complaint, and . . . assume that its contents are true for purposes of 1 a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).” Davis v. HSBC Bank Nevada, NA., 691 F.3d 1152, 2 1160 (9th Cir. 2012). In deciding this motion to dismiss, I will consider as part of the complaint 3 the website material attached to defendants’ first request for judicial notice. ECF No. 24-1. 4 Defendants also request judicial notice of HUD’s implementation guidance on housing 5 quality standards. ECF No. 35. Judicial notice can be taken of facts that are “generally known” 6 and “can be accurately and readily determined.” Fed. R. Evid. 201. Agency regulations or 7 interpretations are sometimes subject to judicial notice of the facts therein as a matter of public 8 record. See, e.g., Citizens for a Better Env’t-Cal. v. Union Oil Co., 861 F. Supp. 889, 897 (N.D. 9 Cal. 1994); but see Ries v. Arizona Beverages USA LLC, 287 F.R.D. 523, 542 (N.D. Cal. 2012) 10 (refusing to take judicial notice of correspondences from the FDA regarding the fact of whether 11 certain ingredients are natural because it is “central to the reasonable dispute between the 12 parties”). Here, the implementation guidance lists the types of conditions that are considered life- 13 threatening (“LT”), meaning that the units cannot be rented as part of the low-income housing 14 program if those conditions are present. If those LT conditions are not present, then the unit may 15 still be rented under the program with a provision that non-LT conditions of disrepair must still be 16 fixed within 30 days. Plaintiffs do not object to judicial notice of this document, although they 17 dispute defendants’ assertion that their specific broken air conditioner was not an LT condition— 18 a topic beyond the scope of the guidance. Since the facts in the implementation guidance are not 19 disputed, I will take judicial notice of this document. 20 Finally, after the parties fully briefed this motion, plaintiffs filed an unauthorized sur- 21 reply. ECF No. 40. Given the liberal standards afforded to pro se litigants and the new material 22 in the reply, including the implementation guidance discussed above, I will consider plaintiffs’ 23 filing on this motion to dismiss. 24 Statement of Alleged Facts 25 Plaintiff Delthenia Bell has lived with and cared for her developmentally disabled adult 26 son, plaintiff Maurice Massey, since at least 2008. See ECF No. 16 at 4. Plaintiffs have resided 27 together in rental housing with financial assistance through the HCV program, also known as 28 section 8. See id. at 2, 31, 35. For part of that time, Bell’s daughter also resided with them. Id. at 1 61. Between 2016 and 2019, there were periods during the summers when plaintiffs’ air 2 conditioner did not work. Id. at 26-27, 31-37. Plaintiffs’ landlord, Bettye Greer, paid for some 3 air conditioning repairs but refused others and tried to get plaintiffs to take responsibility for 4 maintaining the system. See id. at 31-37. Plaintiff Bell reported her landlord to defendant SHRA, 5 but it refused to intervene, suggesting that Bell should either move or direct her grievances to her 6 landlord. Id. at 28, 40, 45. The broken air conditioner caused Massey to be hospitalized and to 7 arrange for alternative accommodations when the residence got too hot. Id. at 5. 8 Plaintiffs’ air conditioner stopped working again on May 18, 2019, and Greer refused to 9 repair it. On June 18, 2019, Bell provided SHRA with Massey’s doctor’s opinion that living 10 there without a working air conditioner was “an unhealthy condition.” Id. at 47. Bell demanded 11 an inspection. Id. SHRA inspected the air conditioner on June 24, 2019. Id. at 52. SHRA gave 12 Greer 30 days to repair it, despite Bell’s protest that plaintiffs would suffer further injury with 13 such a long delay. Id. at 53. Bell notified defendants of plaintiffs’ claims against them for the 14 delay and of defendants’ refusal to enforce housing quality standards; SHRA rejected the claim as 15 a matter between plaintiffs and their landlord. Id. at 20-29. 16 Bell was a participant in the Family Self-Sufficiency Program (“FSS”) established to 17 coordinate assistance for families under section 8 and to “enable eligible families to achieve 18 economic independence and self-sufficiency.” 42 U.S.C. § 1437u(a). Bell’s five-year FSS 19 contract expired on February 28, 2020. ECF No. 16 at 86. She sought an extension because she 20 could not “function properly” during the summers when the air conditioner was broken, suffering 21 problems with sleep, work, and homework. Id. at 87. Bell’s daughter also moved out of the 22 residence because of the conditions, causing Bell’s income qualifications to change. Id. On July 23 15, 2020, SHRA denied Bell’s extension request because all FSS goals had been met and Bell 24 was eligible to graduate. Id. at 88. Bell was neither given a hearing form with her denial letter 25 nor allowed a hearing regarding her FSS contract extension denial. Id. at 4, 9. 26 Bell also sought down payment assistance in 2020 through the Cal Home First-Time 27 Homebuyer Mortgage Assistance program so that she could purchase a home instead of 28 continuing to rent from Greer, id. at 60-67, but she was told that she did not meet the program’s 1 income requirements, see id. at 75. She notified defendants of her claims regarding denial, but 2 defendants informed her that they did not make any determinations regarding down payment 3 assistance and suggested that Bell might follow up directly where she applied. Id. at 68. 4 Although defendants do not administer the program, they do provide contact information for the 5 approved lenders who administer it. ECF No. 24-1 at 7-10. 6 Legal Standard 7 “Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is proper when the complaint either (1) lacks a cognizable 8 legal theory or (2) fails to allege sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory.” Somers v. 9 Apple, Inc., 729 F.3d 953, 959 (9th Cir. 2013). Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 10 requires a complaint to contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader 11 is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must 12 contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 13 face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 14 544, 570 (2007)). A claim has facial plausibility when a plaintiff “pleads factual content that 15 allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 16 alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 17 In assessing the sufficiency of the pleadings, “courts must consider the complaint in its 18 entirety, as well as other sources courts ordinarily examine when ruling on Rule 12(b)(6) motions 19 to dismiss, in particular, documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of 20 which a court may take judicial notice.” Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 21 308, 322 (2007). The court is to “accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and 22 construe the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Outdoor Media 23 Group, Inc. v. City of Beaumont, 506 F.3d 895, 899-900 (9th Cir. 2007). However, “the tenet that 24 a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal 25 conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 26 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “While legal conclusions can 27 provide the complaint's framework, they must be supported by factual allegations.” Id. at 679. 28 Those facts must be sufficient to push the claims “across the line from conceivable to plausible.” 1 Id. at 683. Ultimately, the allegations must “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim 2 is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal quotation marks and 3 citation omitted). 4 Where a plaintiff appears without counsel in a civil rights case, the court must construe 5 the pleadings liberally and afford the plaintiff any benefit of the doubt. Karim-Panahi v. Los 6 Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). The rule of liberal construction is 7 “particularly important in civil rights cases.” Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 8 1992). In giving liberal interpretation to a pro se civil rights complaint, courts may not “supply 9 essential elements of claims that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of 10 Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). 11 Discussion 12 Plaintiffs’ claims revolve around three distinct factual issues: the broken air conditioner; 13 the refusal of down payment assistance because of income; and the refusal of an extension on 14 Bell’s FSS contract. Plaintiffs bring claims through section 1983 for violation of federal law as 15 well as under supplemental jurisdiction for violations of state tort law related to their lack of air 16 conditioning. Section 1983 allows a private citizen to sue for the deprivation of a right secured 17 by federal law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Manuel v. City of Joliet, Ill., 137 S. Ct. 911, 916 (2017). 