Pross v. Caribank

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Pross v. Caribank

520 So. 2d 698, 13 Fla. L. Weekly 568, 1988 Fla. App. LEXIS 729, 1988 WL 15452

CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida

DecidedMarch 2, 1988

DocketNo. 87-0504

StatusPublished

This text of 520 So. 2d 698 (Pross v. Caribank) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Pross v. Caribank, 520 So. 2d 698, 13 Fla. L. Weekly 568, 1988 Fla. App. LEXIS 729, 1988 WL 15452 (Fla. Ct. App. 1988).

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Opinion

SALMON, MICHAEL H., Associate Judge.

This case is presented to us with many interesting points, but because we have determined that a material issue of fact existed making entry of summary final judgment inappropriate, we leave those issues to a later time. A brief overview of the facts is necessary.

The appellants (Pross) contracted with Three “D” Corporation (Builder) to construct a residence for them on “Lot 1, Block 9,” for which they paid the entire purchase price, $224,000.00. They later decided they wanted a different house, one to be built on Lot 3, Block 14. As a result, Pross was released from the contract involving Lot 1, Block 9 (which was sold to someone else), and entered into a contract for the purchase of Lot 3, Block 14. The Builder then obtained a loan from Caribank which encumbered Lot 3, Block 14, and two other lots not involved in this appeal.¹ A question of fact exists as to whether this second contract was given to Caribank before it made its loan,² and we conclude that the answer to the question is material. See Holl v. Talcott, 191 So.2d 40 (Fla.1966). The trial court decided the question presumably on the basis that the mortgage of Caribank was recorded prior to the deed to Pross. The effect of knowledge by Cari-bank of the Pross contract, if in fact it had knowledge, was not considered.

Reversed and remanded with directions to vacate the summary final judgment.

ANSTEAD and GLICKSTEIN, JJ., concur.

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SALMON, MICHAEL H., Associate Judge.

This case is presented to us with many interesting points, but because we have determined that a material issue of fact existed making entry of summary final judgment inappropriate, we leave those issues to a later time. A brief overview of the facts is necessary.

The appellants (Pross) contracted with Three “D” Corporation (Builder) to construct a residence for them on “Lot 1, Block 9,” for which they paid the entire purchase price, $224,000.00. They later decided they wanted a different house, one to be built on Lot 3, Block 14. As a result, Pross was released from the contract involving Lot 1, Block 9 (which was sold to someone else), and entered into a contract for the purchase of Lot 3, Block 14. The Builder then obtained a loan from Caribank which encumbered Lot 3, Block 14, and two other lots not involved in this appeal.¹ A question of fact exists as to whether this second contract was given to Caribank before it made its loan,² and we conclude that the answer to the question is material. See Holl v. Talcott, 191 So.2d 40 (Fla.1966). The trial court decided the question presumably on the basis that the mortgage of Caribank was recorded prior to the deed to Pross. The effect of knowledge by Cari-bank of the Pross contract, if in fact it had knowledge, was not considered.

Reversed and remanded with directions to vacate the summary final judgment.

ANSTEAD and GLICKSTEIN, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

520 So. 2d 698, 13 Fla. L. Weekly 568, 1988 Fla. App. LEXIS 729, 1988 WL 15452, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/pross-v-caribank-fladistctapp-1988.

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