1 May 13, 2026 2 SEAN F. MCAVOY, CLERK
3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
6 EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 7 PROGRESSIVE CASUALTY No. 2:25-CV-00367-RLP INSURANCE COMPANY, 8 ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S Plaintiff, MOTION FOR DEFAULT 9 JUDGMENT; AND DEFAULT v. JUDGMENT 10 BREMMER CONSTRUCTION, INC., 11 JOHN BRYANT, and JEANNIE BRYANT, 12 Defendants. 13 14 Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Progressive Casualty Insurance Company’s 15 (Progressive) Motion for Default Judgment. ECF No. 9. The Court has considered 16 the record and is fully informed. No Defendant has appeared or otherwise 17 participated in the pending action, and no Defendant has responded to the Order of 18 Default issued by the Clerk of Court on February 27, 2026. ECF No. 8. For the 19 reasons discussed below, the Court grants the Motion. 20 // 1 BACKGROUND 2 The following facts are taken from Progressive’s Complaint.
3 Progressive issued Defendants John and Jeannie Bryant an auto liability 4 policy (the “Policy”). ECF No. 1, ¶7. Under the Policy, Progressive agreed to pay 5 damages for which an “insured person” became legally responsible for because of
6 an accident. Id., ¶13. The Policy defined “Insured person” to mean the policy 7 holders with respect to an accident arising out of the use of an “auto.” Id., ¶14. In 8 turn, the Policy defined “auto” as: 9 “Auto” means a land motor vehicle: a. of the private passenger, pickup body, or cargo van type; 10 b. designed for operation principally upon public roads; c. with at least four wheels; and 11 d. with a gross vehicle weight rating of 12,000 pounds or less, according to the manufacturer’s specifications. 12 Id., ¶15. 13 On or about August 16, 2023, the Bryants and Defendant Bremmer 14 Construction, Inc. were sued in Washington state court. Id., ¶8. The state court 15 lawsuit alleges Mr. Bryant drove a 1995 Peterbilt semi-truck involved in an 16 accident. Id., ¶9. The truck weighs at least 33,000lbs, and is not of the private 17 passenger, pickup body, or cargo van type. Id., ¶¶17-18. 18 Defendants tendered the state court lawsuit to Progressive, who agreed to 19 defend them with a reservation of rights. Id., ¶¶10-11. Progressive then filed the 20 instant action for declaratory judgment, seeking a declaration that it has no duty to 1 defend or indemnify Defendants as the vehicle involved in the accident does not 2 qualify as an “auto” under the Policy. Id., ¶¶19-25.
3 Progressive filed the instant Complaint on September 18, 2025. ECF No. 1. 4 Proofs of Service on Defendants were filed on December 12, 2025. ECF Nos. 4, 5. 5 Progressive filed its motion for Entry of Default on February 20, 2026, ECF No. 6,
6 and an Order of Default was entered on February 27. ECF No. 8. Progressive now 7 moves for default judgment against all Defendants. ECF No. 9. 8 LEGAL STANDARD 9 Obtaining a default judgment is a two-step process. See FRCP 55. First,
10 “when a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed 11 to plead or otherwise defend . . . the clerk must enter the party’s default. FRCP 12 55(a). Second, once the clerk has entered default against a party, the moving party
13 may seek default judgment. FRCP 55(b). When the claim is for non-monetary 14 relief, the moving party must move the court for entry of default judgment. FRC{ 15 55(b)(2). The decision to grant default judgment lies within the discretion of the 16 court. PepsiCo. Inc. v. Cal Sec. Cans, 238 F. Supp.2d 1172, 1174 (C.D. Cal. 2002)
17 (citing Draper v. Coombs, 792 F.2d 915, 924–25 (9th Cir. 1986)). In deciding 18 whether default judgment is appropriate, the court may consider the following 19 factors: (1) possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff; (2) merits of the plaintiff’s
20 substantive claim; (3) sufficiency of the complaint; (4) sum of money at stake in 1 the action; (5) possibility of a dispute concerning material facts; (6) whether 2 default was due to excusable neglect; and (7) the strong public policy underlying
3 the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decision on the merits. Eitel v. 4 McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471–72 (9th Cir. 1986). 5 Once the clerk enters default against a party, the well-pleaded allegations of
6 the complaint are taken as true, except for allegations related to damages. See 7 Geddes v. United Fin. Grp., 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1977). Furthermore, 8 allegations are only true as to those defaulting defendants. Shanghai Automation 9 Instrument Co., Ltd. v. Kuei, 194 F.Supp.2d 995, 1000 (N.D. Cal 2001).
10 DISCUSSION 11 Progressive moves for default judgment, seeking declaratory relief that it has 12 no duty to defend or indemnify Defendants.
13 A. Jurisdiction 14 “When entry of judgment is sought against a party who has failed to plead or 15 otherwise defend, a district court has an affirmative duty to look into its 16 jurisdiction over both the subject matter and the parties” to “determine whether it
17 has the power . . . to enter the judgment in the first place.” In re Tuli, 172 F.3d 707, 18 712 (9th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted). 19 Where an insurer seeks a declaration that it does not owe a duty to defend or
20 indemnify under an issued insurance policy, the amount in controversy for 1 purposes of establishing diversity jurisdiction is the value of the underlying tort 2 action. Budget Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Higashiguchi, 109 F.3d 1471, 1473 (9th Cir.
3 1997). 4 1. Subject Matter Jurisdiction 5 Subject matter jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Progressive is
6 a foreign insurer organized under the laws of Ohio with a principal place of 7 business in Ohio. ECF No. 1, ¶1. Bremmer Construction, Inc. is a business 8 organized under the laws of Washington with a principal place of business in 9 Washington. Id., ¶2. The Bryants are residents of Wenatchee, Washington. Id., ¶3.
10 Progressive alleges the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. Id., ¶5. 11 2. Personal Jurisdiction 12 The Court finds an adequate basis to exercise personal jurisdiction over
13 Defendants, as the Bryants are domiciled in Washington and Bremmer 14 Construction, Inc. has its principal place of business in Washington. Id., ¶¶2-3. 15 Further, venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(b)(1) and 1391(b)(2), as all 16 Defendants reside or have their principal place of business within this district and
17 this case concerns a motor vehicle accident which occurred within this district. Id., 18 ¶¶ 2-3, 9. 19 //
20 1 B. Procedural Requirements 2 The process for obtaining a default judgment is set forth in FRCP 55(b) and
3 LCivR 55(b). The Court is satisfied that Plaintiff has complied with these 4 procedural requirements.
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1 May 13, 2026 2 SEAN F. MCAVOY, CLERK
3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
6 EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 7 PROGRESSIVE CASUALTY No. 2:25-CV-00367-RLP INSURANCE COMPANY, 8 ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S Plaintiff, MOTION FOR DEFAULT 9 JUDGMENT; AND DEFAULT v. JUDGMENT 10 BREMMER CONSTRUCTION, INC., 11 JOHN BRYANT, and JEANNIE BRYANT, 12 Defendants. 13 14 Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Progressive Casualty Insurance Company’s 15 (Progressive) Motion for Default Judgment. ECF No. 9. The Court has considered 16 the record and is fully informed. No Defendant has appeared or otherwise 17 participated in the pending action, and no Defendant has responded to the Order of 18 Default issued by the Clerk of Court on February 27, 2026. ECF No. 8. For the 19 reasons discussed below, the Court grants the Motion. 20 // 1 BACKGROUND 2 The following facts are taken from Progressive’s Complaint.
3 Progressive issued Defendants John and Jeannie Bryant an auto liability 4 policy (the “Policy”). ECF No. 1, ¶7. Under the Policy, Progressive agreed to pay 5 damages for which an “insured person” became legally responsible for because of
6 an accident. Id., ¶13. The Policy defined “Insured person” to mean the policy 7 holders with respect to an accident arising out of the use of an “auto.” Id., ¶14. In 8 turn, the Policy defined “auto” as: 9 “Auto” means a land motor vehicle: a. of the private passenger, pickup body, or cargo van type; 10 b. designed for operation principally upon public roads; c. with at least four wheels; and 11 d. with a gross vehicle weight rating of 12,000 pounds or less, according to the manufacturer’s specifications. 12 Id., ¶15. 13 On or about August 16, 2023, the Bryants and Defendant Bremmer 14 Construction, Inc. were sued in Washington state court. Id., ¶8. The state court 15 lawsuit alleges Mr. Bryant drove a 1995 Peterbilt semi-truck involved in an 16 accident. Id., ¶9. The truck weighs at least 33,000lbs, and is not of the private 17 passenger, pickup body, or cargo van type. Id., ¶¶17-18. 18 Defendants tendered the state court lawsuit to Progressive, who agreed to 19 defend them with a reservation of rights. Id., ¶¶10-11. Progressive then filed the 20 instant action for declaratory judgment, seeking a declaration that it has no duty to 1 defend or indemnify Defendants as the vehicle involved in the accident does not 2 qualify as an “auto” under the Policy. Id., ¶¶19-25.
