Prince v. Gurvitz

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Prince v. Gurvitz

37 A.D.2d 727, 323 N.Y.S.2d 861, 1971 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 3550

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedJuly 6, 1971

StatusPublished

Cited by4 cases

This text of 37 A.D.2d 727 (Prince v. Gurvitz) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Prince v. Gurvitz, 37 A.D.2d 727, 323 N.Y.S.2d 861, 1971 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 3550 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1971).

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Opinion

In an action to recover damages caused by defendants’ coercion of plaintiff to transfer his shares in defendant Prince Chevrolet, Inc., and for other relief, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County, entered November 19, 1970, which granted respondent’s motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (subd. [a], par. 7). Order reversed, with $10 costs and disbursements, and motion denied. Plaintiff’s first cause of action, alleging that respondent and the other defendants, by means of threats of criminal prosecution, eonspiratorially coerced plaintiff to transfer his stock in defendant Prince Chevrolet, Inc., to defendant Gurvitz and to perform certain other acts is legally sufficient (Rich v. New York Cent. & [728]*728Hudson Riv. R. R. Co., 87 N. Y. 382; Penal Law, § 135.60, subds. 4, 5), notwithstanding that special damages are not pleaded. Rabin, P. J., Hopkins, Christ, Brennan and Benjamin, JJ., concur.

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In an action to recover damages caused by defendants’ coercion of plaintiff to transfer his shares in defendant Prince Chevrolet, Inc., and for other relief, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County, entered November 19, 1970, which granted respondent’s motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (subd. [a], par. 7). Order reversed, with $10 costs and disbursements, and motion denied. Plaintiff’s first cause of action, alleging that respondent and the other defendants, by means of threats of criminal prosecution, eonspiratorially coerced plaintiff to transfer his stock in defendant Prince Chevrolet, Inc., to defendant Gurvitz and to perform certain other acts is legally sufficient (Rich v. New York Cent. & [728]*728Hudson Riv. R. R. Co., 87 N. Y. 382; Penal Law, § 135.60, subds. 4, 5), notwithstanding that special damages are not pleaded. Rabin, P. J., Hopkins, Christ, Brennan and Benjamin, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

37 A.D.2d 727, 323 N.Y.S.2d 861, 1971 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 3550, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/prince-v-gurvitz-nyappdiv-1971.

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