Professional Window Tinting, Inc. v. Jay Wallace, Brand Imaging, Inc. and Lincoln University

• Court: Superior Court of Delaware
• Decided: March 23, 2026
• Docket: N23C-11-062 FWW
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

PROFESSIONAL WINDOW TINTING, ) INC., a Delaware corporation, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) C.A. No. N23C-11-062 FWW v. ) ) JAY WALLACE, BRAND IMAGING, ) INC. and LINCOLN UNIVERSITY, ) ) Defendants. )

Submitted: January 21, 2026 Decided: March 23, 2026

Upon Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss GRANTED

ORDER

Robert C. McDonald, Esquire; Adrienne M. McDonald, Esquire, SILVERMAN McDONALD & FRIEDMAN, 1523 Concord Pike, Suite 400, Wilmington, DE 19803, Attorneys for Plaintiff Professional Window Tinting, Inc.

William J. “Jay” Wallace, 540 B Glenhurst Ct. Salisbury, MD 21804, Defendant, pro se.

WHARTON, J. This 23rd day of March, 2026, upon consideration of the Revised Motion to

Dismiss (“Motion”) of Defendant William J. “Jay” Wallace (“Wallace”), 1 Plaintiff 0F

Professional Window Tinting, Inc.’s (“PWT”) Motion to Strike Defendant’s Motion

to Dismiss or in the Alternative, Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to

Dismiss, 2 Wallace’s Reply, 3 and the record in this case, it appears to the Court that: 1F 2F

1. On November 8, 20253 PWT brought this breach of contract and debt

action against Wallace, Brand Imaging, Inc. (“Brand Imaging”) and Lincoln

University (“Lincoln”). 4 3F The Complaint alleges that Wallace, individually, and

owner of Brand Imaging and agent of Lincoln, entered into a contract in Delaware

with PWT for the installation of tinting on windows at Lincoln in the amount of

$109,999.00. 5 The Complaint further alleges that PWT fully performed under the 4F

contract, but Wallace failed to pay a balance of $49,999.00. 6 On June 26, 2024, 5F

PWT voluntarily dismissed Lincoln. 7 6F

2. In a 13 page motion, Wallace moves to dismiss under Superior Court

Civil Rules 12(b)(1) through 12(b)(6), inclusive, for improperly identifying the

1 Mot. to Dismiss, D.I. 35 (“MTD”). The original motion was filed on November 25, 2025, D.I. 33. 2 Pl.’s Mot. to Strike, D.I. 37. 3 Def.’s Reply, D.I. 39 4 Complaint, D.I. 1. 5 Id. at ⁋⁋ 5, 7. 6 Id. at ⁋⁋ 8, 9. 7 D.I. 14. 2 Defendants, and, anticipatorily, improperly attempting to pierce the corporate veil. 8 7F

Wallace moves for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction claiming, that PWT has “provided no written agreement signed by him

individually, no evidence of a personal guarantee and no factual basis showing that

[he] not Brand Imaging Graphics, LLC, contracted with [PWT].” 9 Further, any 8F

personal liability he may have had was discharged in bankruptcy in 2023. 109F

3. Wallace also contends that the Complaint should be dismissed under

Rules 12(b)(2) and 12(b)(3) for lack of personal jurisdiction and improper venue. 1110F

He argues that the Complaint alleges no facts establishing that he has minimum

contacts with Delaware – the work was performed in Pennsylvania, he is a Maryland

resident and the alleged contract performance was entirely outside of Delaware. 12 11F

The Motion maintains the same holds true for venue – “none of the operative facts

contract negotiations, performance, payment, or alleged breach – occurred in

Delaware.” 13 12F

8 MTD, D.I. 35. 9 Id. ⁋ 21. 10 Id. at ⁋ 22. 11 Id. at ⁋⁋ 24-26. 12 Id. at ⁋ 24. 13 Id. at ⁋ 25. 3 4. Wallace’s Motion argues that the Complaint fails to state a claim under

Rule 12(b)(6). 14 He claims that no valid contract is alleged, 15 no individual liability 13F 14F

is pled, 16 and damages are not pled with the required specificity. 17 15F 16F

5. The Motion’s next argument is that service on him was untimely,

implicating the statute of limitations, and warranting dismissal under Rule 12(b)(2).

