1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 NOMAN AHMAD, Case No. 2:23-cv-1378-DAD-JDP (PS) 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 14 EL CONCILIO, LLC, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 18 Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, brings this case against defendants El Concilio; Lacie, Kelly, 19 and Steven Stonehouse; and Jose Raul Rodriguez.1 ECF No. 45 at 1. There are two pending 20 motions to dismiss, one filed by the Stonehouse defendants, ECF No. 46, and another filed by El 21 Concilio and Rodriguez, ECF No. 47. Plaintiff has filed oppositions to each, ECF Nos. 50 & 51, 22 and defendants have filed their replies, ECF Nos. 52 & 53. For the reasons stated below, I find 23 that the motions to dismiss should be granted and all claims dismissed without leave to amend. 24 I. Legal Standards 25 A complaint may be dismissed under that rule for “failure to state a claim upon which 26 relief may be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to 27 1 The complaint also references an uncertain number of “Doe” defendants who have not 28 been identified or served. ECF No. 45 at 3. 1 state a claim, a plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 2 face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim has “facial plausibility 3 when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference 4 that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 5 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability 6 requirement,” but it requires more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. 7 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 8 For purposes of dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), the court generally considers only 9 allegations contained in the pleadings, exhibits attached to the complaint, and matters properly 10 subject to judicial notice, and construes all well-pleaded material factual allegations in the light 11 most favorable to the nonmoving party. Chubb Custom Ins. Co. v. Space Sys./Loral, Inc., 710 12 F.3d 946, 956 (9th Cir. 2013); Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012). 13 Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) may be based on either: (1) lack of a cognizable legal 14 theory, or (2) insufficient facts under a cognizable legal theory. Chubb Custom Ins. Co., 710 F.3d 15 at 956. Dismissal also is appropriate if the complaint alleges a fact that necessarily defeats the 16 claim. Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1228-29 (9th Cir. 1984). 17 II. Background 18 This action proceeds on the second amended complaint. ECF No. 45. Therein, plaintiff 19 brings five causes of action. He asserts four § 1983 claims, three for violations of his Fourteenth 20 Amendment due process rights and one for violation of his First Amendment right to free speech. 21 Id. at 1. He also brings a § 1985 claim alleging that defendants conspired to interfere with his 22 civil rights. Id. Plaintiff’s allegations center on various state court proceedings that he describes 23 as erroneous or corrupt. He claims that, in 2008, all named defendants fabricated criminal 24 allegations against him, causing him to be arrested. Id. at 7-8. Then, in 2009, plaintiff litigated a 25 child custody action against defendants Kelly and Steven Stonehouse and lost. Id. at 9. He 26 alleges that this loss is attributable to a conspiracy between the Stonehouse defendants, El 27 Concilio, LLC, and the state courts in San Joaquin County, where plaintiff alleges “an 28 underground justice system” is maintained. Id. at 14. 1 III. Analysis 2 Plaintiff’s claims fail at a basic level because, as defendants point out, no defendant is a 3 state actor.2 Under § 1983, a claimant must allege that the defendant acted under color of state 4 law. Belgau v. Inslee, 975 F.3d 940, 946 (9th Cir. 2020). Here, none of the defendants is a state 5 official or state entity. The Stonehouse defendants are private citizens, Rodriguez is a private 6 attorney, and El Concilio, LLC is a non-profit organization. ECF No. 45 at 2-3. Plaintiff 7 attempts to remedy the situation by appending “while acting under color of state law” to his 8 allegations. For instance, he alleges that defendants submitted perjured declarations and false 9 statements concerning plaintiff’s relationship with his child and contends that they did so “while 10 acting under color of law and while engaging with state court officials.” Id. at 13. Unfortunately 11 for plaintiff, offering false testimony in a court case, however wrong such conduct might be, does 12 not transform the witness into a state actor. See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1002 (1982) 13 (holding that “merely private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful,” does not violate the 14 Fourteenth Amendment). And alleging engagement with state officials, without describing a 15 plausible theory of that engagement, is insufficient. See Simmons v. Sacramento County Superior 16 Court, 318 F.3d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations that the lawyer 17 was conspiring with state officers to deprive him of due process are insufficient.”); see also Price 18 v. State of Hawaii, 939 F.2d 702, 708 (9th Cir. 1991) (same).3 I recognize that plaintiff has 19 alleged the existence of a “underground justice system” wherein all the defendants and the state 20 courts have conspired against him, but such allegations, which appear somewhat untethered to 21 reality, are insufficient as well. 22
