Prutting v. Prutting

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Prutting v. Prutting

25 A.D.2d 846, 271 N.Y.S.2d 551, 1966 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4117

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedMay 24, 1966

StatusPublished

This text of 25 A.D.2d 846 (Prutting v. Prutting) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Prutting v. Prutting, 25 A.D.2d 846, 271 N.Y.S.2d 551, 1966 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4117 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1966).

Pincite

Opinion

Order, entered January 27, 1966, unanimously affirmed, without costs and disbursements. In view of the stipulation of the parties for the maintenance of the status quo pending the determination of the action, includ[847]*847ing provisions for continuance of residence of plaintiff and child in the apartment rented by defendant and for the furnishing- by defendant of food, laundry, utilities and whatever else is being- presently furnished, Special Term properly exercised its discretion to deny the motion insofar as it additionally sought payment by defendant of sums of money for support of the child. Furthermore, we note that the order which denied such support in view of the conflicting papers raising- issues requiring determination on a trial, was entered on motion of attorneys for the plaintiff. Finally, the exercise of Special Term’s discretion to award a very substantial counsel fee was justified on the basis of the nature and extent of the controversies between the parties and the issues of fact and law raised by the pleadings, with due consideration as to the financial ability of defendant. Certainly, however, defendant may he assured that the power conferred upon the Trial Justice to grant an additional allowance for counsel fees will not be exercised unless the plaintiff establishes that her counsel was reasonably required to and did render services of a nature and extent requiring the additional allowance.

Concur — Breitel, J. P., McNally, Stevens and Eager, JJ.

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Order, entered January 27, 1966, unanimously affirmed, without costs and disbursements. In view of the stipulation of the parties for the maintenance of the status quo pending the determination of the action, includ[847]*847ing provisions for continuance of residence of plaintiff and child in the apartment rented by defendant and for the furnishing- by defendant of food, laundry, utilities and whatever else is being- presently furnished, Special Term properly exercised its discretion to deny the motion insofar as it additionally sought payment by defendant of sums of money for support of the child. Furthermore, we note that the order which denied such support in view of the conflicting papers raising- issues requiring determination on a trial, was entered on motion of attorneys for the plaintiff. Finally, the exercise of Special Term’s discretion to award a very substantial counsel fee was justified on the basis of the nature and extent of the controversies between the parties and the issues of fact and law raised by the pleadings, with due consideration as to the financial ability of defendant. Certainly, however, defendant may he assured that the power conferred upon the Trial Justice to grant an additional allowance for counsel fees will not be exercised unless the plaintiff establishes that her counsel was reasonably required to and did render services of a nature and extent requiring the additional allowance.

Concur — Breitel, J. P., McNally, Stevens and Eager, JJ.

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Bluebook (online)

25 A.D.2d 846, 271 N.Y.S.2d 551, 1966 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4117, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/prutting-v-prutting-nyappdiv-1966.