Pridgeon v. State
This text of 605 So. 2d 1004 (Pridgeon v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
Appellant Pridgeon has moved for rehearing of this court’s affirmance of his conviction of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, urging that the court has overlooked appellant’s objections raised at trial. We grant the motion for rehearing, withdraw our previous opinion and substitute the following therefor.
Appellant Pridgeon was tried and convicted on the charge of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. One of the elements to be proved by the state in such a case is a prior felony conviction of the defendant. Thus, at trial the state intro[1005]*1005duced into evidence two certified copies of felony judgments and convictions bearing the name “Paul K. Pridgeon.” After a state’s witness identified appellant as the “Paul K. Pridgeon” named on exhibit # 2 (a certified copy of judgment and conviction), defense counsel asked for, and was granted an opportunity to “voir dire” the witness. Upon questioning, it became clear that the witness’s testimony identifying appellant as the same “Paul K. Prid-geon” named on the document was merely hearsay testimony.1 The following colloquy ensued:
Defense counsel: We object, Your Hon- or.
* * Jfe * * *
The Court: I think the document is self-authenticating. The document is admitted.
Shortly thereafter, with respect to the introduction of state’s exhibit # 1 (another certified copy of judgment and conviction),2 defense counsel again established that the witness’s testimony identifying appellant as the same “Paul K. Pridgeon” named on exhibit # 1 was hearsay testimony.3 Thereupon, defense counsel objected:
Defense counsel: We’d object on that ground, Judge, that they have not demonstrated this is the same person that’s named on the document.
The Court: The objection is overruled. The document is admitted.
[1006]*1006We first note that the trial court correctly admitted the documents into evidence, albeit for the wrong reason. Even an authentic document will not be admitted if there is another exclusionary rule which is applicable. For example, when a document is hearsay, it is inadmissible even though it has been properly authenticated. Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence, § 902.1 (1992). The certified copies of judgments and convictions were admissible under Section 921.241, Florida Statutes (1989), for the limited purpose of proving that the fingerprints appearing thereon were the fingerprints of the defendant against whom judgment of guilt was rendered. The introduction of such documents, however, is not sufficient to establish a basic element of the crime charged, that the defendant on trial is the same convicted felon named on the certified documents. To establish this essential element of the crime, the state must produce affirmative evidence that the defendant on trial and the person named on the certified document is one and the same person. See Sinkfield v. State, 592 So.2d 322 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); Killingsworth v. State, 584 So.2d 647 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). One method of establishing this essential fact is through direct testimony.
Appellant’s argument must fail because we are unable to discern the nature of appellant’s objections at trial. It is axiomatic that in order to preserve an issue for appellate review, a specific and timely objection to the perceived error must be made at trial. Jackson v. State, 451 So.2d 458 (Fla.1984); Steinhorst v. State, 412 So.2d 332 (Fla.1982); Castor v. State, 365 So.2d 701 (Fla.1978); Sheffield v. State, 585 So.2d 396 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). In the present case, it is unclear whether appellant was objecting to the introduction of the documents into evidence, or to the hearsay testimony of the state’s witness.4 It seems apparent from the record that the trial judge considered the objections as addressing the admissibility of the documents themselves, as he responded to the objections by ruling the documents admissible. Thus, we must conclude that no specific hearsay objection to the officer’s testimony was raised, and that such hearsay testimony constituted affirmative evidence from which the jury could reasonably conclude that appellant was indeed the person named on the certified copies of judgment and conviction. Accordingly, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
605 So. 2d 1004, 1992 Fla. App. LEXIS 10590, 1992 WL 277242, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/pridgeon-v-state-fladistctapp-1992.