Proctor v. Biden

• Court: District Court, S.D. Florida
• Decided: August 30, 2022
• Docket: 1:22-cv-22714
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

Case No. 22-cv-22714-BLOOM

LESSIE EARL PROCTOR,

Plaintiff,

v.

JOE BIDEN,

Defendant. ____________/

ORDER DISMISSING CASE THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon a sua sponte review of the record. Plaintiff Lessie Earl Proctor has filed what he purports to be a “1983 Civil Action” against the President of the United States, Joe Biden. ECF No. [1] at 1. Although Plaintiff claims to be seeking one billion dollars in damages and a pardon from the President, the substance of his claims arise from the denial of a previously filed 28 U.S.C. § 2255 Motion to Vacate in Case No. 22-cv-20066-RUIZ.1 See id. at 2 (“In Pensacola Florida the 922(g) were droped [sic]. The courts in Miami charged with 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) for that to stick.”); see also ECF No. [1-1] at 1–7 (attaching the § 2255 motion filed in Case No. 22-cv-20066). Mindful of the obligation “to look behind the label of a pro se inmate’s motion to determine if it is cognizable under a different statutory framework[,]” United States v. Stossel, 348 F.3d 1320, 1322 n.2 (11th Cir. 2003), the Court reconstrues Plaintiff’s Complaint as a successive § 2255 motion and dismisses it for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. To start, the Court is confident that this instant action is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C.

1 The Court has taken judicial notice of the docket sheet and documents filed in Case No. 22-cv-20066- RUIZ, which is accessible through PACER and CM/ECF via https://flsd-ecf.sso.dcn/cgi-bin/iquery.pl. See Fed. R. Evid. 201; United States v. Rey, 811 F.2d 1453, 1457 n.5 (11th Cir. 1987) (“A court may take judicial notice of its own records and the records of inferior courts.”). § 1983. Section 1983 only applies to officials who operate under “color of state law,” so “§ 1983 actions do not lie against federal [officials].” Fullman v. Graddick, 739 F.2d 553, 560 (11th Cir. 1984). If Plaintiff wished to sue a federal official such as President Biden, then we would have to analyze the suit under the dictates of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of

Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). But Bivens also cannot apply in this instance since, by Plaintiff’s own admission, President Biden is not personally responsible for any identifiable constitutional harm. ECF No. [1] at 1–2; see also Thibeaux v. United States Att’y Gen., 275 F. App’x 889, 892 (11th Cir. 2008) (“Bivens claims can be brought against federal officers in their individual capacities only; they do not apply to federal officers acting in their individual capacities.”).2 Conversely, a § 2255 motion is “the exclusive mechanism for a federal prisoner to seek collateral relief” from his or her federal sentence. McCarthan v. Dir. of Goodwill Indus.-Suncoast, Inc., 851 F.3d 1076, 1081 (11th Cir. 2017). That is clearly the object of the instant “Complaint” since Plaintiff is explicitly arguing that he is serving an illegal federal sentence. See ECF No. [1] at 1–2. Plaintiff previously filed a § 2255 motion in Case No. 22-cv-20066, which challenged the

same sentence, but Judge Rodolfo A. Ruiz rejected Plaintiff’s argument and expressly found that Plaintiff’s sentence was legal. See Order Dismissing Motion to Vacate, Proctor v. United States, No. 22-cv-20066 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 11, 2022), ECF No. [4] at 4 (“Both Movant’s Indictment and the jury verdict form clearly show that the sole predicate offenses for Movant’s § 924(c) convictions were [substantive Hobbs Act robberies], and so Movant’s § 924(c) convictions are plainly legal.”). Since Plaintiff “previously filed a § 2255 motion to vacate, he must apply for and receive permission from the court of appeals before filing a successive § 2255 motion.” Samak v. Warden,

2 On a more fundamental level, the Court would still dismiss the case even if it could be construed under § 1983 or Bivens. Plaintiff has failed to pay the filing fee or file a motion to proceed in forma pauperis, and, therefore, the case could be properly dismissed for failure to prosecute under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). See, e.g., Castro v. Dir., F.D.I.C., 449 F. App’x 786, 788 (11th Cir. 2011). Case No. 22-cv-22714-BLOOM

FCC Coleman-Medium, 766 F.3d 1271, 1274 (11th Cir. 2014). This same restriction applies even if Plaintiff was merely seeking reconsideration of Judge Ruiz’s Order under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). See Farris v. United States, 333 F.3d 1211, 1216 (11th Cir. 2003) (“Because Farris was moving to vacate his sentences and he previously had filed a § 2255 motion, the district court did not err in construing his [Rule 60(b) motion] as a successive § 2255 motion.”). “Without authorization, the district court lacks jurisdiction to consider a second or successive [§ 2255 motion].” /d. Since Plaintiff has not received permission from the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals to file a successive § 2255 motion, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider this action.? Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that this action is DISMISSED for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Clerk is directed to CLOSE the case. The Clerk is also DIRECTED to attach the docket sheet for Case No. 22-cv-20066-RUIZ to this Order for its inclusion to the record. All pending motions are DENIED as moot. DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, on August 30, 2022.

BETH BLOOM UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE Copies to: Lessie Earl Proctor, Pro Se 20924-043 Manchester Federal Correctional Institution Inmate Mail/Parcels P.O. Box 4000 Manchester, KY 40962

3 Plaintiff also appealed Judge Ruiz’s Order to the Eleventh Circuit, see Notice of Appeal, Proctor v. United States, No. 20-cv-20066 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 25, 2022), ECF No. [7], which further divests this Court of jurisdiction, see Doe, 1-13 ex rel. Doe Sr. 1-13 v. Bush, 261 F.3d 1037, 1064 (11th Cir. 2001).