Prout v. Chisolm

21 A.D. 54, 47 N.Y.S. 376
CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
DecidedOctober 15, 1897
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 21 A.D. 54 (Prout v. Chisolm) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Prout v. Chisolm, 21 A.D. 54, 47 N.Y.S. 376 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1897).

Opinion

Cullen, J.:

The defendants were stockbrokers in the city of Hew York and members of the Consolidated Exchange in that city, upon which exchange their principal dealings were transacted. In the years 1891 and 1892 the plaintiff was a customer of the defendants, and through them speculated in stocks. During this period he deposited With the defendants as margins, or to secure them against .loss, in fulfilling his orders, $29,000 in money and railroad bonds of the par value of $15,000. The transactions of the plaintiff through the defendants’ firm were very numerous. It is stated that they approximated in number 2,000, At the end of the dealings between the parties the defendants claimed that the plaintiff’s deposit, or margin, had been exhausted, and that he was indebted to' them in a large sum. The plaintiff claims that at this time he discovered that the transactions reported to him by the defendants as made in the fulfillment of his orders were fictitious; that as mat.ter of fact they neither bought stock when he ordered a purchase nor sold stock when -he ordered a sale. Thereupon he instituted this action; and in. it he sought to recover the money paid the defendants and the value of the securities deposited with them. The defendants answered admitting their employment by the plaintiff as brokers for the purchase and sale of stocks. They denied that the purchases and sales reported by them were fictitious, and alleged that, on the contrary, they were actual. Thus the only issue in this case under the pleadings (except a plea of another action pending, to which it is unnecessary to refer) was whether the defendants actually fulfilled the plaintiff’s orders or whether the sales and purchases reported by them were fictitious and in fact not made. On a previous trial of the action, at the close of the plaintiff’s case the court dismissed the complaint. On appeal the judg[56]*56ment entered on that direction was reversed and a new trial ordered.

(Prout v. Chisolm, 89 Hun, 108.) The opinion delivered by Mr. Justice Dykmaií on the prior appeal very clearly shows the nature of the plaintiff’s action, and is decisive of his right to maintain it. It leaves but little to be added by us. The rule of law as to the duty of an agent to his. principal has been so long and so positively settled that it may now be said to be elemental*y. The relation of an agent to his principal is one of confidence and trust. “ The principal bargains, in the employment, for the exercise of the disinterested skill, diligence and zeal of the agent for his own exclusive benefit.” (Story on Agency, § 210.) “Hence it is well settled * * * that an agent employed to sell cannot himself become the purchaser, and an agent employed to buy cannot himself be the seller.” (Id. § 211.) “ Thus, for example, if an agent authorized .to buy should buy of himself, and the bargain is advantageous to the principal, * * * the latter has his election to ratify it or not; if disadvantageous, he may affirm it or repudiate it at his pleasure. On the other hand, if the agent makes any profits in the care of his agency by any concealed management, either in buying or selling, or in other transactions on account of his principal, the profits will belong exclusively to the latter.” (Id. § 214.)

It is, therefore, wholly immaterial in this case whether in fact the plaintiff suffered any loss by the failure of the defendants to execute his orders, or whether as matter of fact the plaintiff is better, or at least no. worse off than if his orders had been executed. A broker, agent - or servant cannot speculate on the orders of his. employer or master. There are so-called exchanges or offices in many cities in which persons assume to speculate in stocks.. In these places it is . understood, both by customer and banker, that stocks are not to be actually sold or ^purchased, but' that the customer is to pay the banker or the banker pay the customer, according to the fluctuation of the market price of stocks in those exchanges where stocks are really bought and sold. But such transactions are mere gambling. They are illegal, and the maintenance of establishments where such dealings are carried on is criminal. In such cases where the dealings are fair the persons are probably subject to no other criticism or condemnation than is to be passed on gamblers' generally. But there is no pretense in this case that the plaintiff [57]*57contemplated such a course of business. The defendants were members of a regular exchange and held themselves out as carrying on a legitimate and lawful business, and the pleadings admit that they were employed by the plaintiff to effect actual purchases and sales. If, therefore, they failed to execute the plaintiff’s orders in the expectation of making a profit for themselves through the fluctuation of the market, they were not only subject to condemnation as gambling, but were guilty of fraud. We think the trial court erred in speaking of this as mere legal fraud. The conduct of the defendants, if the charges made against them by the plaintiff were established, was dishonest and fraudulent, in morals as well as law. Even had they acted in good faith, and for the purpose of executing the plaintiff’s orders, either sold to the plaintiff their own stock or bought from him his stock, the plaintiff would have had the right, at his election, to repudiate the transaction. It was said in Taussig v. Hart (58 N. Y. 425): That transaction did not help the matter. It amounted to a sale by the plaintiffs of 100 shares of their own stock to the defendant, which was not binding upon the defendant, for the reason that the law does not permit an agent employed to purchase to buy of himself. It is no answer that the intention was honest and that the brokers did better for their principal by selling him their own stock than they could have done by going into the open market. The rule is inflexible, and although its violation in the particular case caused no damage to the pi'incipal,. he cannot be compelled to adopt the purchase. Consequently, whether the purchase of. 100 shares from Williams was for defendant’s account, or the plaintiffs sold to the defendant 100 shares of their own stock, on either theory the referee was justified in rejecting that item of the account.” If this be the rule, even where a broker acts in good faith towards his principal, it applies with much greater force to a case where the broker purposely fails to execute the principal’s order, and the principal, instead of having the stock ordered to be purchased, has simply the personal responsibility of the broker to make good any profits that might have accrued on the purchase had the purchase been actually effected. The matter, however, is too clear to require or even justify further discussion. The sole right of the [58]*58defendants to retain the plaintiff’s money was to pay them for their commissions on purchases, or sales, and to reimburse them for losses on tliose. dealings. If there were no such dealings, the plaintiff had. the right to reclaim his money and securities. This disposes of the question raised by the refusal of the trial court .to dismiss the complaint, and also of such requests to charge as proceed on the theory that the plaintiff was entitled to recover only such sum as would have been due to him had the purchases and sales of stock been in fact made.

We think the evidence sufficient to support the verdict of the jury,, and that we are not warranted in disturbing that verdict.

The books of the defendants did not. disclose the names of the-parties from whom they bought stock or to whom they sold stock.

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Bluebook (online)
21 A.D. 54, 47 N.Y.S. 376, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/prout-v-chisolm-nyappdiv-1897.