Pro Mod Realty, LLC v. US Bank National Association

2014 DNH 069

• Court: District Court, D. New Hampshire
• Decided: April 9, 2014
• Docket: CV-13-498-JL
• Status: Published

Opinion

Pro Mod Realty, LLC v. US Bank National Association CV-13-498-JL 4/9/14

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Pro Mod Realty, LLC and Gary Fitzgerald

v. Crvrl No. 13-CV-498-JL Opinion No. 2014 DNH 069 U.S. Bank National Association and Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC

SUMMARY ORDER

This case presents the question of whether the defendants,

the holder and servicer of a mortgage loan taken out by plaintiff

Pro Mod Realty, LLC, have improperly attempted to foreclose on

the loan despite Pro Mod's attempts to modify it. The plaintiffs

(who include both Pro Mod and its managing member, Gary

Fitzgerald) allege that the servicer, Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC,

promised not only "to consider modification applications and

. . . offer alternatives to foreclosure" but also that, "while it

consider[ed] a request for modification, it would not initiate a

new foreclosure or move forward with a foreclosure sale."

Despite these promises, the plaintiffs claim, the defendants

"attempted to move forward with a foreclosure sale while it [sic] was purportedly reviewing the Plaintiffs' multiple applications

for loan modification."1

Based on these allegations, the plaintiffs seek to enjoin

the defendants from foreclosing on theories of promissory

estoppel and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair

dealing. The plaintiffs also argue that, "[p]rior to any

judicial sanction of foreclosure," the defendants must be ordered

"to produce documentation of their legal right to foreclose."

The plaintiffs originally filed this action in Hillsborough

County Superior Court, which issued a temporary restraining order

and, later, a preliminary injunction, against the foreclosure

sale. The defendants then removed the action to this court, see

28 U.S.C. § 1441, invoking its diversity jurisdiction, see id.

§ 1332(a)(1). Pro Mod, a limited liability company, has the

citizenship of its only member, Fitzgerald, who is domiciled in

New Hampshire, while U.S. Bank, a national banking association,

is a citizen of Minnesota, where it is located, see id. § 1348,

and Ocwen has the citizenship of its only member, a Florida

1In a seeming inconsistency, the amended complaint also alleges that, prior to attempting to proceed with the foreclosure sale in October 2013, Ocwen notified Fitzgerald that it had denied his application for a modification in light of the pending sale. But, as the ensuing analysis makes clear, whether or not Ocwen communicated this to Fitzgerald prior to attempting to proceed with the October 2013 foreclosure sale is immaterial to the outcome here.

2 corporation with its principal place of business in Georgia, see

id. § 1332 (c) (1) .

The defendants have moved to dismiss the plaintiffs' amended

complaint, arguing that it fails to state a claim for relief,

see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Per its usual practice on

dispositive motions, the court invited the parties to appear for

oral argument, if they wished. The plaintiffs indicated that

they did not wish to be heard, so the court has decided the

motion solely on the papers. The court grants the motion for the

reasons set forth below.

Promissory estoppel. Under the New Hampshire doctrine of

promissory estoppel, "a promise reasonably understood as intended

to induce action is enforceable by one who relies on it to his

detriment or to the benefit of the promisor." Panto v. Moore

Bus. Forms, Inc., 130 N.H. 730, 738 (1988) (citing Restatement

(Second) of Contracts § 90 (1981)). Promissory estoppel thus

protects only "reasonable reliance" on the part of the promisor.

Marbucco Corp. v. City of Manchester, 137 N.H. 629, 633 (1993);

see also Rockwood v. SKF USA, Inc., 758 F. Supp. 2d 44, 57

(D.N.H. 2010), aff'd , 687 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012).

In moving to dismiss the promissory estoppel claim, the

defendants argue, among other things, that the plaintiffs could

not have reasonably relied on Ocwen's alleged promises, i.e.,

3 that it would "consider modification applications" from the

plaintiffs; that, while doing so, it "would not initiate a new

foreclosure or move forward with a foreclosure sale"; and that,

even if the plaintiffs did not "qualify for modification," the

defendants would "offer alternatives to foreclosure."