3 Progressive filed the instant Complaint on September 18, 2025. ECF No. 1. 4 Proofs of Service on Defendants were filed on December 12, 2025. ECF Nos. 4, 5. 5 Progressive filed its motion for Entry of Default on February 20, 2026, ECF No. 6,
6 and an Order of Default was entered on February 27. ECF No. 8. Progressive now 7 moves for default judgment against all Defendants. ECF No. 9. 8 LEGAL STANDARD 9 Obtaining a default judgment is a two-step process. See FRCP 55. First,
10 “when a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed 11 to plead or otherwise defend . . . the clerk must enter the party’s default. FRCP 12 55(a). Second, once the clerk has entered default against a party, the moving party
13 may seek default judgment. FRCP 55(b). When the claim is for non-monetary 14 relief, the moving party must move the court for entry of default judgment. FRC{ 15 55(b)(2). The decision to grant default judgment lies within the discretion of the 16 court. PepsiCo. Inc. v. Cal Sec. Cans, 238 F. Supp.2d 1172, 1174 (C.D. Cal. 2002)
17 (citing Draper v. Coombs, 792 F.2d 915, 924–25 (9th Cir. 1986)). In deciding 18 whether default judgment is appropriate, the court may consider the following 19 factors: (1) possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff; (2) merits of the plaintiff’s
20 substantive claim; (3) sufficiency of the complaint; (4) sum of money at stake in 1 the action; (5) possibility of a dispute concerning material facts; (6) whether 2 default was due to excusable neglect; and (7) the strong public policy underlying
3 the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decision on the merits. Eitel v. 4 McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471–72 (9th Cir. 1986). 5 Once the clerk enters default against a party, the well-pleaded allegations of
6 the complaint are taken as true, except for allegations related to damages. See 7 Geddes v. United Fin. Grp., 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1977). Furthermore, 8 allegations are only true as to those defaulting defendants. Shanghai Automation 9 Instrument Co., Ltd. v. Kuei, 194 F.Supp.2d 995, 1000 (N.D. Cal 2001).
10 DISCUSSION 11 Progressive moves for default judgment, seeking declaratory relief that it has 12 no duty to defend or indemnify Defendants.
13 A. Jurisdiction 14 “When entry of judgment is sought against a party who has failed to plead or 15 otherwise defend, a district court has an affirmative duty to look into its 16 jurisdiction over both the subject matter and the parties” to “determine whether it
17 has the power . . . to enter the judgment in the first place.” In re Tuli, 172 F.3d 707, 18 712 (9th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted). 19 Where an insurer seeks a declaration that it does not owe a duty to defend or
20 indemnify under an issued insurance policy, the amount in controversy for 1 purposes of establishing diversity jurisdiction is the value of the underlying tort 2 action. Budget Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Higashiguchi, 109 F.3d 1471, 1473 (9th Cir.
3 1997). 4 1. Subject Matter Jurisdiction 5 Subject matter jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Progressive is
6 a foreign insurer organized under the laws of Ohio with a principal place of 7 business in Ohio. ECF No. 1, ¶1. Bremmer Construction, Inc. is a business 8 organized under the laws of Washington with a principal place of business in 9 Washington. Id., ¶2. The Bryants are residents of Wenatchee, Washington. Id., ¶3.
10 Progressive alleges the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. Id., ¶5. 11 2. Personal Jurisdiction 12 The Court finds an adequate basis to exercise personal jurisdiction over
13 Defendants, as the Bryants are domiciled in Washington and Bremmer 14 Construction, Inc. has its principal place of business in Washington. Id., ¶¶2-3. 15 Further, venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(b)(1) and 1391(b)(2), as all 16 Defendants reside or have their principal place of business within this district and
17 this case concerns a motor vehicle accident which occurred within this district. Id., 18 ¶¶ 2-3, 9. 19 //
20 1 B. Procedural Requirements 2 The process for obtaining a default judgment is set forth in FRCP 55(b) and
3 LCivR 55(b). The Court is satisfied that Plaintiff has complied with these 4 procedural requirements. In particular, the Court notes that Plaintiff’s counsel 5 previously submitted a declaration on March 10, 2026, that complies with the
6 requirements of LCivR 55(b)(1)(A)-(B). ECF No. 10. 7 C. Substantive Requirements 8 As stated above, the Court considers the seven Eitel factors in exercising its 9 discretion to enter a default judgment. 782 F.2d at 1471-72.
