Provost v. United States

269 U.S. 443, 46 S. Ct. 152, 70 L. Ed. 352, 1926 U.S. LEXIS 359
Supreme Court of the United States·Decided January 11, 1926·No. 258·Published·Cited by 97 cases

Opinion

Mr. Justice Stone

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The appellants are co-partners engaged in business as stock brokers with membership in the New York Stock Exchange. They brought suit in the Court of Claims to recover, as an illegally exacted tax, the cost of internal revenue stamps affixed by them in the period from 1917 to 1920 to “tickets” which were documentary evidence of transactions commonly known in the stock-brokerage business as the “ loan ” of shares of stock and the return by the borrower to the lender of shares of stock “ borrowed.” The case was tried upon agreed facts embodied in the findings of the court below, and from the judgment for the defendant in that court the case was brought here on appeal. Jud. Code, § 242, before amendment of 1925.

*450 The applicable provisions of the statutes are to be found in War Revenue Act of 1917, Title VIII, Schedule A, par. 4, 40 Stat. 300, 322, which is printed in the margin * and in the similar provision of the Revenue Act of 1918, Title XI, Schedule A, par. 4, 40 Stat. 1057, 1135, which may, for the purposes of this case, be taken to be a re-enactment of the 1917 provision. Both acts imposed a stamp tax of two cents per share upon “all sales or agreements /to sell, or memoranda of sales or deliveries of, or transfers of legal title to shares or certificates of stock.” • The question presented is whether'the transfers of shares of corporate stock involved in the “ loan ” and “ return ” transactions in accordance with the rules and practice of the Stock Exchange, are taxable transfers within the meaning of the statute..

The loan of stock is usually, though not necessarily, incidental to a “ short sale.” As the phrase indicates, a short sale is a contract for the sale of shares which the *451 seller does not own or the certificates for which are not within his control so as to be available for delivery at the time when, under the rules of the Exchange, delivery must be made. Under the rules of the New York Stock Exchange, applicable so far as the facts of this case are concerned, a broker who sells stock is required to make delivery of the certificates on the next business day. If he does not have them available,'he must procure them for the purpose of making delivery. This he may do by purchasing or borrowing the required shares, delivery of the certificates to be made to the broker to whom he has already contracted to sell.

If he borrows them, he deposits with the lending broker their full market price; and until the loan is returned, this deposit is maintained, by means of daily payments back and forth between the borrower and the lender, at the varying level of the market value of the shares loaned.

*452 The lender, who thus receives in money the full market value of the shares — much more than he would ordinarily realize by ^pledging them — usually pays interest on' the money so received, at the current rate for demand loans. But the rate of interest is a matter of negotiation and agreement,, and the deposit may, on occasion, carry no interest, or the borrower of the stock may pay a premium when the stock is greatly in demand.

During the continuance of the loan the borrowing broker is bound by the loan contract to give the lender all the benefits and the lender is bound to assume all the burdens incident to ownership of the stock which is the subject of the transaction, as though the lender had retained the stock. The borrower must accordingly credit the lender with the amount of any dividends paid upon the stock while the loan continues and the lender must assume or pay to the borrower the amount of any assessments upon the stock. The lender of the stock, concurrently with the receipt of the deposit, delivers to the borrower the certificates of the stock lent, and the transaction is evidenced by a “ loan ticket,” to which the broker lending the stock affixes the revenue stamps here in question. The stock thus borrowed then becomes available for delivery on the short sale.

The original short sale is thus completed and there remains only the obligation of the borrowing broker, terminable on demand, either by the borrower or the lender, to return the stock borrowed on repayment to him of his cash deposit, and the obligation of the lender to repay the deposit, with interest as agreed. The stock for this purpose, if not provided by the customer, must be obtained by borrowing stock of like kind and amount from other brokers, or by purchasing the stock in the open market and charging the customer for whose account the .sale was originally made, with the purchase price. In that case the short sale transaction and the borrowing *453 transaction as well are brought to their conclusion by the actual purchase of stock of which the customer was short at the time when the sale was made and the delivery of the stock, thus purchased, to the lender. * The return transaction in every case is evidenced by a “borrowed stock return ticket ” to which the borrowing broker affixes the revenue stamps. The claim of the appellants comprises the cost of stamps purchased by them and affixed to loan tickets or to borrowed stock return tickets pursuant to Treasury regulations.

It will be observed that the completed short sale transaction usually involves four separate steps in each of which there is either a sale dr a- complete transfer of-all the legal elements of ownership. These are (1) the sale of the stock by the person effecting the short sale, followed by the transfer and delivery of the certificates for the borrowed stock to the purchaser’s broker; (2) the transfer of the shares from the lender to the borrower, who uses them for delivery on the customer’s short sale; (3). the purchase by the borrowing broker of the stock required to repay the'loan; and (4) the transfer and délivery by the borrower to the lender of, the certificates for the purchased shares to replace the shares borrowed. Each transfer, may be accompanied by a physieal delivery of certificates of the stock transferred; but the intermediate deliveries in (2) and (3) are usually eliminated by use of the Stock Exchange Clearing House.

It is conceded that the first and third transactions are taxable ás “sales” or “agreements to sell” within the *454 meaning of the statute; but it is contended that the second and fourth are not subject to the tax, because they involve neither a transfer of the legal title to the stock loaned and returned, nor “deliveries” of the shares or certificates representing them within the meaning of the Acts of 1917 and 1918, and that taking into-account the history and purposes of the two statutes, it wasi not intended to include these transactions among the taxable transfers described.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Provost v. United States, 269 U.S. 443, 46 S. Ct. 152, 70 L. Ed. 352, 1926 U.S. LEXIS 359 (1926).

269 U.S. 443 (Provost v. United States) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Lizzie W. Calloway v. Commissioner of IRS
691 F.3d 1315 (Eleventh Circuit, 2012)
Samueli v. CIR
661 F.3d 399 (Ninth Circuit, 2011)
Samueli v. Commissioner
661 F.3d 399 (Ninth Circuit, 2011)
Calloway v. Commissioner
135 T.C. No. 3 (U.S. Tax Court, 2010)
Alpha I, L.P. v. United States
93 Fed. Cl. 280 (Federal Claims, 2010)
Henry and Susan F. Samueli v. Commissioner
132 T.C. No. 4 (U.S. Tax Court, 2009)
Samueli v. Comm'r
132 T.C. No. 4 (U.S. Tax Court, 2009)
Marriott International Resorts, L.P. v. United States
83 Fed. Cl. 291 (Federal Claims, 2008)
Kornman & Associates, Inc. v. United States
527 F.3d 443 (Fifth Circuit, 2008)
H.J. Heinz Co. & Subsidiaries v. United States
76 Fed. Cl. 570 (Federal Claims, 2007)
Chiles v. M.C. Capital Corp.
642 N.E.2d 1115 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 1994)
Hagen v. Commissioner
1993 T.C. Memo. 646 (U.S. Tax Court, 1993)
Occupational-Urgent Care Health Systems, Inc. v. Sutro & Co.
711 F. Supp. 1016 (E.D. California, 1989)
National-Standard Co. v. Commissioner
80 T.C. No. 27 (U.S. Tax Court, 1983)
Zemurray Foundation v. United States
687 F.2d 97 (Fifth Circuit, 1982)
United States v. Gerald L. Richards
583 F.2d 491 (Tenth Circuit, 1978)
Hendricks v. Commissioner
51 T.C. 235 (U.S. Tax Court, 1968)
Pike v. Commissioner
44 T.C. 787 (U.S. Tax Court, 1965)