1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 9 PRINCE PAUL RAYMOND WILLIAMS, No. 1:25-cv-00981-JLT-EPG 10 Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, RECOMMENDING THAT THIS CASE BE 11 v. DISMISSED, WITHOUT PREJUDICE, FOR 12 CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF (1) FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM; (2) CHILD SUPPORT, et al., FAILURE TO COMPLY COURT ORDERS, 13 AND (3) FAILURE TO PROSECUTE THIS Defendants. CASE 14 (ECF Nos. 11, 12, 14) 15 OBJECTIONS, IF ANY, DUE WITHIN 16 THIRTY (30) DAYS 17
18 Plaintiff Prince Paul Raymond Williams is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in 19 this civil action. Plaintiff filed the complaint commencing this action on August 7, 2025. (ECF 20 No. 1). He then filed a first amended complaint on September 29, 2025. (ECF No. 11). 21 The Court concludes that the first amended complaint fails to state any cognizable claims 22 because it violates Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), which requires “a short and plain 23 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” 24 Moreover, Plaintiff has failed to respond to court orders to file a redacted version of his 25 initial complaint despite being warned of possible dismissal, which likewise demonstrates his 26 failure to prosecute this case. (ECF Nos. 12, 14). 27 Accordingly, the Court recommends that this case be dismissed, without prejudice, for 28 1 failure to state a claim, failure to comply with court orders, and failure to prosecute this case. 2 I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT 3 As Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court screens the complaint under 28 4 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), which requires a court to dismiss a case that “is frivolous or malicious;” “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or “seeks monetary relief against a 5 defendant who is immune from such relief.” 6 II. BACKGROUND 7 Plaintiff filed his initial complaint on August 7, 2025 (ECF No. 1). Because Plaintiff’s 8 initial complaint contained the unredacted names of two minors in violation of Federal Rule of 9 Civil Procedure 5.2(a)(3), the Court issued an order on September 30, 2025, directing Plaintiff to 10 file a redacted copy of the complaint within 10 days using only the minors’ initials. (ECF No. 12). 11 The Court advised Plaintiff that failure to comply with this order could result in dismissal of the 12 case. (Id. at 2). 13 After Plaintiff failed to comply with the Court’s order, the Court gave him another 14 opportunity to do so, issuing the following minute order on October 20, 2025, which noted the 15 Court’s concern that Plaintiff had abandoned the prosecution of this case. 16 On September 30, 2025, the Court ordered Plaintiff to file a redacted copy of his initial complaint (which contained the full names of minors) within 10 days, but 17 Plaintiff has failed to comply with this order or file anything since then. (ECF No. 18 12 ). Plaintiff’s failure to respond not only demonstrates that he has chosen not to comply with a court order but indicates that he may have abandoned the 19 prosecution of this case. Upon consideration, the Court will grant Plaintiff a single sua sponte extension to October 30, 2025, to comply with the Court’s order 20 requiring redaction of the initial complaint. (ECF No. 12 ). Plaintiff is warned that failure to comply with this order, or any other court order, may result in sanctions, 21 including the dismissal of this case. 22 (ECF No. 14). 23 Plaintiff has also failed to respond to this order. Rather, the last filing in this case from 24 Plaintiff was his first amended complaint filed on September 29, 2025, which he did before the 25 Court screened his initial complaint. (ECF No. 11). 26 Turning to Plaintiff’s amended complaint, it is 154 pages long. It asserts 14 causes of 27 action against 10 named Defendants. Plaintiff brings a host of claims and cites differing authority 28 (Constitutional rights, Federal criminal provisions, Federal civil provisions, state law, etc.); 1 factually, his amended complaint mainly argues that Defendants violated his rights in connection 2 with attempts to collect his child support obligations. 3 Plaintiff Prince Paul Raymond Williams, proceeding in propria persona, brings this civil action to redress continuing deprivations of federal and California rights 4 caused by the issuance and enforcement of administrative income-withholding orders and the related furnishing of derogatory credit information by state and 5 county child-support actors in Fresno and Solano Counties. Two Title IV-D matters are at issue: (1) a case opened in Fresno County in or about 2010 and later 6 enforced in Solano County following the unilateral relocation of Plaintiff’s minor 7 child; and (2) a Fresno County case opened in or about 2014. Since inception of each account, Defendants have diverted Plaintiff’s wages month after month 8 without providing constitutionally adequate notice, access to calculations, a meaningful opportunity-to-be heard before a neutral adjudicator, or de novo 9 review following an objection to commissioner jurisdiction, and have furnished materially inaccurate and misleading tradelines to national consumer reporting 10 agencies, damaging Plaintiff’s credit and employment prospects. 11 (ECF No. 11, at p. 4). 12 Among the various causes of action alleged, Plaintiff lists 42 U.S.C. § 1983, The Fair 13 Credit Reporting Act, and state law claims (including defamation, conversion, and fraud). 14 III. FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH RULE 8(a) 15 A. Rule 8(a) Legal Standards 16 A complaint is required to contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 17 the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 18 required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 19 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A plaintiff must set forth “sufficient 20 factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. 21 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). The mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting 22 this plausibility standard. Id. at 679. While a plaintiff’s allegations are taken as true, courts “are 23 not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 24 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally, a plaintiff’s 25 legal conclusions are not accepted as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 26 Pleadings of pro se plaintiffs “must be held to less stringent standards than formal 27 pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that 28 1 pro se complaints should continue to be liberally construed after Iqbal). 2 B. Analysis 3 The Court concludes that Plaintiff’s amended complaint violates Rule 8(a). First, 4 Plaintiff’s complaint is needlessly long, mostly because Plaintiff includes irrelevant information. See Knapp v. Hogan, 738 F.3d 1106, 1109 (9th Cir.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 9 PRINCE PAUL RAYMOND WILLIAMS, No. 1:25-cv-00981-JLT-EPG 10 Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, RECOMMENDING THAT THIS CASE BE 11 v. DISMISSED, WITHOUT PREJUDICE, FOR 12 CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF (1) FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM; (2) CHILD SUPPORT, et al., FAILURE TO COMPLY COURT ORDERS, 13 AND (3) FAILURE TO PROSECUTE THIS Defendants. CASE 14 (ECF Nos. 11, 12, 14) 15 OBJECTIONS, IF ANY, DUE WITHIN 16 THIRTY (30) DAYS 17
18 Plaintiff Prince Paul Raymond Williams is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in 19 this civil action. Plaintiff filed the complaint commencing this action on August 7, 2025. (ECF 20 No. 1). He then filed a first amended complaint on September 29, 2025. (ECF No. 11). 21 The Court concludes that the first amended complaint fails to state any cognizable claims 22 because it violates Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), which requires “a short and plain 23 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” 24 Moreover, Plaintiff has failed to respond to court orders to file a redacted version of his 25 initial complaint despite being warned of possible dismissal, which likewise demonstrates his 26 failure to prosecute this case. (ECF Nos. 12, 14). 27 Accordingly, the Court recommends that this case be dismissed, without prejudice, for 28 1 failure to state a claim, failure to comply with court orders, and failure to prosecute this case. 2 I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT 3 As Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court screens the complaint under 28 4 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), which requires a court to dismiss a case that “is frivolous or malicious;” “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or “seeks monetary relief against a 5 defendant who is immune from such relief.” 6 II. BACKGROUND 7 Plaintiff filed his initial complaint on August 7, 2025 (ECF No. 1). Because Plaintiff’s 8 initial complaint contained the unredacted names of two minors in violation of Federal Rule of 9 Civil Procedure 5.2(a)(3), the Court issued an order on September 30, 2025, directing Plaintiff to 10 file a redacted copy of the complaint within 10 days using only the minors’ initials. (ECF No. 12). 11 The Court advised Plaintiff that failure to comply with this order could result in dismissal of the 12 case. (Id. at 2). 13 After Plaintiff failed to comply with the Court’s order, the Court gave him another 14 opportunity to do so, issuing the following minute order on October 20, 2025, which noted the 15 Court’s concern that Plaintiff had abandoned the prosecution of this case. 16 On September 30, 2025, the Court ordered Plaintiff to file a redacted copy of his initial complaint (which contained the full names of minors) within 10 days, but 17 Plaintiff has failed to comply with this order or file anything since then. (ECF No. 18 12 ). Plaintiff’s failure to respond not only demonstrates that he has chosen not to comply with a court order but indicates that he may have abandoned the 19 prosecution of this case. Upon consideration, the Court will grant Plaintiff a single sua sponte extension to October 30, 2025, to comply with the Court’s order 20 requiring redaction of the initial complaint. (ECF No. 12 ). Plaintiff is warned that failure to comply with this order, or any other court order, may result in sanctions, 21 including the dismissal of this case. 22 (ECF No. 14). 23 Plaintiff has also failed to respond to this order. Rather, the last filing in this case from 24 Plaintiff was his first amended complaint filed on September 29, 2025, which he did before the 25 Court screened his initial complaint. (ECF No. 11). 