UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Private Jet Services Group, Inc. v. Civil N o . 05-cv-098-JD Opinion N o . 2005 DNH 141 Sky King, Inc.
O R D E R
Private Jet Services Group, Inc., (“PJS”) alleges that Sky
King, Inc., breached four agreements to provide jet services for
PJS’s clients during March, April, and May of 2005 and that Sky
King also violated the New Hampshire Consumer Protection Act. 1
Sky King moves to dismiss the case on the grounds that this court
lacks personal jurisdiction over it and, therefore, that venue is
not proper in New Hampshire. Alternatively, Sky King moves to
transfer the case to the Eastern District of California under 28
U.S.C. § 1404(a). PJS objects to Sky King’s motion.
1 PJS moved to file an amended complaint which was granted while Sky King’s motion to dismiss was pending. The amended complaint adds three breach of contract claims that were not pleaded in the first complaint and also adds the New Hampshire Consumer Protection Act claim. Because Sky King had not yet filed a responsive pleading, PJS was entitled to file an amended complaint without first seeking leave of the court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). I. Personal Jurisdiction
The plaintiff bears the burden of showing that personal
jurisdiction exists in response to a defendant’s motion to
dismiss. Daynard v . Ness, Motley, Loadholt, Richardson & Poole
P.A., 290 F.3d 4 2 , 51 (1st Cir. 2002). When, as here, the
parties are proceeding under the prima facie method for
determining personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff “may not rely on
the mere allegations of its complaint, but must point to specific
facts in the record that support those allegations.” Jet Wine &
Spirits, Inc. v . Bacardi & Co., Ltd., 298 F.3d 1 , 8 (1st Cir.
2002). The plaintiff’s burden is not onerous, however, because
the prima facie standard “permits the district court to consider
only whether the plaintiff has proffered evidence that, if
credited, is enough to support findings of all facts essential to
personal jurisdiction.” N . Laminate Sales, Inc. v . Davis, 403
F.3d 1 4 , 22 (1st Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). The applicable New Hampshire statute permits jurisdiction to
the extent allowed under the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 293-A:15.10; Sawtelle v .
Farrell, 70 F.3d 1381, 1388 (1st Cir. 1995). Due process is
satisfied if the defendant had sufficient contacts with the forum
state, which may be demonstrated under either a general or
specific jurisdictional theory. Noonan v . Winston Co., 135 F.3d
2 8 5 , 89 (1st Cir. 1998). PJS asserts that Sky King’s contacts meet the requirements of specific jurisdiction, which is analyzed in three categories: relatedness, purposeful availment, and reasonableness.2 Daynard, 290 F.3d at 6 0 .
A. Relatedness
“To satisfy the relatedness requirement, the claim
underlying the litigation must directly arise out o f , or relate
t o , the defendant’s forum-state activities.” N . Laminate Sales,
403 F.3d at 25 (internal quotation marks omitted). A breach of
contract claim arises from or relates to the defendant’s contacts
with the forum if those contacts “were instrumental either in the
formation of the contract or its breach.” Phillips Exeter Acad.
v . Howard Phillips Fund, 196 F.3d 2 8 4 , 289 (1st Cir. 1999). The
court analyzes the defendant’s contacts by considering “the
parties’ prior negotiations and contemplated future consequences,
along with the terms of the contract and the parties’ actual
course of dealing.” Daynard, 290 F.3d at 52 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
PJS alleges that Sky King breached four agreements. The
2 PJS discusses the jurisdictional requirements in the context of its breach of contract claims, except for the reasonableness factor where it also raises the Consumer Protection Act claim.
3 first agreement, dated January 1 2 , 2005, and signed on March 9,
2005, pertained to flight services from March 1 4 , 2005, through
March 2 8 , 2005, for teams participating in the March 2005 NCAA
basketball tournament. PJS contends that Sky King breached the
NCAA agreement by failing to comply with the “Maintenance and
Repair” provision of the agreement, which caused delays and other
problems with scheduled flights. The second, third, and fourth
agreements provided for flight services on specific days in April
and May of 2005. PJS alleges that Sky King anticipatorily
repudiated the second agreement and failed to perform the third
and fourth agreements without refunding the money paid by PJS.
It is undisputed that Sky King is a California corporation
that has no offices, employees, or operations in New Hampshire.
PJS is a New Hampshire corporation. None of the flight services,
which were the subject of the four agreements, occurred in New
Hampshire. PJS asserts, however, that Sky King’s contacts with New Hampshire were instrumental in the formation of those
agreements.
Greg Raiff, president of PJS, provides his affidavit in
support of PJS’s objection to Sky King’s motion. Raiff states
that PJS was incorporated in July of 2003 and that PJS’s first
contact with Sky King was in August when Greg Lukenbill,
president and chief executive officer of Sky King, contacted him
4 seeking business from PJS. 3 The four agreements at issue in this
case were negotiated by Lukenbill in California and Raiff in New
Hampshire by telephone and fax in early 2005. 4 Claire Pollock,
the administrative operations manager for PJS, also provided her
affidavit and confirms Lukenbill’s calls to Raiff and the contact
between Sky King and PJS pertaining to the agreements.
The agreements were written on Sky King’s letterhead and
were faxed to PJS in New Hampshire. The terms were negotiated by
communications between California and New Hampshire. The series
of four agreements also shows an ongoing relationship between Sky
King and PJS in New Hampshire. Therefore, Lukenbill’s contacts
with PJS in New Hampshire, on behalf of Sky King, are
jurisdictional because they are directly related to the formation
of the four agreements at issue in this case. See, e.g.,
Workgroup Tech. Corp. v . MGM Grand Hotel, LLC, 246 F. Supp. 2d
102, 113 (D. Mass. 2003).
3 Raiff’s prior contacts with Sky King, when he worked for a different employer and before PJS began operations, are not material to the contracts at issue here. Also, to the extent Raiff contends that Lukenbill called him continuously throughout 2005 seeking business unrelated to the four agreements at issue here, those contacts are not considered. 4 Raiff states in his affidavit that Sky King authorized PJS to act as its agent in New Hampshire but then disavows the relevance of the agency relationship to the claims alleged here.
5 B. Purposeful Availment
“‘Second, the defendant’s in-state contacts must represent a
purposeful availment of the privilege of conducting activities in
the forum state, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Private Jet Services Group, Inc. v. Civil N o . 05-cv-098-JD Opinion N o . 2005 DNH 141 Sky King, Inc.
O R D E R
Private Jet Services Group, Inc., (“PJS”) alleges that Sky
King, Inc., breached four agreements to provide jet services for
PJS’s clients during March, April, and May of 2005 and that Sky
King also violated the New Hampshire Consumer Protection Act. 1
Sky King moves to dismiss the case on the grounds that this court
lacks personal jurisdiction over it and, therefore, that venue is
not proper in New Hampshire. Alternatively, Sky King moves to
transfer the case to the Eastern District of California under 28
U.S.C. § 1404(a). PJS objects to Sky King’s motion.
1 PJS moved to file an amended complaint which was granted while Sky King’s motion to dismiss was pending. The amended complaint adds three breach of contract claims that were not pleaded in the first complaint and also adds the New Hampshire Consumer Protection Act claim. Because Sky King had not yet filed a responsive pleading, PJS was entitled to file an amended complaint without first seeking leave of the court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). I. Personal Jurisdiction
The plaintiff bears the burden of showing that personal
jurisdiction exists in response to a defendant’s motion to
dismiss. Daynard v . Ness, Motley, Loadholt, Richardson & Poole
P.A., 290 F.3d 4 2 , 51 (1st Cir. 2002). When, as here, the
parties are proceeding under the prima facie method for
determining personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff “may not rely on
the mere allegations of its complaint, but must point to specific
facts in the record that support those allegations.” Jet Wine &
Spirits, Inc. v . Bacardi & Co., Ltd., 298 F.3d 1 , 8 (1st Cir.
2002). The plaintiff’s burden is not onerous, however, because
the prima facie standard “permits the district court to consider
only whether the plaintiff has proffered evidence that, if
credited, is enough to support findings of all facts essential to
personal jurisdiction.” N . Laminate Sales, Inc. v . Davis, 403
F.3d 1 4 , 22 (1st Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). The applicable New Hampshire statute permits jurisdiction to
the extent allowed under the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 293-A:15.10; Sawtelle v .
Farrell, 70 F.3d 1381, 1388 (1st Cir. 1995). Due process is
satisfied if the defendant had sufficient contacts with the forum
state, which may be demonstrated under either a general or
specific jurisdictional theory. Noonan v . Winston Co., 135 F.3d
2 8 5 , 89 (1st Cir. 1998). PJS asserts that Sky King’s contacts meet the requirements of specific jurisdiction, which is analyzed in three categories: relatedness, purposeful availment, and reasonableness.2 Daynard, 290 F.3d at 6 0 .
A. Relatedness
“To satisfy the relatedness requirement, the claim
underlying the litigation must directly arise out o f , or relate
t o , the defendant’s forum-state activities.” N . Laminate Sales,
403 F.3d at 25 (internal quotation marks omitted). A breach of
contract claim arises from or relates to the defendant’s contacts
with the forum if those contacts “were instrumental either in the
formation of the contract or its breach.” Phillips Exeter Acad.
v . Howard Phillips Fund, 196 F.3d 2 8 4 , 289 (1st Cir. 1999). The
court analyzes the defendant’s contacts by considering “the
parties’ prior negotiations and contemplated future consequences,
along with the terms of the contract and the parties’ actual
course of dealing.” Daynard, 290 F.3d at 52 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
PJS alleges that Sky King breached four agreements. The
2 PJS discusses the jurisdictional requirements in the context of its breach of contract claims, except for the reasonableness factor where it also raises the Consumer Protection Act claim.
3 first agreement, dated January 1 2 , 2005, and signed on March 9,
2005, pertained to flight services from March 1 4 , 2005, through
March 2 8 , 2005, for teams participating in the March 2005 NCAA
basketball tournament. PJS contends that Sky King breached the
NCAA agreement by failing to comply with the “Maintenance and
Repair” provision of the agreement, which caused delays and other
problems with scheduled flights. The second, third, and fourth
agreements provided for flight services on specific days in April
and May of 2005. PJS alleges that Sky King anticipatorily
repudiated the second agreement and failed to perform the third
and fourth agreements without refunding the money paid by PJS.
It is undisputed that Sky King is a California corporation
that has no offices, employees, or operations in New Hampshire.
PJS is a New Hampshire corporation. None of the flight services,
which were the subject of the four agreements, occurred in New
Hampshire. PJS asserts, however, that Sky King’s contacts with New Hampshire were instrumental in the formation of those
agreements.
Greg Raiff, president of PJS, provides his affidavit in
support of PJS’s objection to Sky King’s motion. Raiff states
that PJS was incorporated in July of 2003 and that PJS’s first
contact with Sky King was in August when Greg Lukenbill,
president and chief executive officer of Sky King, contacted him
4 seeking business from PJS. 3 The four agreements at issue in this
case were negotiated by Lukenbill in California and Raiff in New
Hampshire by telephone and fax in early 2005. 4 Claire Pollock,
the administrative operations manager for PJS, also provided her
affidavit and confirms Lukenbill’s calls to Raiff and the contact
between Sky King and PJS pertaining to the agreements.
The agreements were written on Sky King’s letterhead and
were faxed to PJS in New Hampshire. The terms were negotiated by
communications between California and New Hampshire. The series
of four agreements also shows an ongoing relationship between Sky
King and PJS in New Hampshire. Therefore, Lukenbill’s contacts
with PJS in New Hampshire, on behalf of Sky King, are
jurisdictional because they are directly related to the formation
of the four agreements at issue in this case. See, e.g.,
Workgroup Tech. Corp. v . MGM Grand Hotel, LLC, 246 F. Supp. 2d
102, 113 (D. Mass. 2003).
3 Raiff’s prior contacts with Sky King, when he worked for a different employer and before PJS began operations, are not material to the contracts at issue here. Also, to the extent Raiff contends that Lukenbill called him continuously throughout 2005 seeking business unrelated to the four agreements at issue here, those contacts are not considered. 4 Raiff states in his affidavit that Sky King authorized PJS to act as its agent in New Hampshire but then disavows the relevance of the agency relationship to the claims alleged here.
