PROGRESSIVE MOUNTAIN INSURANCE COMPANY v. AU MEDICAL CENTER, INC.

• Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia
• Decided: April 30, 2025
• Docket: A25A0721
• Status: Published

Opinion

FIFTH DIVISION MCFADDEN, P. J., HODGES and PIPKIN, JJ.

NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be physically received in our clerk’s office within ten days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed. https://www.gaappeals.us/rules

April 30, 2025

In the Court of Appeals of Georgia A25A0721. PROGRESSIVE MOUNTAIN INSURANCE COMPANY v. AU MEDICAL CENTER, INC. et al.

MCFADDEN, Presiding Judge.

Progressive Mountain Insurance Company appeals an order granting AU

Medical Center, Inc.’s motion for summary judgment in AU’s action for satisfaction

of a hospital lien. Contrary to Progressive’s argument on appeal, the lien was

enforceable. So we affirm.

To prevail on summary judgment, the moving party must demonstrate that

there is no genuine issue of material fact, and that the undisputed facts, when viewed

in the nonmovant’s favor, entitle the movant to judgment as a matter of law. See

OCGA § 9-11-56 (c). We review a trial court’s grant of a motion for summary

judgment de novo. Cowart v. Widener, 287 Ga. 622, 624 (1) (a) (697 SE2d 779) (2010). So viewed, the undisputed facts show that Elizabeth Giles was injured while she

was a passenger in a car driven by Progressive’s insured. Giles was a minor at that

time. She received medical treatment from AU, and AU filed a hospital lien for the

cost of that treatment. More than a year later, Giles settled her claims against

Progressive’s insured and signed a release. AU’s lien was not paid.

AU filed a complaint against Progressive, seeking reimbursement under the lien

statute for the charges for the medical care provided to Giles. Progressive answered

the complaint and filed a third-party complaint against Giles, contending that she had

agreed in the release to pay any liens. Giles answered the third-party complaint. Then

all three parties moved for summary judgment.

The trial court granted AU’s motion for summary judgment, but the appellate

record includes no ruling on Progressive’s and Giles’s motions. Progressive filed this

appeal, challenging the grant of summary judgment in favor of AU.

Progressive argues that because Giles was a minor when AU provided medical

treatment to her, she did not owe AU for the cost of that treatment, see OCGA § 19-7-

2; Southern Guar. Ins. Co. v. Sinclair, 228 Ga. App. 386, 387 (491 SE2d 843) (1997),

2 and she could not sue to recover her medical expenses. So, Progressive concludes,

AU’s lien is not enforceable. We disagree.

The statute at issue, OCGA § 44-14-470 (b), provides:

Any . . . corporation operating a hospital . . . shall have a lien for the reasonable charges for hospital . . . care and treatment of an injured person, which lien shall be upon any and all causes of action accruing to the person to whom the care was furnished or to the legal representative of such person on account of injuries giving rise to the causes of action and which necessitated the hospital . . . care . . . . The lien provided for in this subsection is only a lien against such causes of action and shall not be a lien against such injured person. . . .

Our Supreme Court has rejected the principle that “the debt must be owed by the

patient in order for a hospital to foreclose on a lien[,]” because such a condition is not

expressly stated in the statute. MCG Health v. Owners Ins. Co., 288 Ga. 782, 784 (1)

(707 SE2d 349) (2011). See also Dawson v. Hosp. Auth. of Augusta, 98 Ga. App. 792,

793-794 (1) (106 SE2d 807) (1958) (hospital could enforce its lien under materially

similar predecessor statute, even though the injured party was not legally liable to pay

the expenses of her treatment because of her status). The fact that Giles legally did not

3 owe the debt for her medical treatment due to her minority status does not mean that

AU’s lien was not enforceable.

Progressive’s reliance on Sinclair, 228 Ga. App. at 386-388, is misplaced. That

case had nothing to do with a hospital lien, so OCGA § 44-14-470 was not at issue.

Instead, Sinclair concerned an insurer’s claim for reimbursement under the terms of

an insurance policy.

In Sinclair, the insurance company that insured the car in which two minors

were injured paid for the minors’ medical treatment under a medical payments

provision in the policy. Id. at 387. The minors then settled their personal injury claims

against the other driver. Id. The insurer filed an action against the minors for

reimbursement, under a provision of the insurance policy, for the medical care

payments it had made on their behalf. Id.

We agreed with the minors that because they — as minors — were not

responsible for their medical expenses, the settlement with the other driver did not

include compensation for their medical expenses. So the insurer was not entitled to

reimbursement under the terms of the policy. Sinclair, 228 Ga. App. at 387-388. We

concluded that the insurer’s

4 claim for reimbursement of medical expenses under the policy is predicated on the [minors’] having a right of action against [the other driver] for the expenses. Because it is clear that no such right of action exists, [the insurer] is not entitled to reimbursement, and the trial court did not err in denying [the insurer’s] motion for summary judgment and granting summary judgment to [the minors].

Id. at 388.

Progressive argues that AU’s lien should be limited so that it attaches to causes

of action seeking medical expenses paid on behalf of Giles. It argues that since a cause

of action for the expenses of Giles’s medical care was vested in Giles’s parents (and

there is no indication that they filed such an action), AU’s lien was unenforceable.

The statute, however, does not impose such a limitation. Rather it provides that

the lien attaches to “any and all causes of action accruing to the person to whom the

care was furnished or to the legal representative of such person on account of injuries

giving rise to the causes of action and which necessitated the hospital . . . care . . . .”

OCGA § 44-14-470 (b) (emphasis supplied). We may not “impose a requirement to

the statute that [is] not expressly stated therein.” MCG Health, 288 Ga. at 785 (1).

Judgment affirmed. Hodges and Pipkin, JJ., concur.