18 To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that a defendant acting under color of state 19 law caused an alleged deprivation of a right secured by federal law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Soo 20 Park v. Thompson, 851 F.3d 910, 921 (9th Cir. 2017). 21 To bring state tort claims against public entity defendants under the California Tort 22 Claims Act, Cal. Gov’t Code § 810, et seq., plaintiffs must present those claims to the public 23 entities before commencing suit. See Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 945.4, 950.2; Portnoy v. Cty. of Yolo, 24 613 F. App’x 586, 587 (9th Cir. 2015) (affirming the dismissal of state law claims for failure to 25 comply with the California Tort Claims Act). Claims “relating to a cause of action for death or 26 injury to person or to personal property” must be presented within six months of claim accrual. 27 Cal. Gov’t Code § 911.2(a). “California law holds that the limitations period begins once the 28 plaintiff has notice or information of circumstances to put a reasonable person on inquiry.” 1 Harlow v. Cty. of Riverside, 295 F. App’x 252, 254 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal citations, quotation 2 marks, and emphasis omitted). 3 Air Conditioning 4 HUD prescribes certain housing quality standards (“HQS”) for all section 8 housing. 42 5 U.S.C. § 1437f(o)(8); 24 C.F.R. § 982.401. As to temperature, housing “must have and be 6 capable of maintaining a thermal environment healthy for the human body.” 24 C.F.R. 7 § 982.401(e)(1). There must be a safe system for heating and cooling, where applicable, that 8 assures “a healthy living environment appropriate to the climate.” § 982.401(e)(2). If the owner 9 of section 8 housing fails to maintain the unit in compliance with HQS, the local public housing 10 agency (“PHA”) is obligated to “take prompt and vigorous action to enforce the owner 11 obligations.” 24 C.F.R. § 982.404(a)(2). 12 Plaintiffs assert that SHRA did not provide prompt and vigorous action to enforce owner 13 obligations, injuring their health and costing them time and money to make repairs, find other 14 accommodations, and seek medical treatment. SHRA argues that the air conditioning problem 15 was not life threatening and that, in any case, when the agency acted in 2019 to have the air 16 conditioner repaired, that action constituted prompt and vigorous enforcement. Plaintiffs claim 17 that the temperature in the rental property was so hazardous that they had to seek medical 18 treatment. Plaintiffs allege that they were forced to make repairs, to deduct the costs from their 19 rent, and even to vacate the property when the air conditioner stopped working for prolonged 20 periods. They allege that this happened every summer until SHRA finally intervened. Given the 21 liberal pleading standard afforded pro se litigants and the burden on defendants at this stage, I 22 find that plaintiffs’ federal claims regarding noncompliance with HQS thermal conditions at their 23 residence should not be dismissed. 24 Plaintiffs also seek to bring state tort claims related to defendants’ failure to ensure a 25 working air conditioner at their residence. Defendants argue that plaintiffs failed to provide a 26 timely notice of claims under the California Tort Claims Act. Plaintiffs provided notice of their 27 state claims more than six months after accrual, see ECF No. 16 at 20, 24, which is outside the 28 1 statutory deadline, Cal. Gov’t Code § 911.2. However, plaintiffs’ notices were filed within one 2 year of accrual and included requests to permit late notice. ECF No. 16 at 20, 24. 3 Under state law, a governmental entity can allow a late claim if the request for 4 consideration is within one year and the proposed claim is attached to the request. Cal. Gov’t 5 Code § 911.4. If the entity does not want to consider the late claim, it must reject that claim as 6 untimely and not consider the merits. § 911.3; Rason v. Santa Barbara City Hous. Auth., 201 7 Cal. App. 3d 817, 830 (1988) (“The purpose of the section 911.3 notice is to assure that the 8 claimant distinguishes between a claim rejected on its merits and one returned as untimely.”). 9 Here, from the records attached to the complaint, it appears that, citing the Covid-19 pandemic, 10 plaintiffs sought permission to file untimely claims after six months had passed. See ECF No. 16 11 at 20, 24. SHRA then processed their claims and decided them on the merits. ECF No. 16 at 28. 