Wallace contends that he was not served for nearly two years after the Complaint

was filed, requiring dismissal under Rule 4(j), depriving this Court of personal

jurisdiction. 18 Further, the delay defeats the intent of the three year statute of 17F

limitation found in 10 Del. C. § 8106. 19 18F

6. Wallace claims that he was improperly sued as “Jay Wallace” when his

real name is William J. Wallace and that Defendant Brand Imaging, Inc. is an entity

that never existed. 20 The company’s correct name was Brand Imaging Graphics, 19F

LLC, but it was dissolved in August 2023. 21 “Because Plaintiff sued the wrong 20F

14 Id. at ⁋⁋ 27-30. 15 Id. at ⁋ 27. 16 Id. at ⁋ 28. 17 Id. at ⁋ 29 18 Id. at ⁋⁋ 31, 32. 19 Id. at ⁋ 32. 20 Id. at ⁋ 33. 21 Id. 4 names and attempted to proceed against a dissolved entity with no capacity to be

sued, dismissal is required under Rule 12(b)(4).” 22 21F

6. The Motion’s last ground for dismissal is entitled “Corporate Veil

Piercing Defense (Anticipatory).” The Motion states that to the extent the Plaintiff

may attempt to hold him personally liable by piercing the corporate veil, that effort

would fail. 23 22F

7. PWT responded by moving to strike the Motion, or alternatively, to deny

it. 24 PWT disputes all of Wallace’s Rule 12(b) arguments, observes that he relies on 23F

information outside of the pleadings, giving the Court the option of converting the

motion to one for summary judgment, and fails to comply with the Court’s page

limit of six pages for motions. 25 24F It asks the Court to strike the motion. 26 25F

Alternatively, PWT notes that Delaware is a notice pleading state, and under that

standard, Wallace’s Rule 12(b) contentions are without merit. 27 26F

8. Wallace opposes PWT’s Motion to Strike. 28 He maintains it must be 27F

denied because Rule 12(f) only allows the Court to strike pleadings and motions are

22 Id. at ⁋ 35. 23 Id. at ⁋⁋ 36-38. 24 Pl.’s Mot. to Strike., D.I. 37. 25 Id. at ⁋ 2. 26 Id. at ⁋ 3. 27 Id. at ⁋ 4. 28 Def.’s Opp. to Pl.’s Mot. to Strike, D.I. 39 5 not pleadings under Rule 7(b). 29 Further, he argues that striking his motion for 28F

exceeding the Court’s page limitation is an overly harsh sanction to impose upon a

pro se litigant. 30 He proposes that he be allowed to refile a motion that conforms 29F

with the rules if the Court finds his motion noncompliant. 31 Finally, he asks the 30F

Court to disregard matters outside of the pleadings in his motion and refrain from

exercising its discretion to convert the motion to a summary judgment motion. 32 31F

9. Superior Court Civil Rule 78(b) provides, “Motions shall not exceed

six pages in length.” 33 At 13 pages, the Motion to Dismiss is more than double the 32F

authorized length. While this Court has excused de minimus defects, 34 it finds the 3 F

defect here substantial. Absent the ability to strike nonconforming motions, the

Court would be powerless to enforce Rule 78(b). Accordingly, the Motion to

Dismiss is stricken. Nevertheless, in light of Wallace’s pro se status 35 and in the 34F

interests of justice, the Court grants him leave to file a conforming motion.

29 Id. at ⁋⁋ 4-10. 30 Id. at ⁋ 11. 31 Id. at ⁋ 12. 32 Id. at ⁋⁋ 13-17. 33 Super. Ct. Civ. R. 70(b). 34 See, Kostyshyn v. Board of Adjustment (Town of Bellefonte), 2007 WL 3380126 at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 17, 2007); State v. Stevens, 2017 WL 2480803 at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. 2017. 35 Wallace may be a pro se litigant, but his papers display more legal acumen than the typical pro se party. 6 THEREFORE, Plaintiff Professional Window Tinting, Inc.’s Motion to

Strike is GRANTED. Defendant Jay Wallace is granted leave to file a Motion to

Dismiss conforming to Superior Court Civil Rule 78(b) no later than 20 days from

the date of this Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Ferris W. Wharton Ferris W. Wharton, J.