Priore v. New York City Department of Parks & Recreation

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Priore v. New York City Department of Parks & Recreation

124 A.D.3d 749, 2 N.Y.S.3d 170

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedJanuary 21, 2015

Docket2014-02378

StatusPublished

Cited by6 cases

This text of 124 A.D.3d 749 (Priore v. New York City Department of Parks & Recreation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Priore v. New York City Department of Parks & Recreation, 124 A.D.3d 749, 2 N.Y.S.3d 170 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2015).

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Opinion

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant Korean Canaan Presbyterian Church of New York appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Flug, J.), dated December 3, 2013, which denied its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against it.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The plaintiff alleges that he was sitting in a parked vehicle, waiting for a rainstorm to subside, when a tree fell on the vehicle, causing him to sustain personal injuries. The base of the tree was located on the property of the defendant Korean Canaan Presbyterian Church of New York, (hereinafter the church). The plaintiff commenced this action against, among others, the church. The church moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against it, contending that it did not have notice that the tree was in a hazardous condition. The church also submitted certified climatological data which showed that a tornado had touched down in the area where the accident occurred at around the time of the accident, and argued that it could not be held liable for damages caused by an act of God. The Supreme Court denied the motion.

In cases involving fallen trees, a property owner will only be held liable if he knew or should have known of the defective condition of the tree (see Ivancic v Olmstead, 66 NY2d 349, 351 [1985]; Harris v Village of E. Hills, 41 NY2d 446, 450 [1977]; Pulgarin v Demonteverde, 63 AD3d 1026 [2009]; Lillis v Wessolock, 50 AD3d 969 [2008]). “Constructive notice in such a *750 case can be imputed if the record establishes that a reasonable inspection would have revealed the dangerous condition of the tree” (Lillis v Wessolock, 50 AD3d at 969; see Harris v Village of E. Hills, 41 NY2d at 449). “Proximate cause is a jury question” (Nowlin v City of New York, 81 NY2d 81, 89 [1993]; see Moore v Gottlieb, 46 AD3d 775 [2007]). “For a loss to be considered the result of an act of God, human activities cannot have contributed to the loss in any degree” (Cangialosi v Hallen Constr. Corp., 282 AD2d 565, 566 [2001]; see Sawicki v GameStop Corp., 106 AD3d 979 [2013]; Fulgum v Town of Cortlandt, 2 AD3d 775 [2003]).

Here, the church failed to establish, prima facie, that it conducted a reasonable inspection of the subject tree, that the tree did not manifest any indicia of decay, and that the incident was solely caused by an act of God (see Ivancic v Olmstead, 66 NY2d 349 [1985]; Fulgum v Town of Cortlandt, 2 AD3d 775 [2003]). Since the church failed to meet its initial burden as the movant, it is not necessary to review the sufficiency of the plaintiffs opposition papers (see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851 [1985]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the church’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against it.

Balkin, J.P, Cohen, Duffy and LaSalle, JJ., concur.

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In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant Korean Canaan Presbyterian Church of New York appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Flug, J.), dated December 3, 2013, which denied its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against it.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The plaintiff alleges that he was sitting in a parked vehicle, waiting for a rainstorm to subside, when a tree fell on the vehicle, causing him to sustain personal injuries. The base of the tree was located on the property of the defendant Korean Canaan Presbyterian Church of New York, (hereinafter the church). The plaintiff commenced this action against, among others, the church. The church moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against it, contending that it did not have notice that the tree was in a hazardous condition. The church also submitted certified climatological data which showed that a tornado had touched down in the area where the accident occurred at around the time of the accident, and argued that it could not be held liable for damages caused by an act of God. The Supreme Court denied the motion.

In cases involving fallen trees, a property owner will only be held liable if he knew or should have known of the defective condition of the tree (see Ivancic v Olmstead, 66 NY2d 349, 351 [1985]; Harris v Village of E. Hills, 41 NY2d 446, 450 [1977]; Pulgarin v Demonteverde, 63 AD3d 1026 [2009]; Lillis v Wessolock, 50 AD3d 969 [2008]). “Constructive notice in such a *750 case can be imputed if the record establishes that a reasonable inspection would have revealed the dangerous condition of the tree” (Lillis v Wessolock, 50 AD3d at 969; see Harris v Village of E. Hills, 41 NY2d at 449). “Proximate cause is a jury question” (Nowlin v City of New York, 81 NY2d 81, 89 [1993]; see Moore v Gottlieb, 46 AD3d 775 [2007]). “For a loss to be considered the result of an act of God, human activities cannot have contributed to the loss in any degree” (Cangialosi v Hallen Constr. Corp., 282 AD2d 565, 566 [2001]; see Sawicki v GameStop Corp., 106 AD3d 979 [2013]; Fulgum v Town of Cortlandt, 2 AD3d 775 [2003]).

Here, the church failed to establish, prima facie, that it conducted a reasonable inspection of the subject tree, that the tree did not manifest any indicia of decay, and that the incident was solely caused by an act of God (see Ivancic v Olmstead, 66 NY2d 349 [1985]; Fulgum v Town of Cortlandt, 2 AD3d 775 [2003]). Since the church failed to meet its initial burden as the movant, it is not necessary to review the sufficiency of the plaintiffs opposition papers (see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851 [1985]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the church’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against it.

Balkin, J.P, Cohen, Duffy and LaSalle, JJ., concur.

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124 A.D.3d 749, 2 N.Y.S.3d 170, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/priore-v-new-york-city-department-of-parks-recreation-nyappdiv-2015.

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