23 2 Absent a viable section 1983 claim, plaintiff’s section 1985 claim also fails. See Marcus v. CDC & Prevention, No. 2:22-cv-02383-SSS-ASx, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105515, *9 (C.D. 24 Cal. Jun. 12, 2024) (“However, Section 1985(3) does not create its own independent cause of action. . . . Rather, to plead a Section 1985(3) claim, a plaintiff must first successfully plead a 25 violation of a substantive civil rights statute.”) (internal citations omitted). And plaintiff’s claims for injunctive and declaratory relief are not separate claims or theories, but merely alternative 26 forms of relief. 27 3 I have reviewed plaintiff’s opposition, and, while he cites a great deal of case law pertaining to state actors, his allegations remain as conclusory and fanciful as in the operative 28 complaint. 1 Even if plaintiff could establish that a defendant is a state actor, his claims also appear 2 time-barred. His claims are subject to a two-year statute of limitations. See Jones v. Blanas, 393 3 F.3d 918, 927 (9th Cir. 2004) (actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, courts apply the forum state’s 4 statute of limitations for personal injury actions, and in California this is two years).
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 NOMAN AHMAD, Case No. 2:23-cv-1378-DAD-JDP (PS) 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 14 EL CONCILIO, LLC, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 18 Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, brings this case against defendants El Concilio; Lacie, Kelly, 19 and Steven Stonehouse; and Jose Raul Rodriguez.1 ECF No. 45 at 1. There are two pending 20 motions to dismiss, one filed by the Stonehouse defendants, ECF No. 46, and another filed by El 21 Concilio and Rodriguez, ECF No. 47. Plaintiff has filed oppositions to each, ECF Nos. 50 & 51, 22 and defendants have filed their replies, ECF Nos. 52 & 53. For the reasons stated below, I find 23 that the motions to dismiss should be granted and all claims dismissed without leave to amend. 24 I. Legal Standards 25 A complaint may be dismissed under that rule for “failure to state a claim upon which 26 relief may be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to 27 1 The complaint also references an uncertain number of “Doe” defendants who have not 28 been identified or served. ECF No. 45 at 3. 1 state a claim, a plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 2 face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim has “facial plausibility 3 when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference 4 that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 5 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability 6 requirement,” but it requires more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. 7 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 8 For purposes of dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), the court generally considers only 9 allegations contained in the pleadings, exhibits attached to the complaint, and matters properly 10 subject to judicial notice, and construes all well-pleaded material factual allegations in the light 11 most favorable to the nonmoving party. Chubb Custom Ins. Co. v. Space Sys./Loral, Inc., 710 12 F.3d 946, 956 (9th Cir. 2013); Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012). 13 Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) may be based on either: (1) lack of a cognizable legal 14 theory, or (2) insufficient facts under a cognizable legal theory. Chubb Custom Ins. Co., 710 F.3d 15 at 956. Dismissal also is appropriate if the complaint alleges a fact that necessarily defeats the 16 claim. Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1228-29 (9th Cir. 1984). 17 II. Background 18 This action proceeds on the second amended complaint. ECF No. 45. Therein, plaintiff 19 brings five causes of action. He asserts four § 1983 claims, three for violations of his Fourteenth 20 Amendment due process rights and one for violation of his First Amendment right to free speech. 21 Id. at 1. He also brings a § 1985 claim alleging that defendants conspired to interfere with his 22 civil rights. Id. Plaintiff’s allegations center on various state court proceedings that he describes 23 as erroneous or corrupt. He claims that, in 2008, all named defendants fabricated criminal 24 allegations against him, causing him to be arrested. Id. at 7-8. Then, in 2009, plaintiff litigated a 25 child custody action against defendants Kelly and Steven Stonehouse and lost. Id. at 9. He 26 alleges that this loss is attributable to a conspiracy between the Stonehouse defendants, El 27 Concilio, LLC, and the state courts in San Joaquin County, where plaintiff alleges “an 28 underground justice system” is maintained. Id. at 14. 