10 1. Possibility of Prejudice 11 Under the first Eitel factor, “prejudice exists where the plaintiff has no 12 recourse for recovery other than default judgment.” Curtis v. Illumination Arts,
13 Inc., 33 F. Supp. 3d 1200, 1211 (W.D. Wash. 2014) (citation and quotation marks 14 omitted). Progressive filed its initial complaint on September 18, 2025. ECF No. 1. 15 Defendants have had ample opportunity to respond or otherwise participate in the 16 litigation. Under these circumstances, Progressive will be prejudiced if it is not
17 permitted to proceed against Defendants by way of default judgment. The first 18 Eitel factor weighs in favor of default judgment. 19 2. Merit of Claims and Sufficiency of the Complaint
20 1 The second and third factors are often weighed together, see Curtis, 33 F. 2 Supp. 3d at 1211, and favor a default judgment when the “allegations in the
3 complaint are sufficient to state a claim on which the [plaintiff] may recover.” 4 Danning v. Lavine, 572 F.2d 1386, 1388 (9th Cir. 1978). Progressive has alleged 5 specific and detailed facts in its Complaint that support the entry of a declaration in
6 its favor. The second and third Eitel factors weigh in favor of default judgment. 7 3. The Sum of Money at Stake 8 The fourth Eitel factor, the sum of money at stake, generally does not weigh 9 against default judgment where a plaintiff requests only declaratory relief. See,
10 e.g., PepsiCo, Inc., 238 F.Supp.2d 1172, 1176-77 (C.D. Cal. 2002). While the 11 Court’s issuance of a declaration that Progressive has no duty to indemnify or 12 defend is likely to have financial repercussions for Defendants, it is unclear from
13 the record whether the underlying state court lawsuit is ongoing, or the specific 14 amount in controversy. Therefore, this factor does not weigh for or against default 15 judgment. 16 4. Possibility of a Dispute Concerning Material Facts
17 Where no dispute has been raised, the likelihood that any such dispute exists 18 is remote. See Brow Room v. Med. Laser Experts, LLC, 2021 WL 5830023, at *2 19 (E.D. Wash. Dec. 8, 2021). There is no information before the Court that supports
20 1 the possibility of a dispute concerning the terms of the Policy or whether coverage 2 exists. This factor weighs in favor of default judgment.
3 5. Excusable Neglect 4 “Generally, courts do not find excusable neglect when defendants were 5 properly served with the complaint.” BMO Bank N.A. v. Raiden, LLC, 2023 WL
6 8934854, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 27, 2023) (citation omitted). Defendants were 7 served with the Complaint in November 2025. ECF Nos. 4, 5. Defendants have not 8 appeared in this lawsuit, opposed the motion, or sought vacatur of the default. 9 There is no indication that Defendants’ default is due to excusable neglect.
10 Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of default judgment. 11 6. Policy Consideration 12 Last, the general rule is that “[c]ases should be decided upon their merits
13 whenever reasonably possible.” Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1472 (citing Pena v. Seguros La 14 Comercial, S.A., 770 F.2d 811, 814 (9th Cir. 1985)). While this factor inherently 15 weighs against default judgment, “the mere existence of” FRCP 55(b) “indicates 16 that this Eitel factor is not alone dispositive.” Curtis, 33 F. Supp. 3d at 1213
17 (quoting Microsoft Corp. v. Lopez, 2009 WL 959219, at 3 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 7, 18 2009)) (quotation marks and alteration omitted). “[W]here a defendant’s failure to 19 appear ‘makes a decision on the merits impracticable, if not impossible,’ entry of
20 default judgment is nonetheless warranted.” Elec. Frontier Found. v. Global 1|| Equity Memt. (SA) Pty Ltd., 290 F. Supp. 3d 923, 948 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (quoting Craigslist, Inc. vy. Naturemarket, Inc., 694 F. Supp. 2d 1039, 1061 (N.D. Cal. 3|| 2010)). Defendants’ failure to participate in this litigation has made a decision on 4|| the merits impossible. The final Eite/ factor weighs in favor of default judgment. 5 In sum, the Eite/ factors weigh in favor of granting default judgment. 6 Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED: 7 1. The Motion for Entry of Default Judgment, ECF No. 9, is GRANTED. 9 2. Progressive has no contractual duty to defend or indemnify Bremmer 10|| Construction, John Bryant, and/or Jeannie Bryant with respect to the underlying Washington lawsuit. 12 IT IS SO ORDERED. The Clerk of Court is directed to file this order and 13 || CLOSE the file. 14 DATED May 13, 2026. I 16 ~~ REBECCA L.PENNELL UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 17 18 19 20
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT; ANTI) DNEBATIT T TWINGNMENT * O