Proctor v. Astrue

766 F. Supp. 2d 960, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8852, 2011 WL 338789
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Missouri
DecidedJanuary 31, 2011
DocketCase 09-6132-CV-SJ-REL-SSA
StatusPublished

This text of 766 F. Supp. 2d 960 (Proctor v. Astrue) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Missouri primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Proctor v. Astrue, 766 F. Supp. 2d 960, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8852, 2011 WL 338789 (W.D. Mo. 2011).

Opinion

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

ROBERT E. LARSEN, United States Magistrate Judge.

Plaintiff Brenda S. Proctor seeks review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying plaintiffs two applications: an application for disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401, et seq. (Tr. 95-97), and an application for supplemental security income (SSI) benefits based on disability under Title XVI of the Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381, et seq. (Tr. 27). Plaintiff argues that the ALJ (1) failed to properly evaluate plaintiffs credibility, (2) failed to properly weigh treating physicians’ opinions in deciding the case, and (3) relied upon flawed vocational expert testimony that failed to take into account the opinions of plaintiffs treating physicians. I find that the ALJ did not err as alleged. Therefore, plaintiffs motion for summary judgment will be denied and the decision of the Commissioner will be affirmed.

I. BACKGROUND

On May 28, 2004, plaintiff applied for disability alleging that she has been disabled since August 1, 2002. Plaintiffs disability stems from lower back impairment, osteoarthritis, bi-polar disorder, depression, cardiovascular disease, hypertension, and heel spurs. Plaintiffs applications were denied. On April 2, 2007, a hearing was held before the Honorable Linda L. Sybrant, Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). On June 1, 2007, the ALJ found that plaintiff was not under a “disability” as defined in the Act. On August 18, 2009, the Appeals Council denied plaintiffs request for review. Therefore, the decision of the ALJ stands as the final decision of the Commissioner.

II. STANDARD FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW

Section 205(g) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), provides for judicial review of a “final decision” of the Commissioner under Title II. The standard for judicial review by the federal district court is whether the decision of the Commissioner was supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971); Johnson v. Chater, 108 F.3d 178, 179 (8th Cir.1997); Andler v. Chater, 100 F.3d 1389, 1392 (8th Cir.1996). The determination of whether the Com *964 missioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence requires review of the entire record, considering the evidence in support of and in opposition to the Commissioner’s decision. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488, 71 S.Ct. 456, 95 L.Ed. 456 (1951); Thomas v. Sullivan, 876 F.2d 666, 669 (8th Cir.1989). “The Court must also take into consideration the weight of the evidence in the record and apply a balancing test to evidence which is contradictory.” Gavin v. Heckler, 811 F.2d 1195, 1199 (8th Cir.1987) (citing Steadman v. Securities & Exchange Commission, 450 U.S. 91, 99, 101 S.Ct. 999, 67 L.Ed.2d 69 (1981)).

Substantial evidence means “more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. at 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420; Jemigan v. Sullivan, 948 F.2d 1070, 1073 n. 5 (8th Cir.1991). However, the substantial evidence standard presupposes a zone of choice within which the decision makers can go either way, without interference by the courts. “[A]n administrative decision is not subject to reversal merely because substantial evidence would have supported an opposite decision.” Id.; Clarke v. Bowen, 843 F.2d 271, 272-73 (8th Cir.1988).

III. BURDEN OF PROOF AND SEQUENTIAL EVALUATION PROCESS

An individual claiming disability benefits has the burden of proving he is unable to return to past relevant work by reason of a medically-determinable physical or mental impairment which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). If the plaintiff establishes that he is unable to return to past relevant work because of the disability, the burden of persuasion shifts to the Commissioner to establish that there is some other type of substantial gainful activity in the national economy that the plaintiff can perform. Griffon v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 1150, 1153-54 (8th Cir.1988); McMillian v. Schweiker, 697 F.2d 215, 220-21 (8th Cir.1983).

The Social Security Administration has promulgated detailed regulations setting out a sequential evaluation process to determine whether a claimant is disabled. These regulations are codified at 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1501, et seq. The five-step sequential evaluation process used by the Commissioner is outlined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 and is summarized as follows:

1. Is the claimant performing substantial gainful activity?

Yes = not disabled.

No = go to next step.

2. Does the claimant have a severe impairment or a combination of impairments which significantly limits his ability to do basic work activities?

No = not disabled.

Yes = go to next step.

3. Does the impairment meet or equal a listed impairment in Appendix 1?

Yes = disabled.

4.

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Related

Richardson v. Perales
402 U.S. 389 (Supreme Court, 1971)
Steadman v. Securities & Exchange Commission
450 U.S. 91 (Supreme Court, 1981)
Gavin v. Heckler
811 F.2d 1195 (Eighth Circuit, 1987)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
766 F. Supp. 2d 960, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8852, 2011 WL 338789, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/proctor-v-astrue-mowd-2011.