5 B. Purposeful Availment
“‘Second, the defendant’s in-state contacts must represent a
purposeful availment of the privilege of conducting activities in
the forum state, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of
that state’s laws and making the defendant’s involuntary presence
before the state’s courts foreseeable.’” Daynard, 290 F.3d at 61
(quoting Foster-Miller, Inc. v . Babcock & Wilson Canada, 46 F.3d
138, 144 (1st Cir. 1995)). “The focus in this second requirement
is on voluntariness and foreseeability.” N . Laminate Sales, 403
F.3d at 2 5 . Therefore, purposeful availment involves reaching
out “to the plaintiff’s state of residence to create a
relationship -- say, by solicitation” and depends on “whether the
defendant benefitted from those contacts in a way that made
jurisdiction foreseeable.” Phillips, 196 F.3d at 292.
Lukenbill called Raiff in New Hampshire to solicit his
business.5 The four agreements that are the basis of the claims in this suit were the result of Lukenbill’s efforts and were part
of an ongoing relationship between Sky King and PJS for flight
services. Raiff states that PJS became one of Sky King’s biggest
customers in 2005. Raiff also states that Sky King appointed PJS
5 Lukenbill states in his affidavit that Raiff called him about providing flight services for the NCAA tournament and denies seeking business in New Hampshire. Given the prima facie standard, the court credits PJS’s version of events.
6 employees as crew members on some of its flights under the NCAA
agreement. Sky King was paid under each of the four agreements.
Based on those circumstances, Sky King voluntarily contacted and
did business with a New Hampshire company and, given the extent
of the interaction with PJS and Sky King’s benefit from the
business, it was foreseeable that it might be sued in New
Hampshire.
C. Reasonableness
In addition to the elements of relatedness and purposeful
availment, the court must consider whether the exercise of
jurisdiction would be reasonable in this case. Daynard, 290 F.3d
at 6 2 . Reasonableness depends upon weighing the “Gestalt
factors,” which are “(1) the defendant’s burden of appearing, (2)
the forum state’s interest in adjudicating the dispute, (3) the
plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and effective
relief, (4) the judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most
effective resolution of the controversy, and (5) the common
interests of all sovereigns in promoting substantive social
policies.” Jet Wine, 298 F.3d at 1 1 . These factors are
considered on a sliding scale depending on the strength of the
plaintiff’s showing on the first two elements. Nowak v . Tak How
Investments, Ltd., 94 F.3d 7 0 8 , 717 (1st Cir. 1996).
7 In this case, PJS’s showing of relatedness and purposeful
availment is neither particularly strong nor precariously weak.
Sky King contends that defending this suit in New Hampshire would
impose a substantial financial burden because of the expense of
flying some fifty employees, who worked under the agreements, to
New Hampshire for trial. The First Circuit recognizes “that it
is almost always inconvenient and costly for a party to litigate
in a foreign jurisdiction. Thus . . . , the defendant must
demonstrate that exercise of jurisdiction in the present
circumstances is onerous in a special, unusual, or other
constitutionally significant way." Nowak, 94 F.3d at 718.
Otherwise, defendants from geographically distant places would
always be able to defeat personal jurisdiction. Id. Sky King
reiterates in its reply that all of its witnesses, relevant
documents, and the planes themselves are in California and that
it would impose a special or unusual burden for it to pay for transporting those people and things to New Hampshire.
Sky King has not explained why the planes are necessary for
litigation of the breach of contract claims and the Consumer
Protection Act claim, nor has it explained why so many witnesses
would be necessary or why alternative means of presenting
testimony would not suffice for some witnesses. Further,
presenting witnesses and documents at trial are the usual burdens
8 of litigation. See id. Therefore, there does not appear to be
any unusual burden on Sky King to litigate in New Hampshire. The
First Circuit “has repeatedly observed that a plaintiff’s choice
of forum must be accorded a degree of deference with respect to
the issue of its own convenience.” Sawtelle, 70 F.3d at 1395.
New Hampshire has an interest in having the parties’ dispute
adjudicated here because it involves a New Hampshire business.
See, e.g., N . Laminate Sales, 403 F.3d at 2 6 . On the other hand,
none of the activities contemplated under the parties’ agreements
occurred or were intended to occur here. Therefore, this element
provides only limited support for jurisdiction in New Hampshire.
As is often the case, the interest of the judicial system in
obtaining the most effective resolution of the parties’ dispute
does not appear to favor either forum. See Jet Wine, 298 F.3d at
1 2 ; Sawtelle, 70 F.3d at 1395. The fifth and last factor
examines “the interests of affected governments in substantive social policies.” Nowak, 94 F.3d at 719. For this factor, the
court examines the interests of New Hampshire and California
implicated by the parties’ dispute and concludes that both states
have interests in protecting their respective businesses. See
id.
