Prichard v. Freeland Oil Co.

84 S.E. 945, 75 W. Va. 450, 1914 W. Va. LEXIS 281
CourtWest Virginia Supreme Court
DecidedDecember 22, 1914
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 84 S.E. 945 (Prichard v. Freeland Oil Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering West Virginia Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Prichard v. Freeland Oil Co., 84 S.E. 945, 75 W. Va. 450, 1914 W. Va. LEXIS 281 (W. Va. 1914).

Opinion

MillbR, President:

In an action by lessor against lessee to recover gas rentals, alleged to have accrued to him, from an alleged gas well [451]*451drilled on his land, under his lease, the covenant of the lease relied on as the basis of his action is substantially as follows: “In consideration of the premises, the said party of the second part covenants and agrees, 1st, To deliver to the credit of the first party, his heirs or assigns, free of cost in the pipe line * * * * one eighth (1-8) part of all oil produced and saved from the leased premises; and to pay three hundred ($300.00) dollars per jmar for the gas from each and. every gas well drilled on said premises; said payment to be made on each well within sixty days after well is completed, and to be paid yearly thereafter while it is a gas well.”

On the trial plaintiff obtained a verdict and judgment for $2,669.13, and to that judgment defendant obtained this writ of error.

The lease is dated October 14, 1903. The well in question, the only one drilled oil the land, was begun soon after the date of the lease and completed about August, 1904, and thereafter and up to the date of this suit, August 24, 1911, it was operated as an oil well, having produced some fifteen thousand barrels of oil, one eighth of which was delivered to the plaintiff lessor in accordance with the covenants of the lease.

Outside of his brother, who he says was a member of defendant corporation, but in what capacity he does not say,, nor does it appear, and which he says was a year or two after the well was drilled, plaintiff does not pretend to have ever mentioned the subject of gas rentals, until about the time of bringing this suit. He never presented any bill, or made any demand for the gas rental. He says that about two years before giving his testimony on the trial at November term, 1912, he wrote the defendant company that he intended to make a demand for this rental, but did not tell them he expected to demand pay for five or six years back rent.

The declaration has the common counts in assumpsit, without bill of particulars, and a special count demands annual gas rentals alleged to have accrued to plaintiff under said lease, beginning with the-- day of October, 1904, to and including the-day of October, 1910, at $300.00 per year, with interest on each of said payments from the day they became due respectively until paid, aggregating the sum of [452]*452$2,100.00. The damage laid in the writ and declaration is $2,500.00.

The sole question presented on the trial by pleadings and proofs, and by instructions given and refused, and motion for a new trial, denied, is, what is a “gas well” within the meaning of the contract and the intendment of the parties?

One of the cardinal rules of construction, where there is ambiguity or uncertainty in the meaning of the words of the contract, is to take the instrument by its four corners and read and interpret it in the light of all the facts and circumstances surrounding the parties at the time of making the contract, their relation' to each other, the objects and purposes of entering into the contract, and their actions and conduct at the time and subsequently, and the things done under the contract in the execution thereof.

Literally speaking, perhaps, a’gas well is any well which produces gas. But it cannot be supposed that the parties to this lease meant a well which produced gas in such quantity that when ignited it should burn like a mere taper on the sacred altar, or, as sometimes happens, should send upward a screaming, hissing shaft of flame, uncontrolled, and uncontrollable, and finally die like some great giant of self-exhaustion, a total loss to all concerned. Surely neither of these extremes could have been contemplated. Manifestly the parties contemplated a well having such a pressure and volume of gas, and considered with respect to its location, its proximity to the market, as could be operated profitably, and the gas utilized either on the leased premises, or disposed of commercially to others. True, we decided in McGraw Oil Co. v. Kennedy, 65 W. Va. 595, with respect to a lease for oil and gas for five years “and as long thereafter as oil or gas, or either of them, is produced by the party of the second part”, that the lessor could not forfeit it because- he thought gas was not being .produced in paying quantity, the lessee claiming that it was, and being willing to pay the stipulated sum for the well as a gas well. We held that it was for the lessee to say whether gas was being produced in paying quantities, acting in good faith. The ground of that decision, was that as the lessor got the price of the gas well, he ought not to be heard to complain, if the lessee was willing to pay in good [453]*453faith therefor, and to protect Ms lease for oil and gas from forfeiture.

To the same effect is Lowther Oil Co. v. Miller-Sibley Oil Co., 53 W. Va. 501. But in Carnegie Natural Gas Co. v. South Penn Oil Co., 56 W. Va. 402, involving a co-operating contract, under which, if an oil well was developed by either, the oil company was to get the well, by paying the cost, and if a gas well was developed, the gas company should get it, b> paying the cost thereof, we decided, in effect, that “gas well” in the contract meant a well which developed gas in paying quantities, not a mere pittance of gas, of in a quantity that could, not be marketed and used profitably by the owner.

In Roberts v. Fort Wayne Gas Co., 40 Ind. App. 528, 82 N. E. 558, the lessor sued lessee for gas rentals alleged to be due him under a lease for oil and gas providing, if “gas is found in sufficient quantities to market the same”, the lessor should be paid $100.00 per annum in advance for each gas well drilled, and that operations should be commenced and four wells completed within four months from date, or all paid for after that time, and that if lessee should fail to perform such work, or to pay the rental, he should in lieu thereof, and in full for damages for his default, pay annually during the term $100.00, for each of such wells. The lessee drilled the four wells within.the time prescribed, and for a time produced gas in paying quantities. He also drilled an oil well. ■ "When the gas wells ceased to produce gas in paying quantities he stopped paying the annual rentals therefor, but because the oil well continued to produce oil, did not surrender the lease. The appellate court held that it vras necessary for plaintiff to aver and prove that the gas wells continued to produce gas in paying quantities for the period for which rental was claimed, that the lease sued on vfas a lease to take the profit from land and when the profit became exhausted the liability to pay the consideration therefor was •abrogated. Citing numerous cases from Indiana, Pennsylvania and Ohio.

Indiana Natural Gas & Oil Co. v. Wilhelm, (Ind. App.) 86 N. E. 86, was an action for gas rentals under a lease providing that if gas was found in sufficient quantities to market, lessor’s compensation should be a certain sum per well. . The [454]*454■complaint charged that gas was found in sufficient quantities to be marketed, and to he piped away to market, and that there were good markets within ten miles, and others farther away, where gas could have been delivered and sold at a profit to defendant.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
84 S.E. 945, 75 W. Va. 450, 1914 W. Va. LEXIS 281, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/prichard-v-freeland-oil-co-wva-1914.