Pritchett v. Rainey

Court of Appeals of Georgia

Pritchett v. Rainey

206 S.E.2d 726, 131 Ga. App. 521, 1974 Ga. App. LEXIS 1454

CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia

DecidedApril 2, 1974

Docket48837

StatusPublished

Cited by10 cases

This text of 206 S.E.2d 726 (Pritchett v. Rainey) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Pritchett v. Rainey, 206 S.E.2d 726, 131 Ga. App. 521, 1974 Ga. App. LEXIS 1454 (Ga. Ct. App. 1974).

Pincite

Opinion

Bell, Chief Judge.

Plaintiff brought a two-count complaint. He made a motion for summary judgment as to Count 1. The motion was denied and the denial was certified for direct appeal. Held:

As plaintiff has failed to enumerate any error on the trial court’s omission to make an order under CPA § 56 (d) (Code Ann. § 81A-156 (d)), specifying whether certain facts appear without substantial controversy, we can only determine whether the court erred in denying the motion as to the whole count. Smith v. Allen, 115 Ga. App. 80, *522 81 (153 SE2d 648). In Count 1, plaintiff sought to recover an alleged balance due of $5,452 on a real estate sales contract plus $2,000 for expenses of litigation due to defendant’s bad faith and stubborn litigiousness. Whether a plaintiff is entitled to recover expenses of litigation is solely a question for determination by a jury. Code § 20-1404; Patterson & Co. v. Peterson, 15 Ga. App. 680 (84 SE 163). As plaintiff’s motion goes to the whole count, the jury issue of expenses of litigation alone requires an affirmance of the denial of his motion. Additionally, the pleadings and affidavits show that there is a genuine material question of fact as to whether plaintiff is entitled to the amount claimed to be due on the sales contract, to wit: $5,452.

Submitted January 7, 1974 Decided April 2, 1974. Clifton, Helms & Dodd, Marshall L. Helms, Jr., for appellant. William E. Otwell, for appellee.

Judgment affirmed.

Quillian and Stolz, JJ, concur.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Bell, Chief Judge.

Plaintiff brought a two-count complaint. He made a motion for summary judgment as to Count 1. The motion was denied and the denial was certified for direct appeal. Held:

As plaintiff has failed to enumerate any error on the trial court’s omission to make an order under CPA § 56 (d) (Code Ann. § 81A-156 (d)), specifying whether certain facts appear without substantial controversy, we can only determine whether the court erred in denying the motion as to the whole count. Smith v. Allen, 115 Ga. App. 80, *522 81 (153 SE2d 648). In Count 1, plaintiff sought to recover an alleged balance due of $5,452 on a real estate sales contract plus $2,000 for expenses of litigation due to defendant’s bad faith and stubborn litigiousness. Whether a plaintiff is entitled to recover expenses of litigation is solely a question for determination by a jury. Code § 20-1404; Patterson & Co. v. Peterson, 15 Ga. App. 680 (84 SE 163). As plaintiff’s motion goes to the whole count, the jury issue of expenses of litigation alone requires an affirmance of the denial of his motion. Additionally, the pleadings and affidavits show that there is a genuine material question of fact as to whether plaintiff is entitled to the amount claimed to be due on the sales contract, to wit: $5,452.

Submitted January 7, 1974 Decided April 2, 1974. Clifton, Helms & Dodd, Marshall L. Helms, Jr., for appellant. William E. Otwell, for appellee.

Judgment affirmed.

Quillian and Stolz, JJ, concur.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

206 S.E.2d 726, 131 Ga. App. 521, 1974 Ga. App. LEXIS 1454, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/pritchett-v-rainey-gactapp-1974.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack