Prysm, Inc. v. United States

2019 CIT 149
CourtUnited States Court of International Trade
DecidedNovember 26, 2019
Docket18-00151
StatusPublished

This text of 2019 CIT 149 (Prysm, Inc. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of International Trade primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Prysm, Inc. v. United States, 2019 CIT 149 (cit 2019).

Opinion

Slip Op. 19-

UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE

PRYSM, INC.,

Plaintiff, Before: Jane A. Restani, Judge

v. Court No. 18-00151 UNITED STATES, PUBLIC VERSION Defendant.

OPINION

[In Customs classification matter, Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is denied and Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment is granted.]

Dated: November , 2019

Munford Page Hall, II and Lydia C. Pardini, Adduci, Mastriani & Schaumberg, L.L.P., of Washington, D.C., for Plaintiff Prysm, Inc.

Marcella Powell, Trial Attorney, Civil Division, Commercial Litigation Branch, U.S. Department of Justice, and Amy M. Rubin, Assistant Director, International Trade Field Office, U.S. Department of Justice, of New York, N.Y., for Defendant United States of America. With them on the brief was Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice, of Washington, D.C. Of counsel on the brief was Paula S. Smith, Senior Attorney, Office of the Assistant Chief Counsel, International Trade Litigation, U.S. Customs & Border Protection, of New York, N.Y.

Restani, Judge: This matter is before the court on cross-motions for summary judgment.

Plaintiff Prysm, Inc. (“Prysm”) commenced this action against Defendant United States (the

“government”) to contest the denial by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (“Customs”) of its

administrative protests. Prysm principally claims that Customs incorrectly determined the tariff

classification of its imported laser phosphor displays (“LPDs”), which Prysm claims were

manufactured for use as “parts of” its Display Wall System, a “monitor.” The government replies Court No. 18-00151 Page 2 Public Version that Prysm’s LPDs were manufactured for use as independent “monitors” and are classifiable

accordingly.

There are two issues in this case. First, the court must determine whether Prysm’s

merchandise is a “monitor,” classifiable under heading 8528, Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the

United States (“HTSUS”),1 or a “part” of a monitor, classifiable under heading 8529, HTSUS. If

the merchandise is a monitor, then the court must also determine whether the monitor is principally

used in an automatic data processing system and classifiable under subheading 8528.51.00,

HTSUS, as claimed by Prysm.2 For the reasons that follow, the court concludes that the LPDs are

properly classifiable under subheading 8528.59.33, HTSUS as a color monitor, not incorporating

television reception apparatus, with a video display diagonally greater than 34.29 centimeters, with

a flat panel screen, other; other, subject to a 5 percent ad valorem duty, as asserted by the

government.

1 All citations to the HTSUS, including Section and Chapter Notes, are to the 2016 edition. This version was in effect on December 7, 2016, when Prysm entered the merchandise. See 19 C.F.R. § 141.69.

As of January 1, 2017, subheading 8528.51.00 was deleted and replaced with subheading 8528.51 (for monitors “[c]apable of directly connecting to and designed for use with an automatic data processing machine of heading 8471”). Subheading 8528.59.31 was also deleted. Those changes, which might have precluded some of Prysm’s arguments here, are inapplicable to the instant case. 2 At oral argument, Prysm abandoned its secondary alternative claim that its merchandise is a flat panel display device classifiable under heading 8528.59.31, HTSUS. See Oral Arg. Recording at 28:20–29:06 (Nov. 14, 2019). Many subheadings of heading 8528, HTSUS, reference flat panel screens, such as the one applicable here. A flat panel screen is distinct from the complete object, known as a flat panel display device, of which a flat panel screen is a part. Flat panel display devices are classified under subheading 8528.59.31, HTSUS. By contrast, a device with a flat panel screen, but that is not wholly a flat panel display device, is not classified under that subheading. Court No. 18-00151 Page 3 Public Version BACKGROUND

On December 7, 2016, Prysm entered the subject LPDs at San Francisco. See Customs

Entry Form 1651-0024, ECF No. 31-3 at 40 (Dec. 8, 2016) (“Pl. Ex. 2”). Customs classified the

LPDs under subheading 8528.59.33, HTSUS. See [Pl.’s] Statement of Material Facts as to Which

There Is No Genuine Issue To Be Tried ¶¶ 10–11, ECF No. 31-1 (Mar. 15, 2019) (“Pl. Facts”);

Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Statement of Material Facts as to Which There Is No Genuine Issue To Be

Tried ¶¶ 10–11, ECF No. 37 (May 24, 2019) (“Gov. Facts”). Prysm timely filed a protest on

December 13, 2017. Pl. Facts ¶ 12; Gov. Facts ¶ 12. Prysm disagrees with this classification and

claims that the LPDs are properly classified under subheading 8529.90.99, HTSUS, as “[p]arts

suitable for use solely or principally with the apparatus of headings 8525 to 8528,” free of duty.

See Corrected Compl. ¶¶ 36–38, ECF No. 9 (July 20, 2018). Prysm requested an accelerated

disposition of its protest, and the protest was deemed denied on June 23, 2018, pursuant to 19

U.S.C. § 1515(b). Pl. Facts ¶ 13; Gov. Facts ¶ 13. Prysm timely commenced the instant action on

June 25, 2018. Pl. Facts ¶ 1; Gov. Facts ¶ 1. Prysm moved for summary judgment on March 15,

2019, and the government cross-moved for summary judgment on May 24, 2019. See Pl.’s Mem.

of P. & A. in Supp. of Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 31 (Mar. 15, 2019) (“Pl. Br.”); Def.’s

Mem. in Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. & in Support of Def.’s Cross-Mot. for Summ. J., ECF

No. 37 (May 24, 2019) (“Gov. Br.”).

JURISDICTION

The court exercises jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a), which vests the Court of

International Trade with exclusive jurisdiction over any civil action commenced against the United

States to contest the denial of a protest under Section 515 of the Tariff Act of 1930, codified as

amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1515. Court No. 18-00151 Page 4 Public Version STANDARD OF REVIEW

The court reviews the denial of a Customs classification protest de novo. See Pillowtex

Corp. v. United States, 171 F.3d 1370, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1999); FANUC Robotics Am., Inc., 393 F.

Supp. 3d 1254, 1258 (CIT 2019). The court shall grant summary judgment “if the movant shows

that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.” USCIT R. 56(a). A factual dispute is material if it potentially affects the outcome

of the suit under the governing law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

In a tariff classification dispute, “summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine

dispute as to the underlying factual issue of exactly what the merchandise is.” Bausch & Lomb,

Inc. v. United States, 148 F.3d 1363, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 1998). The court’s inquiry is two-fold. First,

the court ascertains the proper meaning of specific terms in the tariff provision. Cummins Inc. v.

United States, 454 F.3d 1361, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2006).

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