UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
NADINE PRINCE,
Plaintiff,
v. Civil Action No. 23-cv-1352
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Nadine Prince sued the District of Columbia, alleging that its Metropolitan Police
Department (“MPD”) violated federal and common law when it entered her home pursuant to a
search warrant. Defendant moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that Plaintiff fails to
state a claim. Def.’s Mot. for J on the Pleadings at 3–13, ECF No. 26 (“Def.’s MJP”). For the
reasons below, the court will GRANT Defendant’s motion.
I. BACKGROUND
On Wednesday, May 25, 2022, MPD officers executed a search warrant Plaintiff’s
residence. Compare Compl. ¶ 4, ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”) (alleging that MPD officers did not knock
or announce their authority), with Pl.’s Opp. to Def.’s Mot. ¶ 4 (“Pl.’s Opp’n”), ECF No. 29
(conceding that MPD officers did knock before entering). Plaintiff claims that she did not hear
the officers’ knock or announcement, they gave her no time to answer the door, and immediately
broke down her door with a battering ram. Compl. ¶ 4; Pl.’s Opp’n ¶ 4. The officers ordered
Plaintiff to come downstairs, where she found them handcuffing her twenty-five-year-old son.
Compl. ¶ 4. Plaintiff asked to see a warrant, but the officers refused. Id. ¶ 5. Plaintiff alleges that
Page 1 of 6 the officers—who were inside her apartment for about an hour and a half, entered the wrong
apartment. Id. ¶ 6.
Plaintiff filed this case on May 11, 2023, bringing one claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and
five common law claims, including invasion of privacy, destruction of property, trespass, false
imprisonment, and negligence. Id. ¶¶ 7–28. In its answer, Defendant refers to the search warrant
and body-warn camera (“BWC”) footage. Answer at 2, ECF No. 16; see also Notice of Filing
Under Seal at 1, ECF No. 17 (“Notice”). Although Defendant filed a notice that it intended “to
place under seal” the BWC footage, it never did so. Notice at 1. Defendant did, however, attach
the search warrant and related redacted attachments. Notice of Filing Under Seal at 1–8, ECF No.
27-1 (“Second Notice”). 1
On January 13, 2024, Plaintiff moved for summary judgement. Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J. at 1,
ECF No. 21. The court denied the motion, finding that there were disputed issues of material fact.
Jan. 22, 2024 Min. Order.
Defendant now moves for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(c). Def.’s MJP at 1–13. It argues that Plaintiff has not properly alleged municipal liability
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and her other claims are otherwise barred by the fact that MPD had a
valid search warrant. Id. at 3–13.
1 The search warrant was referenced by both parties in their respective pleadings. Compl. ¶ 5; Def.’s MJP at 8–10; Pl.’s Opp’n at 2–6. Consequently, the court may consider the material in deciding Defendant’s motion. See In re Domestic Airline Travel Antitrust Litig., 221 F. Supp. 3d 46, 70 (D.D.C. 2016) (“Incorporation by reference can also amplify pleadings where the document is not attached by the plaintiff, but is ‘referred to the complaint and [] integral to [plaintiff’s] claim.’”) (citation omitted)).
Page 2 of 6 II. LEGAL STANDARDS
The standard for a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings “essentially mirrors”
the standard for a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Tapp v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 306 F.
Supp. 3d 383, 391 (D.D.C. 2016). “The moving party must show that no material issue of fact
remains to be solved and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Jud. Watch, Inc. v.
U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 888 F. Supp. 2d 189, 191 (D.D.C. 2012) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). The court presumes the truth of a plaintiff’s factual allegations and construes
the complaint “in favor of the plaintiff, who must be granted the benefit of all inferences that can
be derived from the facts alleged.” Hettinga v. United States, 677 F.3d 471, 476 (D.C. Cir. 2012)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Courts are generally “unwilling to grant a
judgment under Rule 12(c) unless it is clear that the merits of the controversy can be fairly and
fully decided in this summary manner.” Tapp, 306 F. Supp. 3d at 392 (citing 5C Charles Alan
Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Fed. Practice & Procedure § 1369 (3d ed. 2004)).
III. ANALYSIS
Defendant first argues that Plaintiff’s claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must be dismissed
because it cannot be held liable for MPD’s actions and Plaintiff otherwise fails to allege facts
supporting municipal liability. Def.’s MJP at 6–7. The court agrees.
The District of Columbia may be sued on a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim. Monell v. Dep’t of
Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978); see Act Now to Stop War & End Racism
Coal. & Muslim Am. Soc’y Freedom Found. v. D.C., 846 F.3d 391, 413 D.C. Cir. 2017 (treating
D.C. as a municipality for purposes of Section 1983). But it cannot be liable for MPD’s actions
under a respondeat superior liability theory. See Triplett v. District of Columbia, 108 F.3d 1450,
1453 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
Page 3 of 6 Nevertheless, Plaintiff attempts to hold Defendant vicariously liable for MPD’s actions.
She alleges that MPD failed to knock and announce before entering her home and damaged her
front door. Compl. ¶¶ 4–5. She further alleges—without factual support—that MPD was at the
“wrong apartment.” Id. ¶ 6. Yet, despite being represented by counsel, she did not sue MPD or
any of its officers. Id. at 1–14. Instead, she alleges that MPD “is under the direction and
supervision of [the] District’s chief executive, Muriel Bowser,” that MPD officers “are employees
of the District[,]” and that they were “within the scope of their employment” when they searched
Plaintiff’s home. Id. ¶ 3. But “under § 1983[,] a municipality is liable not under principles of
respondeat superior, but only for constitutional torts arising from ‘action pursuant to official
municipal policy.’” Triplett, 108 F.3d at 1453 (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 691).
In order for the District to be liable under Section 1983, Plaintiff would have to allege that
it had a “policy or custom” of training MPD officers to unlawfully execute search warrants.
Warren v. D.C., 353 F.3d 36
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
NADINE PRINCE,
Plaintiff,
v. Civil Action No. 23-cv-1352
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Nadine Prince sued the District of Columbia, alleging that its Metropolitan Police
Department (“MPD”) violated federal and common law when it entered her home pursuant to a
search warrant. Defendant moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that Plaintiff fails to
state a claim. Def.’s Mot. for J on the Pleadings at 3–13, ECF No. 26 (“Def.’s MJP”). For the
reasons below, the court will GRANT Defendant’s motion.
I. BACKGROUND
On Wednesday, May 25, 2022, MPD officers executed a search warrant Plaintiff’s
residence. Compare Compl. ¶ 4, ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”) (alleging that MPD officers did not knock
or announce their authority), with Pl.’s Opp. to Def.’s Mot. ¶ 4 (“Pl.’s Opp’n”), ECF No. 29
(conceding that MPD officers did knock before entering). Plaintiff claims that she did not hear
the officers’ knock or announcement, they gave her no time to answer the door, and immediately
broke down her door with a battering ram. Compl. ¶ 4; Pl.’s Opp’n ¶ 4. The officers ordered
Plaintiff to come downstairs, where she found them handcuffing her twenty-five-year-old son.
Compl. ¶ 4. Plaintiff asked to see a warrant, but the officers refused. Id. ¶ 5. Plaintiff alleges that
Page 1 of 6 the officers—who were inside her apartment for about an hour and a half, entered the wrong
apartment. Id. ¶ 6.
Plaintiff filed this case on May 11, 2023, bringing one claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and
five common law claims, including invasion of privacy, destruction of property, trespass, false
imprisonment, and negligence. Id. ¶¶ 7–28. In its answer, Defendant refers to the search warrant
and body-warn camera (“BWC”) footage. Answer at 2, ECF No. 16; see also Notice of Filing
Under Seal at 1, ECF No. 17 (“Notice”). Although Defendant filed a notice that it intended “to
place under seal” the BWC footage, it never did so. Notice at 1. Defendant did, however, attach
the search warrant and related redacted attachments. Notice of Filing Under Seal at 1–8, ECF No.
27-1 (“Second Notice”). 1
On January 13, 2024, Plaintiff moved for summary judgement. Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J. at 1,
ECF No. 21. The court denied the motion, finding that there were disputed issues of material fact.
Jan. 22, 2024 Min. Order.
Defendant now moves for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(c). Def.’s MJP at 1–13. It argues that Plaintiff has not properly alleged municipal liability
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and her other claims are otherwise barred by the fact that MPD had a
valid search warrant. Id. at 3–13.
1 The search warrant was referenced by both parties in their respective pleadings. Compl. ¶ 5; Def.’s MJP at 8–10; Pl.’s Opp’n at 2–6. Consequently, the court may consider the material in deciding Defendant’s motion. See In re Domestic Airline Travel Antitrust Litig., 221 F. Supp. 3d 46, 70 (D.D.C. 2016) (“Incorporation by reference can also amplify pleadings where the document is not attached by the plaintiff, but is ‘referred to the complaint and [] integral to [plaintiff’s] claim.’”) (citation omitted)).
Page 2 of 6 II. LEGAL STANDARDS
The standard for a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings “essentially mirrors”
the standard for a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Tapp v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 306 F.
Supp. 3d 383, 391 (D.D.C. 2016). “The moving party must show that no material issue of fact
remains to be solved and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Jud. Watch, Inc. v.
U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 888 F. Supp. 2d 189, 191 (D.D.C. 2012) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). The court presumes the truth of a plaintiff’s factual allegations and construes
the complaint “in favor of the plaintiff, who must be granted the benefit of all inferences that can
be derived from the facts alleged.” Hettinga v. United States, 677 F.3d 471, 476 (D.C. Cir. 2012)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Courts are generally “unwilling to grant a
judgment under Rule 12(c) unless it is clear that the merits of the controversy can be fairly and
fully decided in this summary manner.” Tapp, 306 F. Supp. 3d at 392 (citing 5C Charles Alan
Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Fed. Practice & Procedure § 1369 (3d ed. 2004)).
III. ANALYSIS
Defendant first argues that Plaintiff’s claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must be dismissed
because it cannot be held liable for MPD’s actions and Plaintiff otherwise fails to allege facts
supporting municipal liability. Def.’s MJP at 6–7. The court agrees.
The District of Columbia may be sued on a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim. Monell v. Dep’t of
Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978); see Act Now to Stop War & End Racism
Coal. & Muslim Am. Soc’y Freedom Found. v. D.C., 846 F.3d 391, 413 D.C. Cir. 2017 (treating
D.C. as a municipality for purposes of Section 1983). But it cannot be liable for MPD’s actions
under a respondeat superior liability theory. See Triplett v. District of Columbia, 108 F.3d 1450,
1453 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
Page 3 of 6 Nevertheless, Plaintiff attempts to hold Defendant vicariously liable for MPD’s actions.
She alleges that MPD failed to knock and announce before entering her home and damaged her
front door. Compl. ¶¶ 4–5. She further alleges—without factual support—that MPD was at the
“wrong apartment.” Id. ¶ 6. Yet, despite being represented by counsel, she did not sue MPD or
any of its officers. Id. at 1–14. Instead, she alleges that MPD “is under the direction and
supervision of [the] District’s chief executive, Muriel Bowser,” that MPD officers “are employees
of the District[,]” and that they were “within the scope of their employment” when they searched
Plaintiff’s home. Id. ¶ 3. But “under § 1983[,] a municipality is liable not under principles of
respondeat superior, but only for constitutional torts arising from ‘action pursuant to official
municipal policy.’” Triplett, 108 F.3d at 1453 (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 691).
In order for the District to be liable under Section 1983, Plaintiff would have to allege that
it had a “policy or custom” of training MPD officers to unlawfully execute search warrants.
Warren v. D.C., 353 F.3d 36, 38 (D.C. Cir. 2004). For example, Plaintiff would have to plead
facts to establish that: (1) the District adopted a policy of unlawfully executing search warrants; or
(2) a District “policymaker” directed MPD to unlawfully execute such warrants; or (3) the
District’s search warrant policies “are so consistent that they have become [a] ‘custom’” of the
municipality; or (4) the District knew or should have known of a risk that officers would unlawfully
execute search warrants, but showed “deliberate indifference” to that risk by failing to act. Baker
v. D.C., 326 F.3d 1302, 1306 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (citations omitted).
Plaintiff alleges no such facts. She only complains about the specific actions of the MPD
officers who entered and searched her home. Compl. ¶¶ 4–6. Accordingly, Count I must be
dismissed.
Page 4 of 6 Because Count I—the only federal claim—will be dismissed, the court would have to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s five remaining common law claims in order to
hear this case. “[T]he district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims
that . . . form part of the same case or controversy [.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). However,
supplemental jurisdiction “‘is a doctrine of discretion, not a plaintiff’s right.’” Shekoyan v. Sibley
Int’l, 409 F.3d 414, 423 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (quoting United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715,
726 (1966)). A district court, in its discretion, may choose not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over a claim if the court “has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction[.]” 28
U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); see also Mead v. City First Bank of D.C., N.A., 616 F. Supp. 2d 78, 81 (D.D.C.
2009). In making such a determination, a court must balance considerations of judicial economy,
convenience, fairness, and comity. Shekoyan, 409 F.3d at 424. “Typically, if all federal law claims
have been dismissed, the factors counsel against exercising supplemental jurisdiction.” Trimble
v. D.C., 779 F. Supp. 2d 54, 60 (D.D.C. 2011); Ali Shafi v. Palestinian Auth., 686 F. Supp. 2d 23,
31 (D.D.C. 2010); Williams v. Savage, 569 F. Supp. 2d 99, 113 (D.D.C. 2008).
The court will not exercise supplemental jurisdiction on Plaintiff’s common law claims for
Count II (invasion of privacy), Count III (destruction of property), Count IV (trespass), Count V
(false imprisonment), and Count VI (negligence). Comp. ¶¶ 13–28. Plaintiff does not address any
of the factors set forth above. Pl.’s Opp’n at 1–7. And Plaintiff’s common law claims would be
more appropriately adjudicated by the District of Columbia Superior Court. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(c)(1). The claims are based on District of Columbia law, the proceedings have not
advanced past the motion to dismiss stage in this court, and, given that Plaintiff’s allegations are
based in the District of Columbia, there “seems little difference in convenience for the parties
Page 5 of 6 whether they litigate in D.C. or federal court.” See Edmondson & Gallagher v. Alban Towers
Tenants Ass’n, 48 F.3d 1260, 1267 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court will GRANT Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings. A corresponding order will follow.
Date: March 26, 2025
Tanya S. Chutkan TANYA S. CHUTKAN United States District Judge
Page 6 of 6