As just noted, the New Hampshire Supreme Court has adopted

the definition of promissory estoppel set forth in § 90 of the

Restatement (Second) of Contracts. The Restatement provides that

[w]ords of promise which by their terms make performance entirely optional with the ''promisor' whatever may happen, or whatever course of conduct in other respects he may pursue, do not constitute a promise . . . . [S]uch words are often referred to as forming an illusory promise . . . . [E]ven if a present intention is manifested, the reservation of an option to change that intention means that there can be no promisee who is justified in an expectation of performance.

Id. § 2 cmt. e. Thus, a promise to "consider" taking a specified

course of action in response to the promisee's request does not

commit the promisor to that course of action, nor justify any

expectation that the promisor will, in fact, take that course of

action. See 1 Richard Lord, Williston on Contracts § 4:27 (4th

ed. 2007) ("a promise that a promisor would favorably consider an

application has been held too indefinite because the promisor may

keep the promise and yet freely exercise such choice as he or she

wishes") (footnote omitted).

4 So "a promise to consider doing something is illusory," as

one federal court of appeals has held in upholding the dismissal

of a mortgagor's promissory estoppel claim based on the

mortgagee's alleged promise to consider modifying the loan.

McGowan v. Homeward Residential, Inc., 50 0 F. App'x 882, 885

(11th Cir. 2012). The plaintiffs cannot premise their promissory

estoppel theory on Ocwen's alleged commitment to "consider

[their] modification applications," either on its own or in

conjunction with Ocwen's alleged further promise that, "while it

consider[ed] a reguest for modification, it would not initiate a

new foreclosure or move forward with a foreclosure sale" (a

promise which, based on the amended complaint, it is not even

clear that Ocwen broke, see note 1, supra) .

Nor can the plaintiffs base that claim on Ocwen's alleged

promise to "offer alternatives to foreclosure" in the event they

did not "gualify for modification." The plaintiffs do not allege

that either Ocwen's behavior or the surrounding circumstances

provided any inkling as to what the terms of those "alternatives"

might be. A promisee cannot reasonably rely on the mere promise

of a forthcoming offer, absent any basis whatsoever for

anticipating its terms. See, e.g.. Sands v. Ridefilm Corp., 212

F.3d 657, 664 (1st Cir. 2000) (ruling that prospective employee

could not rely on company's promises to hire him before any of

5 the terms of his employment had even been discussed). Federal

courts have therefore dismissed promissory estoppel claims based

on bare promises to offer loan modifications, ruling that the

plaintiffs could not plead reasonable reliance. See, e.g.,

Cortez v. Mtg. Elec. Regis. Sys., Inc., No. 11-872, 2012 WL

1744449, at *3 (D. Nev. May 11, 2012); Labrant v. Mtg. Elec.

Regis. Sys., Inc., 870 F. Supp. 2d 671, 679 (D. Minn. 2012). The

same result is in order here.

Furthermore, even if the plaintiffs could have reasonably

relied on any of the alleged promises, they have not sufficiently

alleged that they actually did so. All the plaintiffs say on

this score is that they "were prejudiced by the defendants'

failure to act substantively on the plaintiffs' modification

applications in that [they] did not seek alternatives to

foreclosure such as selling the property" (capitalization

omitted). The Court of Appeals has recently held that just such

an allegation, at least when standing alone, fails to plead the

reliance necessary to state a promissory estoppel claim.

MacKenzie v. Flagstar Bank, FSB, 738 F.3d 486, 497 (1st Cir.

2013) (applying Massachusetts law).

The mortgagors in that case, just like the plaintiffs here,

alleged that they had detrimentally relied on the mortgage

holder's "promise to consider them for a loan modification" by

6 "awaiting determination of . . . eligibility and loan

modification instead of seeking alternatives to foreclosure."

Id. at 496-97 (guotation marks omitted). In affirming the

dismissal of the promissory estoppel claim, the Court of Appeals

ruled that the mortgagors had "not alleged any facts that would

allow us to infer that their decision not to seek 'alternatives

to foreclosure' was detrimental to them. In other words, there

is no reason for us to believe [they] would have successfully

avoided foreclosure, or been better off in any way, but for their

reliance on [the mortgage holder's] supposed promise to consider

them for a loan modification." Id. at 497. The same is true

here. MacKenzie controls and dictates dismissal of the

promissory estoppel claim for want of detrimental reliance on the

alleged promises, even if their illusory nature is ignored.

Breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. As

this court has observed, "[a] necessary prereguisite to a claim

for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing

is a contract between the parties." Moore v. Mtg. Elec. Reg.