26 Turning to Plaintiff’s amended complaint, it is 154 pages long. It asserts 14 causes of 27 action against 10 named Defendants. Plaintiff brings a host of claims and cites differing authority 28 (Constitutional rights, Federal criminal provisions, Federal civil provisions, state law, etc.); 1 factually, his amended complaint mainly argues that Defendants violated his rights in connection 2 with attempts to collect his child support obligations. 3 Plaintiff Prince Paul Raymond Williams, proceeding in propria persona, brings this civil action to redress continuing deprivations of federal and California rights 4 caused by the issuance and enforcement of administrative income-withholding orders and the related furnishing of derogatory credit information by state and 5 county child-support actors in Fresno and Solano Counties. Two Title IV-D matters are at issue: (1) a case opened in Fresno County in or about 2010 and later 6 enforced in Solano County following the unilateral relocation of Plaintiff’s minor 7 child; and (2) a Fresno County case opened in or about 2014. Since inception of each account, Defendants have diverted Plaintiff’s wages month after month 8 without providing constitutionally adequate notice, access to calculations, a meaningful opportunity-to-be heard before a neutral adjudicator, or de novo 9 review following an objection to commissioner jurisdiction, and have furnished materially inaccurate and misleading tradelines to national consumer reporting 10 agencies, damaging Plaintiff’s credit and employment prospects. 11 (ECF No. 11, at p. 4). 12 Among the various causes of action alleged, Plaintiff lists 42 U.S.C. § 1983, The Fair 13 Credit Reporting Act, and state law claims (including defamation, conversion, and fraud). 14 III. FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH RULE 8(a) 15 A. Rule 8(a) Legal Standards 16 A complaint is required to contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 17 the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 18 required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 19 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A plaintiff must set forth “sufficient 20 factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. 21 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). The mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting 22 this plausibility standard. Id. at 679. While a plaintiff’s allegations are taken as true, courts “are 23 not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 24 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally, a plaintiff’s 25 legal conclusions are not accepted as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 26 Pleadings of pro se plaintiffs “must be held to less stringent standards than formal 27 pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that 28 1 pro se complaints should continue to be liberally construed after Iqbal). 2 B. Analysis 3 The Court concludes that Plaintiff’s amended complaint violates Rule 8(a). First, 4 Plaintiff’s complaint is needlessly long, mostly because Plaintiff includes irrelevant information. See Knapp v. Hogan, 738 F.3d 1106, 1109 (9th Cir. 2013) (noting that Rule 8(a) is violated 5 “when a pleading says too much”) (emphasis in original); Cafasso, U.S. ex rel. v. Gen. Dynamics 6 C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1058 (9th Cir. 2011) (collecting authority that Rule 8(a) is violated 7 when a complaint is needlessly long and contains irrelevant information). Plaintiff’s complaint is 8 154 pages, and while “verbosity or length is not by itself a basis for dismissing a complaint,” 9 there is “no authority supporting the proposition . . . that a pleading may be of unlimited length.” 10 Cafasso, U.S. ex rel., 637 F.3d at 1058 (citation omitted). A significant portion of the complaint’s 11 length is devoted to irrelevant information. For example, Plaintiff cites legal cases and doctrines 12 not directly related to his causes of action, e.g., the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.1 (See, e.g., ECF 13 No. 11, pp. 10, 12, ); see Yould v. Barnard, No. 5:18-CV-01255-EJD, 2018 WL 4105094, at *4 14 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2018) (noting that complaint violated Rule 8(a) where “[i]t contain[ed] 15 extensive sections of legal argument which make it nearly impossible for a defendant or the court 16 to sort out alleged facts from opinion or commentary” and that “[t]hese statements [were] 17 unnecessary to state a claim and serve only to confuse”). Plaintiff also prematurely addresses 18 summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, listing what he believes are 19 material disputes of fact. (ECF No. 11, p. 120). Similarly, he addresses “[a]nticipated defenses” in 20 the case and explains “how they are defeated.” (Id. at 76). Importantly, a complaint is intended to 21 present a short and plain statement of claims—it is not a means to provide legal argument, 22 address potential dispositive motions, or refute defenses a defendant may raise. 23 Second, Plaintiff’s allegations improperly group all Defendants together without making clear which individual Defendants undertook the actions underlying his claims. For example, the 24 amended complaint states as follows: 25
26 1 “The Rooker–Feldman doctrine takes its name from Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923), and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 103 S.Ct. 27 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983). Under Rooker–Feldman, a federal district court does not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear a direct appeal from the final judgment of a state court.” Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 28 1154 (9th Cir. 2003). 1 Defendants, acting under color of state law, deprived Plaintiff of a protected property interest in wages without constitutionally adequate pre-deprivation 2 process by (a) issuing and expanding administrative IWOs that conscripted Plaintiff’s Fresno employer without a neutral adjudicator, individualized notice, 3 disclosure of calculations, or de novo review after a timely Cal. Fam. Code§ 4 4251(b) objection; and (b) reinforcing the seizure with seal-bearing demands and “court-ordered” representations to induce compliance. This states a claim under 42 5 U.S.C. § 1983 against individual actors and under Monell against Fresno and Solano Counties. 6 (Id. at 42). 7 Thus, for the reasons explained above, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to comply with Rule 8(a) 8 and is subject to dismissal on that basis. 9 IV. FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH COURT ORDERS AND PROSECUTE 10 Plaintiff’s complaint is likewise subject to dismissal for failure to comply with court 11 orders and to prosecute this case. 12 In determining whether to dismiss a[n] [action] for failure to prosecute or failure to 13 comply with a court order, the Court must weigh the following factors: (1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to 14 manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to defendants/respondents; (4) the availability of less drastic alternatives; and (5) the public policy favoring 15 disposition of cases on their merits. 16 Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 17 1258, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 1992)). 18 “The public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation always favors dismissal.” 19 Pagtalunan, 291 F.3d at 642 (quoting Yourish v. California Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 990 (9th Cir. 20 1999)). Therefore, the first factor weighs in favor of dismissal. As to the Court’s need to manage its docket, “[t]he trial judge is in the best position to 21 determine whether the delay in a particular case interferes with docket management and the 22 public interest. . . . It is incumbent upon the Court to manage its docket without being subject to 23 routine noncompliance of litigants. . . .” Id. (citations omitted). Here, Plaintiff has failed to 24 respond to two court orders directing him to file a redacted version of his initial complaint. Aside 25 from this failure, his silence indicates that he has abandoned the prosecution of this case. 26 Plaintniff’s failures are delaying the case from proceeding and interfering with docket 27 management, as the case cannot progress without some indication that Plaintiff will abide by the 28 1 Court’s orders and prosecute this action. Therefore, the second factor weighs in favor of 2 dismissal. 3 Turning to the risk of prejudice, “pendency of a lawsuit is not sufficiently prejudicial in 4 and of itself to warrant dismissal.” Id. (citing Yourish, 191 F.3d at 991). However, “delay inherently increases the risk that witnesses’ memories will fade and evidence will become stale,” 5 id. at 643, and it is Plaintiff’s failure to comply with court orders and prosecute this case that is 6 causing delay. Therefore, the third factor weighs in favor of dismissal. 7 As for the availability of lesser sanctions, given that Plaintiff has chosen not to respond to 8 court orders or prosecute this action, despite being warned of possible dismissal on two 9 occasions, there is little available to the Court besides dismissal which would constitute a 10 satisfactory lesser sanction while protecting the Court from further unnecessary expenditure of its 11 scarce resources. Notably, given the stage of these proceedings, the preclusion of evidence or 12 witnesses is not available. Further, because the Court is recommending dismissal without 13 prejudice, it has stopped short of recommending the harsher sanction of dismissal with prejudice. 14 Therefore, the fourth factor weighs in favor of dismissal. 15 Finally, because public policy favors disposition on the merits, this final factor weighs 16 against dismissal. Id. 17 After weighing the factors, the Court concludes that dismissal without prejudice is 18 appropriate. 19 V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER 20 For the reasons explained above, IT IS RECOMMENDED that: 21 1. This case be dismissed, without prejudice, based on Plaintiff’s failure to state a 22 claim, failure to comply with court orders, and failure to prosecute this case. 23 2. The Clerk of Court be directed to close this case. These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District 24 Court Judge assigned to this action pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within 25 thirty (30) days after being served with a copy of these Findings and Recommendations, Plaintiff 26 may file written objections with the Court. Any objections shall be limited to no more than fifteen 27 (15) pages, including exhibits. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate 28 1 | Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within 2 | the specified time may result in the waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 3 | 834, 839 Oth Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)). 4 ; IT IS SO ORDERED.
| Dated: _ November 18, 2025 [Jee ey □□ 7 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28