Progressive Marathon Insurance Company v. Antoinette Rivera

• Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida
• Decided: April 2, 2026
• Docket: 6D2025-1304
• Status: Published

Opinion

SIXTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL STATE OF FLORIDA _____________________________

Case No. 6D2025-1304 Lower Tribunal No. 2024-CA-000351-O _____________________________

PROGRESSIVE MARATHON INSURANCE COMPANY,

Appellant,

v.

ANTOINETTE RIVERA,

Appellee.

_____________________________

Appeal pursuant to Fla. R. App. P. 9.130 from the Circuit Court for Orange County. A. James Craner, Judge.

April 2, 2026

PER CURIAM.

DISMISSED. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.130(a)(3)(C)(i) (“Appeals to the district

courts of appeal of nonfinal orders are limited to those that . . . determine . . . the

jurisdiction of the person.” (emphasis added)); Torres v. SBE Hotel Grp., LLC, 403

So. 3d 883, 885 (Fla. 3d DCA 2023) (“The rule requires that an interlocutory order

on appeal must actually adjudicate and determine the personal jurisdiction issue.”

(quoting Dexx Med. Indus., CA v. Fitesa Naotecidos S.A., 346 So. 3d 1215, 1217

(Fla. 3d DCA 2022))); see also Walker v. Fla. Gas Transmission Co., LLC, 134 So.

3d 571, 572 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (“[T]he categories of non-final orders subject to interlocutory appeal are narrowly construed.” (citing Travelers Ins. Co. v. Bruns,

443 So. 2d 959, 961 (Fla. 1984))).

NARDELLA and WHITE, JJ., concur. PRATT, J., concurs, and concurs specially.

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND DISPOSITION THEREOF IF TIMELY FILED _____________________________

PRATT, J., specially concurring.

I fully concur in the majority’s decision to dismiss this appeal. Because the

trial court’s nonfinal order did not “determine . . . the jurisdiction of the person”

within the meaning of Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3)(C)(i), the

nonfinal order does not fall within the limited category of nonfinal orders that may

be interlocutorily appealed. See generally Fla. R. App. P. 9.130. We therefore lack

jurisdiction to reach the merits of Appellant’s arguments regarding the nonfinal

order at this juncture. Compare, e.g., art. V, § 4(b)(1), Fla. Const. (“District courts

of appeal . . . may review interlocutory orders in such cases to the extent provided

by rules adopted by the supreme court.”), and Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(b)(1)(B)

(“District courts of appeal shall review, by appeal . . . nonfinal orders as prescribed

by rule 9.130.”), and Fla. R. App. P. 9.130(a)(1) (“This rule applies to appeals to the

district courts of appeal of the nonfinal orders authorized herein[.]”), and Fla. R.

App. P. 9.130(a)(3)(C)(i) (“Appeals to the district courts of appeal of nonfinal orders 2 are limited to those that . . . determine . . . the jurisdiction of the person.”), with, e.g.,

art. V, § 4(b)(1), Fla. Const. (“District courts of appeal shall have jurisdiction to hear

appeals, that may be taken as a matter of right, from final judgments or orders of

trial courts . . . not directly appealable to the supreme court or a circuit court.”), and

Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(b)(1)(A) (“District courts of appeal shall review, by appeal . .

. final orders of trial courts . . . not directly reviewable by the supreme court or a

circuit court.”), and Fla. R. App. P. 9.110(a)(1) (“This rule applies to those

proceedings that . . . invoke the appeal jurisdiction of the courts described in [the

enumerated rules, including rule 9.030(b)(1)(a)] . . . .”), and Fla. R. App. P. 9.110(h)

(“[T]he court may review any ruling or matter [to which rule 9.110 applies]

occurring before filing of the notice [of appeal].”), and Fla. R. App. P. 9.130(h)

(“This rule will not preclude initial review of a nonfinal order on appeal from the

final order in the cause.”).

Alyssa M. Reiter, of Wicker Smith O’Hara McCoy & Ford, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for Appellant.

Mary J. Walter, of Walter Appeals & General Litigation, Orlando, for Appellee.