Prince v. State

3 Stew. & P. 253
CourtSupreme Court of Alabama
DecidedJanuary 15, 1833
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 3 Stew. & P. 253 (Prince v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Alabama primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Prince v. State, 3 Stew. & P. 253 (Ala. 1833).

Opinion

Taylor, J.

Two preliminary questions have been made, in this case, by the Attorney General.

1. That the points reserved by the court below, as novel and difficult, should have been signed by the judge, in the manner of a bill of exceptions.

2. That the record is not sufficiently authenticated.

The whole record is extremely inartificially made out, and without, the least regard to connexion. It appears, however, that the several objections to the proceedings below, made by the prisoner, and reserved for the opinion of this court, were spread upon the record; succeeding which is a statement, that the questions arising thereon are referred to this court, as .novel and difficult.

The statute which authorises the .circuit court to refer questions, arising upon the trial of criminal cases, which they deem novel and difficult, to this court for its opinion thereon, does not prescribe the manner [255]*255in which ifc is to be done. It is, of conree, left to the courts, to adopt that method, which they shall deem most expedient. This court would not be very particular with respect to the manner, so that it clearly appeared by the record, that the reference was made by the Circuit, court. No good reason, however, can be perceived for requiring this part of the record to be certified under the hand of the judge, more than any other act of the court.

The record shows the proceedings of the court, as well as of the’ parties; and it'is to facilitate business that a clerk is employed to enter these proceedings; but they are no less the act, of the Judge on that account. I conceive that convenience is most promoted by pursuing the method which has been adopted in this case.

The second point is considered equally untenable. The certificate, it is true, is not technically drawn. Instead of certifying that he had given a true transcript of the record of the case, as it remained in his office, the clerk certifies, “ that the foregoing pages contain, a true statement touching said cause, as the same remains now on file-in my said, office.”

Were this a casein which the whole record could be brought before us, for revision, the objection might be a good one, as there might be a “ statement touching the cause,” without there being a complete transcript of the record; the one expression not being tantamount to the other. But it sufficiently appears that this “statement” contains all that was referred to this court; and shows what points were so referred, and, if it did not, the prejudice would not be to the State, but to the prisoner.

I come now, to consider the points referred.

[256]*256The prisoner svcs indicted for stealing- a slave.— When pul upen his trial, he objected to the jurors drawn and summoned on the original venire: “First ■ — Because the sheriff, who, it appeared, was one of the owners of the slave, charged to have been stolen, had assisted, since the prosecution was commenced, in selecting the names of competent persons for jurors, and placing them in the jury box, pursuant to law.”

“'Second — -Because the said sheriff had aided in drawing from the jury box, the jurors summoned on the-original venire.”

“It appeared in evidence that the offence was committed early in April, or in the latter part of March, 1830; an indictment was found in 1831, and at the instance of the State of” (at) “this term, a nolle prosequi was entered, the prisoner having been, since the finding of said indictment, in custody. The present indictment was found at this term.”

“The prisoner's counsel moved the court, to instruct the jury, lhat the statute of limitations operated asa bar to the conviction.

“Theprisoner; after the return of the verdict, moved, in arrest of judgment, because the tales jurors were summoned by the coronor, pursuant to an order of the court, for that purpose, without a venire facias, in his hands, directing him to summon them.

“ After verdict, the prisoner also moved, in arrest of judgment, that the grand jury were irregularly drawn, for the objections made to the original venire. No objection was made to the competency of the coroner.

“ Which several objections and motions, were over[257]*257ruled by tho court, and the questions of law there-' upon arising, roforrocl lo tiro Supremo court, as novel and diíiioalí.”

Two pointu, only, have boca insisted on, in argu blent — the others being abandoned.

1. The conviction was barred, by the statute of limitations.

2. The challenge to the array of the jurors, whose 'names were specified, in tho venire Jadas, should have been allowed.

The statute of limitations declares, fthat no person or- persons, shall be prosecuted, tried, or punished, for any offence, wilful murder, arson, forgery, counterfeiting and larceny excepted, unless the indictment, presentment, or information for the same, be found or exhibited within one year next, after the offence shall be done or committed.”

It is conceded, by the counsel for the prisoner, that the term “larceny,” in its.general and technical signification, includes the offence charged in the indictment ; but, it is contended, that our statutes have distinguished the crime of slave-stealing, from other -larcenies.; that it is treated of distinctly in our laws., and a different punishment provided for its perpetration.

It is certainly true, that, in prescribing the punishment for crimes, the general assembly has made slave stealing, capital; and awarded a milder punishment as the penalty, for laroony in general.

Tho 18th section of the act of 1607,

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
3 Stew. & P. 253, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/prince-v-state-ala-1833.