Sys., Inc., 848 F. Supp. 2d 107, 127 (D.N.H. 2012) (citing J & M

Lumber & Constr. Co. v. Smyjunas, 161 N.H. 714, 724 (2011)) . In

moving to dismiss this claim, the defendants argue that the

plaintiffs have not alleged the existence of any contract between

either of them and either of the defendants, aside from the

7 mortgage (of which U.S. Bank is the assignee of record). As the

defendants point out, however, "the fact that [a mortage holder]

exercised [its] contractual right to foreclose on [a borrower]

after [it] defaulted on [its] mortgage payments does not amount

to a breach of the implied covenant," which also "cannot be used

to reguire the lender to modify or restructure the loan." Id. at

129-30. The mortgage agreement, then, cannot serve as the basis

for the plaintiffs' claim for breach of the covenant of good

faith and fair dealing, and they do not argue to the contrary.

Instead, the plaintiffs suggest that the defendants' duty of

good faith and fair dealing emanates from Ocwen's alleged

promises to consider the plaintiffs' applications to modify the

loan, relying on the notion that promissory estoppel "serves to

impute contractual status based upon an underlying promise, and

to provide a remedy to the party who detrimentally relies on the

promise." Great Lakes Aircraft Co. v. Claremont, 135 N.H. 270,

290 (1992). As discussed above, though, the plaintiffs have not

alleged any promise to which the doctrine of promissory estoppel

could "impute contractual status." They have therefore failed to

plead any contract that could support their claim for breach of

the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.2

2In a single paragraph in this count, as it appears in the amended complaint, the plaintiffs allege that Ocwen "offered, and

8 Order to produce promissory note. Count II of the amended

complaint, entitled "Standing," purports to "rais[e] the issue of

legal standing of the defendants to foreclose [the] mortgage and

reguests strict compliance with the law as reguired before the

drastic remedy of foreclosure by the power of sale can be

lawfully executed," asserting that "possession of a negotiable

instrument such as the note is a prereguisite to its enforcement"

(capitalization omitted). Significantly, however, the plaintiffs

do not allege that the defendants in fact lack possession of the

note secured by the mortgage they have attempted to foreclose.

To the contrary, the plaintiffs proclaim that " [i]f the defendant

cannot produce the original, properly executed promissory note

. . . , the plaintiffs challenge the defendants' legal standing

to foreclose or otherwise collect on the note" (emphasis added).

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not countenance this

sort of hypothetical pleading. To the contrary, "[t]o survive a

motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual

the [p]laintiff accepted, an offer to work out resolution with the mortgage through the government's HAMP program or some other form of modification." This allegation is not only unsupported, but undermined, by the balance of the amended complaint, which (as discussed above) alleges that the defendants promised to offer a modification, but never did so, and that they ultimately denied the plaintiffs' modification reguest, see note 1, supra. The plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged that they accepted the defendants' offer to modify the loan (if that is in fact what the plaintiffs are even trying to allege).

9 matter, accepted as true to state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face . . . . The plausibility standard is not

akin to a probability requirement, but it asks for more than a

sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully."

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotation marks

omitted). So the plaintiffs cannot state a claim simply by

raisinq the possibility that the defendants lack possession of

the note secured by the mortqaqe they have tried to foreclose so

as to make that effort unlawful. The plaintiffs must alleqe that

the plaintiffs lack possession of the note. For reasons that are

unclear, the plaintiffs have not made that alleqation, either in

their amended complaint or their objection to the motion to

dismiss (where they acknowledqe that the defendants have produced

a copy of the note).3 They have therefore failed to state a claim

for relief--such as an injunction preventinq the defendants from

foreclosinq, or requirinq them to produce the note before they do

so--based on the possibility that the defendants lack possession

of the note secured by the mortqaqe.

Accordinqly, the defendants' motion to dismiss (document no.

17) is GRANTED. The defendants' motion for a protective order

3Stranqely, the plaintiffs also state that the defendants "concede they are both the owner of the note and the mortqaqe." It is unclear how this is a concession, and the statement is otherwise unexplained.

10 against discovery pending resolution of the motion to dismiss

(document no. 24) is DENIED as moot. The clerk shall enter

judgment accordingly and close the case.

SO ORDERED.

UnP-ted States District Judge

Dated: April 9, 2014

cc: Charles W. Grau, Esg. Lisa Hall, Esg. Jessica Suzanne Babine, Esg.