Priscilla Brooke Wilson v. Patrick Shane Phillips

CourtCourt of Appeals of Tennessee
DecidedNovember 15, 2017
DocketM2017-00097-COA-R3-CV
StatusPublished

This text of Priscilla Brooke Wilson v. Patrick Shane Phillips (Priscilla Brooke Wilson v. Patrick Shane Phillips) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Tennessee primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Priscilla Brooke Wilson v. Patrick Shane Phillips, (Tenn. Ct. App. 2017).

Opinion

11/15/2017 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE Assigned on Briefs September 1, 2017

PRISCILLA BROOKE WILSON V. PATRICK SHANE PHILLIPS

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Marion County No. 16894 J. Curtis Smith, Judge

No. M2017-00097-COA-R3-CV

The trial court denied mother’s petition to make her the primary residential parent of the parties’ three children. Based upon this court’s review of the facts, we have concluded that the trial court erred in assessing the best interest of the children and reverse the decision of the trial court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Reversed and Remanded

ANDY D. BENNETT, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which CHARLES D. SUSANO, JR., and KENNY W. ARMSTRONG, JJ., joined.

Kathryn R. Leiderman, Jasper, Tennessee, for the appellant, Priscilla Brooke Wilson.

Jerry B. Bible, Jasper, Tennessee, for the appellee, Patrick Shane Phillips.

OPINION

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Patrick Shane Phillips (“Father”) and Priscilla Brooke Wilson (“Mother”) are the parents of three children, Candace Amaya Phillips (born September 2003), Kendyl Mariah Phillips (born April 2005), and Kamryn Layla Phillips (born April 2005). Father filed for divorce in August 2006 and obtained a default judgment on May 1, 2007. In the final decree of divorce entered on May 1, 2007, the trial court granted Father a divorce on grounds of inappropriate marital conduct and abandonment, awarded him primary custody of the three minor children, and incorporated the Father’s proposed parenting plan, pursuant to which Mother had 125 days of parenting time per year. Mother had parenting time with the children the last full week of each month from Sunday at six p.m. until the following Sunday at six p.m. Mother also had the children during the months of June and July, with the exception of the third full week. Mother was ordered to pay child support in the amount of $75.01 per week. The plan provided for joint decision-making.

In November 2009, the court entered a modified parenting plan reflecting an agreement of the parties. Under the new parenting plan, Mother had 107 days of parenting time per year. She had parenting time with the children every week from Friday at 2:00 p.m. until Monday at 7:30 a.m. When school was not in session, Mother had the children from Friday at 6:00 p.m. until Sunday at 6:00 p.m. Father had the children the first full weekend each month. Mother was to pay $515.00 per month in child support.

In December 2011, Father filed a petition for contempt and to modify the parenting plan. Mother filed a response and counter-petition. In an order entered on August 15, 2012, the trial court found that “the proof was evenly divided between the parties” and that the evidence did not support any change to the existing order. As to Father’s allegations that Mother was in arrears on child support and had failed to pay her portion of medical bills, the court found that “the proof was not sufficient to support [Father’s] allegations.”

Mother filed the petition at issue in this appeal on June 28, 2016. In her petition, Mother sought a finding of contempt, a modification of custody, and a restraining order. Mother alleged that Father was in contempt of the November 5, 2009 permanent parenting plan for “making unilateral decisions regarding the children’s non-emergency healthcare, religious upbringing, and extracurricular activities,” “fail[ing] and refus[ing] to provide [Mother] with a copy of his health insurance card for the children,” and “intentionally violat[ing] [Mother’s] rights set forth in T.C.A. § 36-6-101, including, specifically, subsections (1), (5), (6), (7), (8), and (9).” Mother alleged the following substantial and material changes of circumstances which justified a modification of the primary residential parent and the parenting schedule:

(a) [Mother] has remarried and now lives in Dade County, Georgia; (b) The children have a close and loving relationship with [Mother’s] spouse/their step-father and his children; (c) Both [Mother’s] and [Father’s] work schedules have changed. As a result of [Father’s] work schedule the minor children spend much of their time in the care of their step-mother; (d) The minor children are now going through puberty; (e) [Father] and his wife are mentally and physically abusive to the children; (f) [Father] does not adequately or properly attend to the children’s medical needs; (g) The oldest child’s grades have suffered; and

-2- (h) [Father] and his current wife frequently yell and fight with each other in the presence of the children.

Mother requested a restraining order based upon allegations of mental and physical abuse of the children by Father and his wife, “including, slapping, choking, jabbing in the throat, unjustified and excessive spanking, downgrading the children, making derogatory remarks about [Mother] to the children, and using profane names in reference to the children’s extended family.”

Father filed an answer and counter-petition to modify. He included an application for a restraining order against Mother with a verbatim restatement of the allegations contained in Mother’s application for a restraining order. After a hearing on July 5, 2016, the trial court entered restraining orders against both Mother and Father. The orders include the following language: “[Mother/Father] is hereby restrained and enjoined from discussing these proceedings with the minor children and from permitting [her husband/his wife] doing so.”

The trial of this matter took place over three days in July and August 2016. The court heard testimony from Mother, Father, the children’s stepfather, their paternal grandmother, and the children, Amaya, Kamryn, and Kendyl.

Testimony of witnesses

1. Mother

Mother testified that Amaya was almost thirteen years old, and Kamryn and Kendyl were eleven. Mother was married to Kevin Wilson (“Stepfather”), who had two daughters of his own. She testified that their relationship began with a few dates in December 2012. Mother and Stepfather resided in Trenton, Georgia.

Mother stated that, at the time of the last modification hearing, in August 2012, she and her previous husband, Mr. Reed, lived in Chattanooga and were still together. According to Mother, Father’s attorney asked her at that hearing about her relationship with the children, about Mr. Reed’s relationship with the children, and about whether she and Mr. Reed were getting along. Mother testified that, at the time of the hearing, she and Mr. Reed “were getting along okay.” She stated that Mr. Reed had trouble handling the conflicts between Mother and Father and withdrew from Mother during the hearing. After the hearing, Mr. Reed moved out and filed for divorce based on irreconcilable differences. Mother was awarded the house,1 which was encumbered by debt, and she declared bankruptcy in 2013. Mother testified that she “had a substantial amount of identity theft on my credit from my mother and from credit cards that she had taken out.”

1 On cross-examination, Mother testified that the house that she and Mr. Reed lived in was in her name. -3- She further stated that the house had more debt on it that it was worth because of declining home values in the neighborhood.

Mother introduced photographs of her home with Stepfather. They lived in a four- bedroom home with two bathrooms on a one-acre lot. Kamryn and Kendyl shared a bedroom; Amaya shared a bedroom with her stepsister, Alyssa.

At the time of the 2012 hearing, Mother was employed at U.S. Xpress in Chattanooga, where she worked from January 2008 through March 2014. Her hours were from 7:00 a.m to 4:00 p.m.

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Priscilla Brooke Wilson v. Patrick Shane Phillips, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/priscilla-brooke-wilson-v-patrick-shane-phillips-tennctapp-2017.