Provost v. Justin

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Provost v. Justin

19 So. 3d 333, 2009 Fla. App. LEXIS 1538, 2009 WL 484633

CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida

DecidedFebruary 27, 2009

DocketNo. 2D08-2740

StatusPublished

Cited by3 cases

This text of 19 So. 3d 333 (Provost v. Justin) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Provost v. Justin, 19 So. 3d 333, 2009 Fla. App. LEXIS 1538, 2009 WL 484633 (Fla. Ct. App. 2009).

Pincite

Opinion

BAUMANN, HERBERT J., JR., Associate Judge.

In March 1989, Aurele Provost and Geraldine Provost, husband and wife, established a trust that listed as beneficiaries the three children of Aurele Provost, Appellants Marquis Provost, Constance Monty, and Levis Provost (the Trust). Aurele Provost passed away in March 1994. On July 9, 2001, Geraldine Provost executed a document that purported to amend the Trust to distribute the first $10,000 in trust assets to Appellee Sharon Metz,¹ Geraldine Provost’s former foster child, and the remaining assets to her caregiver, Appellee Elizabeth Justin. After Geraldine Provost’s death on July 7, 2005, the children of Aurele Provost filed a complaint for declaratory judgment, seeking to set aside the amendment.² The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, and the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Elizabeth Justin and Sharon Harsch. We reverse.

“The polestar of trust interpretation is the settlors’ intent.” L’Argent v. Barnett Bank, N.A., 730 So.2d 395, 397 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999). “In determining the settlors’ intent, the court should not ‘resort to isolated words and phrases’; instead, the court should construe ‘the instrument as a whole,’ taking into account the general dispositional scheme.” Roberts v. Sarros, 920 So.2d 193, 195 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (citations omitted). The parties agree that these principles apply to the case at hand and rely on both LArgent and Roberts in disputing the interpretation this court should give to the Trust.

As in L'Argent, the Trust contains language that limits the right of amendment to the grantors “during their lives.” See 730 So.2d at 397. Based on our review of the entire Trust document, we conclude that both grantors needed to execute any amendment to the Trust. Because Aurele Provost did not execute the amendment prepared by Geraldine Provost, the amendment is ineffective. Accordingly, we reverse the summary judgment in favor of Appellees Elizabeth Justin and Sharon Harsch and remand for the trial court to enter summary judgment in favor of Appellants Levis Provost, Marquis Provost, and Constance Monty.

Reversed and remanded.

NORTHCUTT, C.J., and CASANUEVA, J., Concur.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

BAUMANN, HERBERT J., JR., Associate Judge.

In March 1989, Aurele Provost and Geraldine Provost, husband and wife, established a trust that listed as beneficiaries the three children of Aurele Provost, Appellants Marquis Provost, Constance Monty, and Levis Provost (the Trust). Aurele Provost passed away in March 1994. On July 9, 2001, Geraldine Provost executed a document that purported to amend the Trust to distribute the first $10,000 in trust assets to Appellee Sharon Metz,¹ Geraldine Provost’s former foster child, and the remaining assets to her caregiver, Appellee Elizabeth Justin. After Geraldine Provost’s death on July 7, 2005, the children of Aurele Provost filed a complaint for declaratory judgment, seeking to set aside the amendment.² The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, and the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Elizabeth Justin and Sharon Harsch. We reverse.

“The polestar of trust interpretation is the settlors’ intent.” L’Argent v. Barnett Bank, N.A., 730 So.2d 395, 397 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999). “In determining the settlors’ intent, the court should not ‘resort to isolated words and phrases’; instead, the court should construe ‘the instrument as a whole,’ taking into account the general dispositional scheme.” Roberts v. Sarros, 920 So.2d 193, 195 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (citations omitted). The parties agree that these principles apply to the case at hand and rely on both LArgent and Roberts in disputing the interpretation this court should give to the Trust.

As in L'Argent, the Trust contains language that limits the right of amendment to the grantors “during their lives.” See 730 So.2d at 397. Based on our review of the entire Trust document, we conclude that both grantors needed to execute any amendment to the Trust. Because Aurele Provost did not execute the amendment prepared by Geraldine Provost, the amendment is ineffective. Accordingly, we reverse the summary judgment in favor of Appellees Elizabeth Justin and Sharon Harsch and remand for the trial court to enter summary judgment in favor of Appellants Levis Provost, Marquis Provost, and Constance Monty.

Reversed and remanded.

NORTHCUTT, C.J., and CASANUEVA, J., Concur.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

19 So. 3d 333, 2009 Fla. App. LEXIS 1538, 2009 WL 484633, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/provost-v-justin-fladistctapp-2009.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack