THE HONORABLE JOHN C. COUGHENOUR 1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 8 AT SEATTLE 9 PROTECTIVE LIFE INSURANCE CASE NO. C25-1751-JCC COMPANY, 10 ORDER 11 Interpleader Plaintiff, 12 v. 13 ERICA VIETZKE LANKFORD, et al., 14 Interpleader Defendants. 15 16 This matter comes before the Court on Interpleader Plaintiff Protective Life Insurance 17 Company’s (“Protective”) motion to discharge it of liability, enjoin Interpleader Defendants from 18 further legal proceedings, dismiss Protective with prejudice, and award its attorney fees and costs 19 (Dkt. No. 23).1 Interpleader Defendants Erica Vietzke Lankford and minor M.A.L. (represented 20 by a Guardian ad litem) oppose portions of the motion, namely, the breadth of liability discharge 21
22 1 Because neither party presents the Court with evidence, (see generally Dkt. Nos. 23, 28, 29), the Court views Protective’s motion as one seeking a judgment on the pleadings in accordance 23 with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). See Tseng v. PeopleConnect, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 3d 24 1136, 1142 (N.D. Cal. 2023) (comparing a Rule 12(c) motion to a motion to dismiss and a Rule 56 motion). This rule allows for judgment on the pleadings after the pleadings are closed. Fed. R. 25 Civ. P. 12(c). This occurs “once a complaint and answer have been filed, assuming . . . that no counterclaim or cross-claim is made.” Doe v. United States, 419 F.3d 1058, 1062 (9th Cir. 2005) 26 (internal citations omitted). 1 Protective seeks and the award of attorney fees and costs to it. (See Dkt. Nos. 28, 29). Having 2 thoroughly considered the briefing and relevant record, the Court GRANTS Protective’s motion 3 (Dkt. No. 23) for the reasons explained herein. 4 I. BACKGROUND 5 According to Protective’s complaint, John Lankford, passed away on or about January 6 22, 2025. (Dkt. No. 1 at 3.) At that time, Protective insured Mr. Lankford’s life via a $500,000 7 death benefit policy. (Id. at 2.) Mr. Lankford obtained the policy in May 2021, designating his 8 spouse, Erica Vietzke Lankford, as the primary beneficiary and his child, M.A.L., as contingent 9 beneficiary. (Id.) Mr. Lankford changed the beneficiary designation in November 2024, naming 10 as the primary beneficiary Ms. Vietzke, as custodian for M.A.L. (Id.) Protective acknowledged 11 the change by mailing a confirmation to Mr. Lankford. (Id.) Mr. Lankford passed away shortly 12 thereafter. (Id.) 13 After Mr. Lankford’s death, Ms. Vietzke initiated a policy claim in her individual 14 capacity. (Id. at 3.) In support, she submitted Mr. Lankford’s death certificate, which lists his 15 marital status as “separated.” (Id.) Protective informed Ms. Vietzke that, at the time of Mr. 16 Lankford’s death, the designated beneficiary was Ms. Vietzke as custodian of minor M.A.L.— 17 not her in her individual capacity. (Id.) Ms. Vietzke now asserts that any revision to the 18 beneficiary designation needed her approval because she and Mr. Lankford were married at the 19 time of his death and she thus maintained a community property interest in the Policy. (See id.) 20 In response, Protective initiated the instant action to resolve potentially conflicting claims 21 to Mr. Lankford’s death benefit. (See generally id.) The value of that benefit plus interest 22 (approximately $530,000) sits in the Court’s registry, pending resolution of this interpleader 23 case. (See generally Dkt. No. 14.) 24 II. DISCUSSION 25 Rule 22 allows a party to file an interpleader action where it may be exposed to double or 26 multiple liability. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 22. It allows “the stakeholder to ‘protect itself against the 1 problems posed by multiple claimants to a single fund.’” Mack v. Kuckenmeister, 619 F.3d 1010, 2 1024 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Minn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Ensley, 174 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 3 1999); see also Michelman v. Lincoln Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 685 F.3d 887, 894 (9th Cir. 2012). “In 4 an interpleader action, the ‘stakeholder’ of a sum of money sues all those who might have claim 5 to the money, deposits the money with the district court, and lets the claimants litigate who is 6 entitled to the money.” Cripps v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 980 F.2d 1261, 1265 (9th Cir. 1992). 7 Rule 22 affords the same remedies as actions brought under its statutory counterpart, 28 8 U.S.C. § 1335. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 22(b). Thus, the Court has authority to enjoin interpleader 9 defendant claimants from prosecuting any other claims against the plaintiff relating to the benefit 10 under the insurance policy at issue. See 28 U.S.C. § 2361. To do so, whether the action is 11 brought under Rule 22 or § 1335, the Court first determines whether there is a single fund as to 12 which two or more adverse claims are asserted. See Mack, 619 F.3d 1010 at 1023. It next 13 determines which claim is valid. Id. Here there is no dispute as to the first requirement. (See 14 generally Dkt. Nos. 23, 28, 29, 30.) Thus, Protective is entitled to a discharge. Although the 15 parties disagree over its scope, along with an award of attorney fees to Protective. (See generally 16 id.) 17 Again, Protective seeks an order dismissing it from this action with prejudice and 18 discharging it from “any further liability relative to” the Policy or Mr. Lankford’s death benefit. 19 (See Dkt. No. 23-1 at 1–2.) Protective also requests that the Court enjoin Interpleader Defendants 20 “from instituting or prosecuting any other proceeding, arbitration, or lawsuit against Protective 21 relative to the Policy and/or the Policy Proceeds.” (Id. at 2.) Interpleader Defendants object to the 22 proposed language as overbroad. (See generally Dkt. Nos. 28, 29.) Instead, they ask that the 23 enjoinment and discharge of liability be limited to “any further liability or involvement regarding 24 the identity of the person(s) ultimately entitled to the $530,636.47 (the ‘Policy Proceeds’).” (See 25 Dkt. Nos. 28 at 3, 29 at 4.) They say that Protective should not be discharged from potential 26 1 liability for hypothetical or unknown extra-contractual claims.2 (See id.) 2 Unpleaded hypothetical counterclaims are insufficient for this Court to deny Protective 3 the relief it now seeks. See Steadfast Ins. Co. v. Valley Forge Ins. Co., 2005 WL 8172271, slip 4 op. at 2 (W.D. Wash. 2005) (discharging stakeholder from interpleader action where the 5 defendants contested discharge based on unraised extra-contractual claims unrelated to the 6 interpleaded funds). Admittedly, the Ninth Circuit recognizes that interpleader actions do not 7 “shield the stakeholder from tort liability, nor from liability in excess of the stake” but only 8 where interpleader defendants affirmatively assert counterclaims for the supposed harms. See 9 Lee v. W. Coast Life Ins. Co., 688 F.3d 1004, 1011 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing State Farm v.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
THE HONORABLE JOHN C. COUGHENOUR 1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 8 AT SEATTLE 9 PROTECTIVE LIFE INSURANCE CASE NO. C25-1751-JCC COMPANY, 10 ORDER 11 Interpleader Plaintiff, 12 v. 13 ERICA VIETZKE LANKFORD, et al., 14 Interpleader Defendants. 15 16 This matter comes before the Court on Interpleader Plaintiff Protective Life Insurance 17 Company’s (“Protective”) motion to discharge it of liability, enjoin Interpleader Defendants from 18 further legal proceedings, dismiss Protective with prejudice, and award its attorney fees and costs 19 (Dkt. No. 23).1 Interpleader Defendants Erica Vietzke Lankford and minor M.A.L. (represented 20 by a Guardian ad litem) oppose portions of the motion, namely, the breadth of liability discharge 21
22 1 Because neither party presents the Court with evidence, (see generally Dkt. Nos. 23, 28, 29), the Court views Protective’s motion as one seeking a judgment on the pleadings in accordance 23 with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). See Tseng v. PeopleConnect, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 3d 24 1136, 1142 (N.D. Cal. 2023) (comparing a Rule 12(c) motion to a motion to dismiss and a Rule 56 motion). This rule allows for judgment on the pleadings after the pleadings are closed. Fed. R. 25 Civ. P. 12(c). This occurs “once a complaint and answer have been filed, assuming . . . that no counterclaim or cross-claim is made.” Doe v. United States, 419 F.3d 1058, 1062 (9th Cir. 2005) 26 (internal citations omitted). 1 Protective seeks and the award of attorney fees and costs to it. (See Dkt. Nos. 28, 29). Having 2 thoroughly considered the briefing and relevant record, the Court GRANTS Protective’s motion 3 (Dkt. No. 23) for the reasons explained herein. 4 I. BACKGROUND 5 According to Protective’s complaint, John Lankford, passed away on or about January 6 22, 2025. (Dkt. No. 1 at 3.) At that time, Protective insured Mr. Lankford’s life via a $500,000 7 death benefit policy. (Id. at 2.) Mr. Lankford obtained the policy in May 2021, designating his 8 spouse, Erica Vietzke Lankford, as the primary beneficiary and his child, M.A.L., as contingent 9 beneficiary. (Id.) Mr. Lankford changed the beneficiary designation in November 2024, naming 10 as the primary beneficiary Ms. Vietzke, as custodian for M.A.L. (Id.) Protective acknowledged 11 the change by mailing a confirmation to Mr. Lankford. (Id.) Mr. Lankford passed away shortly 12 thereafter. (Id.) 13 After Mr. Lankford’s death, Ms. Vietzke initiated a policy claim in her individual 14 capacity. (Id. at 3.) In support, she submitted Mr. Lankford’s death certificate, which lists his 15 marital status as “separated.” (Id.) Protective informed Ms. Vietzke that, at the time of Mr. 16 Lankford’s death, the designated beneficiary was Ms. Vietzke as custodian of minor M.A.L.— 17 not her in her individual capacity. (Id.) Ms. Vietzke now asserts that any revision to the 18 beneficiary designation needed her approval because she and Mr. Lankford were married at the 19 time of his death and she thus maintained a community property interest in the Policy. (See id.) 20 In response, Protective initiated the instant action to resolve potentially conflicting claims 21 to Mr. Lankford’s death benefit. (See generally id.) The value of that benefit plus interest 22 (approximately $530,000) sits in the Court’s registry, pending resolution of this interpleader 23 case. (See generally Dkt. No. 14.) 24 II. DISCUSSION 25 Rule 22 allows a party to file an interpleader action where it may be exposed to double or 26 multiple liability. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 22. It allows “the stakeholder to ‘protect itself against the 1 problems posed by multiple claimants to a single fund.’” Mack v. Kuckenmeister, 619 F.3d 1010, 2 1024 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Minn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Ensley, 174 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 3 1999); see also Michelman v. Lincoln Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 685 F.3d 887, 894 (9th Cir. 2012). “In 4 an interpleader action, the ‘stakeholder’ of a sum of money sues all those who might have claim 5 to the money, deposits the money with the district court, and lets the claimants litigate who is 6 entitled to the money.” Cripps v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 980 F.2d 1261, 1265 (9th Cir. 1992). 7 Rule 22 affords the same remedies as actions brought under its statutory counterpart, 28 8 U.S.C. § 1335. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 22(b). Thus, the Court has authority to enjoin interpleader 9 defendant claimants from prosecuting any other claims against the plaintiff relating to the benefit 10 under the insurance policy at issue. See 28 U.S.C. § 2361. To do so, whether the action is 11 brought under Rule 22 or § 1335, the Court first determines whether there is a single fund as to 12 which two or more adverse claims are asserted. See Mack, 619 F.3d 1010 at 1023. It next 13 determines which claim is valid. Id. Here there is no dispute as to the first requirement. (See 14 generally Dkt. Nos. 23, 28, 29, 30.) Thus, Protective is entitled to a discharge. Although the 15 parties disagree over its scope, along with an award of attorney fees to Protective. (See generally 16 id.) 17 Again, Protective seeks an order dismissing it from this action with prejudice and 18 discharging it from “any further liability relative to” the Policy or Mr. Lankford’s death benefit. 19 (See Dkt. No. 23-1 at 1–2.) Protective also requests that the Court enjoin Interpleader Defendants 20 “from instituting or prosecuting any other proceeding, arbitration, or lawsuit against Protective 21 relative to the Policy and/or the Policy Proceeds.” (Id. at 2.) Interpleader Defendants object to the 22 proposed language as overbroad. (See generally Dkt. Nos. 28, 29.) Instead, they ask that the 23 enjoinment and discharge of liability be limited to “any further liability or involvement regarding 24 the identity of the person(s) ultimately entitled to the $530,636.47 (the ‘Policy Proceeds’).” (See 25 Dkt. Nos. 28 at 3, 29 at 4.) They say that Protective should not be discharged from potential 26 1 liability for hypothetical or unknown extra-contractual claims.2 (See id.) 2 Unpleaded hypothetical counterclaims are insufficient for this Court to deny Protective 3 the relief it now seeks. See Steadfast Ins. Co. v. Valley Forge Ins. Co., 2005 WL 8172271, slip 4 op. at 2 (W.D. Wash. 2005) (discharging stakeholder from interpleader action where the 5 defendants contested discharge based on unraised extra-contractual claims unrelated to the 6 interpleaded funds). Admittedly, the Ninth Circuit recognizes that interpleader actions do not 7 “shield the stakeholder from tort liability, nor from liability in excess of the stake” but only 8 where interpleader defendants affirmatively assert counterclaims for the supposed harms. See 9 Lee v. W. Coast Life Ins. Co., 688 F.3d 1004, 1011 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing State Farm v. Tashire, 10 386 U.S. 523, 535 (1967)). And here, they assert no such thing.3 (See generally Dkt. Nos. 20, 11 21.) Therefore, Protective is entitled to the full release that it seeks. 12 Protective also asks for its attorney fees and costs. (See Dkt. No. 23 at 8–12.) The Ninth 13 Circuit recognizes that a plaintiff “in an action in the nature of interpleader . . . should be 14 awarded attorney fees for the services of his attorneys in interpleading.” Schrimer Stevedoring 15 Co. Ltd. v. Seaboard Stevedoring Corp., 306 F.2d 188, 194 (9th Cir. 1962). And that 16 “[g]enerally, courts have discretion to award attorney fees to a disinterested stakeholder in an 17 interpleader action.” Abex Corp. v. Ski’s Enterprises, Inc., 748 F.2d 513, 516 (9th Cir. 1984). To 18 do so, the Court determines whether the requested number of hours is the same number of hours 19 that reasonably competent counsel would bill and then determines if the requested hourly rate is 20
21 2 In opposing the instant motion, Ms. Vietzke suggests that Protective could be liable for negligence in handling Mr. Lankford’s online beneficiary designation revision. (See Dkt. No. 28 22 at 2.) But she also acknowledges that any such claim is “currently unknown and/or hypothetical.” (Id.) Likewise in their opposition brief, Interpleader Defendant M.A.L. suggests Protective could 23 be liable to her for negligence (See Dkt. No. 29 at 3), but states in their Answer that “if such claims exist, they are not known to M.A.L.’s Guardian ad litem.” (Dkt. No. 20 at 3.) 24 3 If Interpleader Defendants wanted to preserve extra-contractual claims, the appropriate avenue 25 to do so would have been through (a) filing counterclaims in the first place; or, (b) seeking leave to amend their Answer(s) to assert extra-contractual counterclaims—not through argument in an 26 opposition brief to a Rule 12(c) motion. 1 reasonable. Albion Pac. Prop. Res., LLC v. Seligman, 329 F. Supp. 2d 1163, 1169 (N.D. Cal. 2 2004). 3 Here, Protective seeks $608 in costs and $8,619.44 in attorney fees for 27.4 hours of 4 work, excluding the preparation of its reply brief in support of the instant motion (totaling 5 $9,227.44). (Dkt. No. 23 at 10.) Three different lawyers worked on this matter, with hourly rates 6 ranging from $250.75 to $450. (See Dkt. No. 24 at 2–3.) The time spent was reasonable. It is 7 comprised of hours needed to initiate this action, communicate with and attempt service on the 8 parties, communicate with the parties in hopes of avoiding contested motion practice and, finally, 9 prepare and serve the instant motion. (See id. at 1–3) Similarly, the hourly rates are reasonable. 10 They are well within the range of rates charged by comparable professionals for such work in the 11 Seattle area. See, e.g., Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada v. O’Connor, 2017 WL 1479470, slip op. at 12 1 (W.D. Wash. 2017) (Court’s prior finding that hourly rates ranging from $285–$390 in an 13 interpleader action reasonable). Therefore, the requested attorney fees and costs are reasonable. 14 III. CONCLUSION 15 For the foregoing reasons, Protective’s motion for discharge of liability, dismissal with 16 prejudice, and attorney fees and costs (Dkt. No. 23) is GRANTED. Protective is DISMISSED 17 from this action with prejudice and discharged from all further liability relative to the policy and 18 it proceeds. Further, Intervenor Defendants are enjoined from instituting or prosecuting any other 19 proceeding, arbitration, or lawsuit against Protective relative to the policy and/or the policy 20 proceeds. This applies to Intervenor Defendants, their beneficiaries, heirs, agents, attorneys, 21 assigns, and any other parties in privity with them. Protective is also awarded $9,227.44 in 22 attorney fees and costs. 23 // 24 // 25 // 26 // 1 DATED this 13th day of April 2026. A 2 3 4 John C. Coughenour 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26