“The gestalt factors rarely seem to preclude jurisdiction
where relevant minimum contacts exist.” Cambridge Literary
9 Props., Ltd. v . W . Goebel Porzellanfabrik G.m.b.H. & C o . Kg.,
295 F.3d 5 9 , 66 (1st Cir. 2002). Here, although the Gestalt
factors provide little support for exercising jurisdiction, they
do not weigh against the constitutionality of jurisdiction.
Therefore, PJS has carried its burden of showing that this court
may exercise personal jurisdiction over Sky King.
II. Venue
In the event the court were to find personal jurisdiction,
Sky King requested that the case be transferred to the Eastern
District of California pursuant to § 1404(a), arguing that New
Hampshire is a forum non conveniens. PJS objects to transferring
the case.
Under § 1404(a), the court may transfer a civil case to
another district where it might have been brought initially
“[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest
of justice.” To succeed in having the case transferred, Sky King
must show “both that an adequate alternative forum exists and
that considerations of convenience and judicial efficiency
strongly favor litigating the claim in the alternative forum.”
Iragorri v . Int’l Elevator, Inc., 203 F.3d 8 , 12 (1st Cir. 2000).
The First Circuit has cautioned that “the doctrine of forum non
conveniens is used to avoid serious unfairness and that
10 plaintiff’s choice of a forum will be disturbed only rarely.”
Nowak, 94 F.3d at 719.
PJS does not dispute that the Eastern District of California
would provide an adequate alternative forum. In balancing the
convenience of the parties, the court may consider the “relative
ease of access to sources of proof; availability of compulsory
process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining
attendance of willing, witnesses; possibility of view of
premises, if view would be appropriate to the action; all other
practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious
and inexpensive [and] questions as to the enforceability of a
judgment if one is obtained.” Mercier v . Sheraton Int’l, Inc.,
935 F.2d 419, 424 (1st Cir. 1991) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also Coady v . Ashcraft & Gerel, 223 F.3d 1 , 11 (1st
Cir. 2000). The court begins with a presumption in favor of the
forum chosen by the plaintiff, and the defendant bears the burden of showing that considerations of convenience and judicial
efficiency strongly favor an alternative forum. Nowak, 94 F.3d
at 719.
Sky King contends that the factual evidence in the case will
focus on its actions and aircraft and that nearly all of the
pertinent witnesses and documentary evidence for the case are in
California. PJS counters that while it would be more convenient
11 for Sky King to litigate in California, the documentary evidence
can b e , and to a large extent already has been, sent to New
Hampshire and the witnesses can travel here to the extent that
may be necessary. Sky King responds that it should not be
expected to bear the costs of flying its witnesses and evidence
to New Hampshire. However, “[t]he mere suggestion of greater
financial strain is meaningless unless and until the [protesting
party] demonstrates the nature and extent of the supposed
limitations upon [its] ability to litigate.” Iragorri 203 F.3d
at 1 7 .
With respect to judicial efficiency, Sky King contends that
the choice of law provisions in the agreements, specifying
California law, favor litigation in the Eastern District of
California. This court, however, is fully capable of applying
California contract law in this case. See Nowak, 94 F.3d at 720.
The parties have not suggested that there are other related pending cases that would implicate consolidation or other
judicial efficiency issues. See Coady, 223 F.3d at 1 1 .
PJS has chosen New Hampshire as the forum for this case, and
its choice is entitled to deference. Although litigation in New
Hampshire will not be as convenient for Sky King as California
would b e , it has not shown that the inconveniences it will face
would make litigation here unfair. See, e.g., Brian Jackson &
12 Co. v. Eximias Pharm. Corp., 248 F. Supp. 2d 31, 39 (D.R.I.
2003). Therefore, the court will not exercise its discretion to
transfer the case to the Eastern District of California.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the defendant’s motion to dismiss
(document no. 7) is denied.
SO ORDERED.
A t t f ^ Cj 3)1 (jBtvCU), fly Joseph A. DiClerico, Jr. United States District Judge
October 11, 2005
cc: Daniel P. Schwarz, Esquire William A. Staar, Esquire