12 The record contains no notice under section 911.3 that the claims would not be considered 13 because they were untimely, and defendants do not argue that SHRA issued such notice. See 14 Jones v. Kern High Sch. Dist., No. CV-F-07-1628 OWW/TAG, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74040, at 15 *28-30 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2008) (finding that the defendant waived any defense as to the time 16 limit for presenting a claim by failing to serve notice as to untimeliness and deciding the claim on 17 the merits instead of returning it as untimely). Thus, at this stage, construing all inferences in 18 favor of the nonmoving party, it is not appropriate to dismiss plaintiffs’ state law claims as 19 untimely. 20 Down Payment Assistance 21 According to the website referenced in the complaint and the complaint itself, defendants 22 were not responsible for deciding whether Bell would qualify for down payment assistance. 23 Further, Bell alleges that she did not meet the income criteria, which is a valid reason to deny 24 program assistance. See Curry v. Vancouver Hous. Auth., 753 F. App’x 499, 499 (9th Cir. 2019). 25 Plaintiffs fail to state any claim against defendants regarding the denial of down payment 26 assistance, and such claims should be dismissed without leave to amend.1 27 1 See Gardner v. Martino, 563 F.3d 981, 990, 992 (9th Cir. 2009) (no abuse of discretion 28 in denying leave to amend where the amendment would be futile). 1 FSS Contract 2 Plaintiffs assert due process violations related to SHRA’s denial of Bell’s request for an 3 extension of her FSS Contract. “It is well settled that a person can have a property interest in 4 continuing to receive government benefits.” K.W. v. Armstrong, 789 F.3d 962, 972 (9th Cir. 5 2015). This property interest is “grounded in the statute defining eligibility” for the beneficiaries. 6 Ching v. Mayorkas, 725 F.3d 1149, 1156 (9th Cir. 2013) (internal citation and quotation marks 7 omitted). Before beneficiaries can be deprived of their rights, “due process requires an adequate 8 hearing.” Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261 (1970). “The hearing must be at a meaningful 9 time and in a meaningful manner. In the present context these principles require that a recipient 10 have timely and adequate notice detailing the reasons for a proposed termination [of benefits.]” 11 Id. at 267-68 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 12 Defendants provide scant support for their request that the court dismiss plaintiffs’ due 13 process claims. They assert that plaintiffs do not allege that Bell satisfied the FSS contract—and 14 in fact that plaintiffs concede that Bell did not complete the contract’s requirements, ECF No. 24 15 at 11—but this is not what plaintiffs allege. A careful reading of the operative complaint shows 16 that Bell requested an extension in March 2020 and that the extension request was both processed 17 and denied by SHRA. ECF No. 16 at 86-89. The reason SHRA denied Bell’s extension was that 18 she completed the requirements of the FSS contract and was eligible to graduate. Id. at 88. 19 Defendants’ argument to the contrary is unbelievable because it contradicts both the complaint 20 and SHRA’s own documented decision on the matter. Defendants also fail to address the 21 elements of due process claims. Without any other asserted basis for dismissal of plaintiffs’ due 22 process claims related to the termination of Bells’ FSS contract, I will recommend that 23 defendants’ motion to dismiss be denied as to these claims. 24 Conclusion 25 I hereby recommend that defendants’ motion to dismiss, ECF No. 24, be granted in part, 26 as to plaintiffs’ down payment assistance-related claims, and denied in part, as to all other claims. 27 I submit these findings and recommendations to the district judge under 28 U.S.C. 28 § 636(b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, 1 | Eastern District of California. Within 14 days of the service of the findings and 2 || recommendations, any party may file written objections to the findings and recommendations 3 | with the court and serve a copy on all parties. That document should be captioned “Objections to 4 | Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” The district judge will review the findings 5 || and recommendations under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). 6 7 IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: _ February 25, 2022 Q_—_—. 9 JEREMY D. PETERSON 10 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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