1 III. Analysis 2 Plaintiff’s claims fail at a basic level because, as defendants point out, no defendant is a 3 state actor.2 Under § 1983, a claimant must allege that the defendant acted under color of state 4 law. Belgau v. Inslee, 975 F.3d 940, 946 (9th Cir. 2020). Here, none of the defendants is a state 5 official or state entity. The Stonehouse defendants are private citizens, Rodriguez is a private 6 attorney, and El Concilio, LLC is a non-profit organization. ECF No. 45 at 2-3. Plaintiff 7 attempts to remedy the situation by appending “while acting under color of state law” to his 8 allegations. For instance, he alleges that defendants submitted perjured declarations and false 9 statements concerning plaintiff’s relationship with his child and contends that they did so “while 10 acting under color of law and while engaging with state court officials.” Id. at 13. Unfortunately 11 for plaintiff, offering false testimony in a court case, however wrong such conduct might be, does 12 not transform the witness into a state actor. See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1002 (1982) 13 (holding that “merely private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful,” does not violate the 14 Fourteenth Amendment). And alleging engagement with state officials, without describing a 15 plausible theory of that engagement, is insufficient. See Simmons v. Sacramento County Superior 16 Court, 318 F.3d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations that the lawyer 17 was conspiring with state officers to deprive him of due process are insufficient.”); see also Price 18 v. State of Hawaii, 939 F.2d 702, 708 (9th Cir. 1991) (same).3 I recognize that plaintiff has 19 alleged the existence of a “underground justice system” wherein all the defendants and the state 20 courts have conspired against him, but such allegations, which appear somewhat untethered to 21 reality, are insufficient as well. 22
23 2 Absent a viable section 1983 claim, plaintiff’s section 1985 claim also fails. See Marcus v. CDC & Prevention, No. 2:22-cv-02383-SSS-ASx, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105515, *9 (C.D. 24 Cal. Jun. 12, 2024) (“However, Section 1985(3) does not create its own independent cause of action. . . . Rather, to plead a Section 1985(3) claim, a plaintiff must first successfully plead a 25 violation of a substantive civil rights statute.”) (internal citations omitted). And plaintiff’s claims for injunctive and declaratory relief are not separate claims or theories, but merely alternative 26 forms of relief. 27 3 I have reviewed plaintiff’s opposition, and, while he cites a great deal of case law pertaining to state actors, his allegations remain as conclusory and fanciful as in the operative 28 complaint. 1 Even if plaintiff could establish that a defendant is a state actor, his claims also appear 2 time-barred. His claims are subject to a two-year statute of limitations. See Jones v. Blanas, 393 3 F.3d 918, 927 (9th Cir. 2004) (actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, courts apply the forum state’s 4 statute of limitations for personal injury actions, and in California this is two years). As 5 defendants argue, plaintiff’s claims against them stem from events in 2008 (his arrest) and 2009 6 (the parentage litigation), and, while litigation in persisted through 2023, there is specific no 7 allegation that defendants violated his rights after July 12, 2021 (two years before this litigation 8 was initiated). On the contrary, all of plaintiff’s allegations appear to pertain to the earlier stages 9 of that litigation. 10 Accordingly, I find that defendants’ motions to dismiss should be granted and the 11 operative complaint be dismissed without leave to amend. Plaintiff has already been afforded 12 multiple chances to amend and his claims appear fundamentally flawed because, as stated above, 13 none of the defendants is a state actor. See Saul v. United States, 928 F.2d 829, 843 (9th Cir. 14 2021) (“A district court does not err in denying leave to amend where the amendment would be 15 futile . . . .”). 16 IV. Conclusion 17 Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED that: 18 1. Defendants’ motions to dismiss, ECF Nos. 46 & 47, be GRANTED. 19 2. Plaintiff’s second amended complaint, ECF No. 45, be DISMISSED without leave to 20 amend. 21 3. The Clerk of Court be directed to close the case. 22 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 23 assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days of 24 service of these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections with the 25 court and serve a copy on all parties. Any such document should be captioned “Objections to 26 Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations,” and any response shall be served and filed 27 within fourteen days of service of the objections. The parties are advised that failure to file 28 objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. See 1 Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Yist, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 2 | 1991). 3 4 IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: _ May 9, 2025 aw—— 6 JEREMY D. PETERSON 7 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28