Proctor v. United States

D.C. Circuit

Proctor v. United States

177 F.2d 656, 85 U.S. App. D.C. 341, 1949 U.S. App. LEXIS 3259

CourtCourt of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit

DecidedOctober 17, 1949

Docket10228

StatusPublished

Cited by20 cases

This text of 177 F.2d 656 (Proctor v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Proctor v. United States, 177 F.2d 656, 85 U.S. App. D.C. 341, 1949 U.S. App. LEXIS 3259 (D.C. Cir. 1949).

Pincite

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

This case presents the question whether voluntary drunkenness constitutes a defense *657 to a charge of unauthorized use of a vehicle, under § 2204 of Title 22, District of Columbia Code (1940), which provides, inter alia: “Any person who, without the consent of the owner, shall take, use, operate, or remove, * * * an automobile or motor vehicle, and operate or drive * * * the same * * * for his own profit, use or purpose shall be punished * *

No rule is more firmly established than that voluntary drunkenness is no defense for a criminal act, unless specific intent or knowledge is an element of the offense, when drunkenness may be shown to prove mental incapacity to form the specific intent.

It is contended here that the crime involves a specific intent to temporarily appropriate the vehicle for a use inconsistent with the rights of the owner. That, of course, is a necessary result—the natural consequence of taking and using a vehicle without consent. But nothing in the statutory definition makes that result a special element of the offense itself. In our opinion, violation of the statute involves only a “general criminal intent," which may be presumed from doing the prohibited acts. This view, we think, does not conflict with the decision in Pennsylvania Indemnity Fire Corporation v. Aldridge, 1941, 73 App.D.C. 161, 117 F.2d 774, 133 A.L.R. 914. The judgment is

Affirmed.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

PER CURIAM.

This case presents the question whether voluntary drunkenness constitutes a defense *657 to a charge of unauthorized use of a vehicle, under § 2204 of Title 22, District of Columbia Code (1940), which provides, inter alia: “Any person who, without the consent of the owner, shall take, use, operate, or remove, * * * an automobile or motor vehicle, and operate or drive * * * the same * * * for his own profit, use or purpose shall be punished * *

No rule is more firmly established than that voluntary drunkenness is no defense for a criminal act, unless specific intent or knowledge is an element of the offense, when drunkenness may be shown to prove mental incapacity to form the specific intent.

It is contended here that the crime involves a specific intent to temporarily appropriate the vehicle for a use inconsistent with the rights of the owner. That, of course, is a necessary result—the natural consequence of taking and using a vehicle without consent. But nothing in the statutory definition makes that result a special element of the offense itself. In our opinion, violation of the statute involves only a “general criminal intent," which may be presumed from doing the prohibited acts. This view, we think, does not conflict with the decision in Pennsylvania Indemnity Fire Corporation v. Aldridge, 1941, 73 App.D.C. 161, 117 F.2d 774, 133 A.L.R. 914. The judgment is

Affirmed.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

177 F.2d 656, 85 U.S. App. D.C. 341, 1949 U.S. App. LEXIS 3259, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/proctor-v-united-states-cadc-1949.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack