Protest 116113-K of Fendrich

18 Cust. Ct. 200
CourtUnited States Customs Court
DecidedMay 20, 1947
DocketNo. 51734
StatusPublished

This text of 18 Cust. Ct. 200 (Protest 116113-K of Fendrich) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Customs Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Protest 116113-K of Fendrich, 18 Cust. Ct. 200 (cusc 1947).

Opinion

Mollison, Judge:

In December 1943, the plaintiff (a corporation) in this case imported into the United States 91 bales of leaf tobacco from Cuba. It was all invoiced as “unstemmed fillers tobacco” and was entered as unstemmed filler tobacco at the rate of 28 cerits per pound under the provisions of paragraph 601, Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U. S. C. 1940 ed. §1001, par. 601), apparently as amended [201]*201by the trade agreement with Cuba reported in T. D. 50541. It was classified by the collector as unstemmed filler and wrapper tobacco mixed, and assessment was made on the portion determined to be filler tobacco at the rate of 14 cents per pound under the provisions of paragraph 601, as amended, supra, and on the portion determined to be wrapper tobacco at the rate of 91 cents per pound under the provision for unstemmed wrapper tobacco in the same paragraph, as amended. It should be noted that the difference between the entered and assessed rates on the portion of the tobacco found by the collector to be unstemmed filler tobacco was due to the fact that an agreement in force at the time of importation between the United States and Cuba (T. D. 50050) provided that an annual quota of 22,000,000 pounds of filler tobacco would be entitled to the reduced rate, and that the tobacco was entered at the nonquota rate but was found to be entitled to the quota rate.

The protest at bar is directed against the assessment of duty made by the collector on that portion found by that officer to be wrapper tobacco, the claim being that such tobacco was, in fact, unstemmed filler tobacco, dutiable at the 'rate of 14 cents per pound.

On the consular invoice the tobacco was divided into seven lots containing respectively 46, 7, 4, 14, 4, 6, and 10 bales, or a total of 91 bales. The bales covered by the third and seventh lots, 14 bales in all, were found by the collector to contain only filler tobacco. The bales covered by the second lot, seven ¡¡in all, were found to contain 8 percent wrapper tobacco, and the bales covered by the first, fourth, fifth, and sixth lots, 70 in all, were found to contain 10 percent wrapper tobacco.

Paragraph 602 of the tariff act contains a definition of the terms “wrapper tobacco” and “filler tobacco” as follows:

The term “wrapper tobacco” as used in this title means that quality of leaf tobacco which has the requisite color, texture, and burn, and is of sufficient size for cigar wrappers, and the term “filler tobacco” means all other leaf tobacco.

In the same paragraph are set forth statutory requirements for examination of leaf tobacco for classification purposes as follows:

* * * In the examination for classification of any imported leaf tobacco, at least one bale, box, or package in every ten, and at least one in every invoice, shall be examined by the appraiser or person authorized by law to make such examination, and at least ten hands shall be examined in each examined bale, box, or package.

The bales covered by the shipment in question were numbered 50818 to 50908, inclusive. It appears that the plaintiff was instructed by the customs officers to provide for the statutory examination the following-13 bales:

50854/6 50885
50889 50859/60
50894 50865
50871 50899/900
50882

and examination of the same was made by Customs Examiner Brice Lane at the plaintiff’s warehouse in Evansville, Ind., on January 18, 1944, less than a month after importation of the merchandise. It is apparent that Mr. Lane’s advisory return is the basis of the classification adopted by the collector.

In the presentation of its case the plaintiff offered in evidence documents purporting to be the written statements of three persons made under oath relating to the tobacco at bar. Upon objection to the admission of the same made by counsel for the defendant, the judge presiding at the hearing on circuit ordered the documents marked for identification, reserving decision on their admissibility for the division having cognizance of the subject matter.

[202]*202Probably nothing in our American system of evidence is more fundamental than the requirement that testimonial assertions, sought to be given probative value, must be subjected to certain tests, the chief one of which is cross-examination, which experience has shown to be necessary in order to establish their value. Although the statements in question appear to be under oath, they are extrajudicial, and were made under circumstances which prevented the application of the safeguarding test of cross-examination. As offered in this court, they are nothing more than hearsay, and as the circumstances do not bring them under any of the well-recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule, and as there is no exception created by statute applicable to cases arising under section 514, Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U. S. C. 1940 ed., § 1514), as does the case at bar, the objections made by counsel for the defendant are sustained and the documents denied admission into evidence.

There was also offered in evidence on behalf of the plaintiff a copy on a single sheet of what was stated by the secretary of the plaintiff corporation to be the private invoices given by the seller of the tobacco at bar to the purchaser, the plaintiff corporation. No objection to this was made by counsel for the defendant on the ground that it was a copy, but objection was made on the ground “that it is a self-serving declaration.” During the course of the discussion concerning the document at the time it was offered, it was said that the same described the merchandise as “filler tobacco.” The judge of this court presiding at the hearing on circuit ordered the document marked for identification and reserved ruling on its admissibility for this division of the court. A careful examination of the document as offered fails to disclose that the merchandise is described thereon as “filler tobacco,” although it does appear to describe the merchandise as “Un-stripped Havana Vueltas Tobacco,” whatever that may mean.

It is clear, however, that the document was offered in connection with one of the sworn statements already referred to and which had been denied admission into evidence, and we are constrained to, and do, make the same ruling in connection with the said document.

Three witnesses testified on behalf of the plaintiff on the issue of whether or not any of the tobacco in issue consisted of wrapper tobacco within the meaning of the term as set out in the statute. The first of these was Antonio F. Bello. From his testimony it appears that he was employed by the plaintiff corporation, but in what capacity was not brought out. He stated that he saw the 91 bales of tobacco in the warehouses of the plaintiff corporation in Evansville, Ind., and that he “was handling it.”

He testified that he had 32 years’ experience handling tobacco and knew the difference between wrapper and filler tobacco, having handled them over all those years. It is difficult to determine from the record as made Mr. Bello’s exact relationship to the merchandise in question.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
18 Cust. Ct. 200, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/protest-116113-k-of-fendrich-cusc-1947.