Hoee, J.
The disposition of the present appeal, in its principal features, is determined by the decision of this Court in
Brinson v. R. R., reported
169 N. C., 425. In that case it was held, among other things, that an initial carrier sued under the provisions of the Federal Statute of 29 June, 1906, 34 Statutes at Large, 594, for the loss of damage to a shipment by reason of the default of a connecting carrier, could avail itself of any defense existent in the latter’s favor, and that where such shipment by a designated or usual route was in part by water, the Federal statute as to limitations of liability, in ease of carriers by water, could in proper instances be set up and relied upon, citing in support of the position, among other cases, the
Hoffman,
171
Fed., 455;
Riverside Mills v. R. R.
168 Fed., 987;
Ford v. S. S. Co.,
4 Sawyer, 292;
same case,
15 Fed. Cases, No. 8506. Speaking to these authorities in
Brinson's case,
the Court said: “On this question, in
Riverside Mills v. R. R.,
it was held: ‘In an action by the shipper against an initial carrier for loss of goods shipped in interstate commerce, under amendment to Hepburn Act of 29 June, 1906, the carrier may make any proper defense which can be made in a court of law and which any connecting carrier on the line of which the goods were lost or the injury occurred might make.’ And in the case of
Lord v. Goodhall, supra,
it was held, among other things, that ‘A party using for the transportation of his goods, an instrument of commerce which is subject to the regulating power of Congress must use it subject to all the limitations imposed upon its use by Congress.’ Both of these causes were affirmed, on writ of error, in Supreme Court of the United States; the first in
R. R. v. Riverside Mills, supra,
and the second in
Lord v. Goodhall,
102 U. S., 541. The deliverance of the higher Court, however, dealt with other, chiefly constitutional, questions, and the precise point we- are discussing was not directly presented; but, as stated, from the language of the statute and the fact that recovery over is allowed the initial carrier, and from the reason and justice of the position we are well assured that the lower Federal courts have taken the correct view, and that in case of loss by sea the initial carrier may avail itself of these Federal statutes where the same properly apply.” It was further held, in the decision, that in cases coming properly under these provisions of the Federal laws, 3 Compiled Statutes, 1901, ch. 6. sec. 4283-4289 (erroneously printed in
Brinson's case
as 5 Compiled Stat., 1913), where there was a total loss of vessel, cargo, and freight, “without privity or knowledge of the owner or owners,” that ordinarily no recovery could be had, the statute in such cases limiting liability to the owners to the amount or value of their interest in the vessel. On this subject it was said: “These laws, being chapter 5, Laws 1913 (correct by 3 Laws 1901, ch. 6), classified in United States Compiled Statutes under section 4289, p. 2946, by which the owner of a vessel is relieved of responsibility, under certain conditions, by reason of faulty navigation and other specified causes, and section 4283 of the same volume, by which the liability of the owner is restricted to the “value of his interest in the vessel and its freight then pending, for any embezzlement, loss, or destruction, by any person, of any property, goods, or merchandise shipped or put on board of such vessel, or for any loss, damage, or injury by collision, or for any act, matter, or thing, loss, damage, or forfeiture done, occasioned, or incurred without the privity or knowledge of such owner or owners,” etc., have been many times
construed by the Supreme Court of the United States, and it is very generally recognized that defenses existent by reason of the statutes may be made available in a State court having cognizance and jurisdiction of the cause of action,
R. R. v. Wallace, 223
U. S., 481;
Riverside Mills v. R. R.,
168 Fed., 1987; and in reference to the last mentioned section, that on limitation of liability, it is held, in
Norwich v. Transportation Co.,
118 U. S., 468;
Norwich v. Wright,
13
Wallace,
104, and other cases, the value of the vessel must be estimated after the collision, and in case the vessel is then sunk and no freight earned, there is usually an end of liability on the part of the owners.” In the case to which we have referred a recovery by plaintiff was sustained, but this was for the reason that, on a “case agreed,” it was not made to appear that the vessel in question was seaworthy or properly manned or equipped,” a condition required for the operation of the Federal statutes in question ; but, in the present suit the defendant, assuming the burden of this position, as required by the law, has alleged and proved that the ship in this instance was both seaworthy and properly equipped, and that the vessel with the cargo was an entire loss,” and, under the principles approved in our former decision, we must hold that no recovery by plaintiff can be had for this loss.
It was objected for plaintiff that there was conflict in the findings of the jury and, on that account, the verdict should be set aside and a new trial allowed. “It is the recognized position with us that a conflict in a verdict on essential and determinative issues will vitiate it”; but it is also held that a verdict should be liberally and favorably construed with a view of sustaining it if possible, and that to this end it may be interpreted and allowed significance by reference to the pleading’s, the testimony, and the charge of the court.”
Reynolds v. Express Co.,
172 N. C., 487. Considering the present verdict in the light of these principles, we do not discover any material conflict in the findings of the jury. As to the verdict on the fifth issue, though in the form of an indebtedness, it was only entered for the purpose of ascertaining the amount in case the court should rule with plaintiff on the question of liability. "We do not understand that plaintiff’s exception was addressed to that issue. And in reference to the alleged conflict in the responses to the first and second and third issues, the Federal statute, limiting liability to the value of the ship or the owner’s interest therein, applies to all loss, damage, or injury, by collision, etc., “without the privity or knowledge of the owner.” While this qualification includes the. owner’s default in not supplying a seaworthy vessel in the first instance, this being a primary and nondelegable duty, it does not extend to errors in navigation or other negligence on the part of the crew that may be
committed on tbe voyage and in wbicb tbe owner does not share and of wbicb be is necessarily ignorant. In
Lord v. Goodhall,
4 Sawyer supra, tbe correct principle, we tbink, is stated as follows: “Tbe owner is bound to exercise tbe utmost care in tbe selection of a competent master and crew, and in providing a vessel in all respects seaworthy; and if by reason of any neglect or fault in these particulars a loss occurs, tbe owner is in privity within tbe meaning of tbe statute.
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Hoee, J.
The disposition of the present appeal, in its principal features, is determined by the decision of this Court in
Brinson v. R. R., reported
169 N. C., 425. In that case it was held, among other things, that an initial carrier sued under the provisions of the Federal Statute of 29 June, 1906, 34 Statutes at Large, 594, for the loss of damage to a shipment by reason of the default of a connecting carrier, could avail itself of any defense existent in the latter’s favor, and that where such shipment by a designated or usual route was in part by water, the Federal statute as to limitations of liability, in ease of carriers by water, could in proper instances be set up and relied upon, citing in support of the position, among other cases, the
Hoffman,
171
Fed., 455;
Riverside Mills v. R. R.
168 Fed., 987;
Ford v. S. S. Co.,
4 Sawyer, 292;
same case,
15 Fed. Cases, No. 8506. Speaking to these authorities in
Brinson's case,
the Court said: “On this question, in
Riverside Mills v. R. R.,
it was held: ‘In an action by the shipper against an initial carrier for loss of goods shipped in interstate commerce, under amendment to Hepburn Act of 29 June, 1906, the carrier may make any proper defense which can be made in a court of law and which any connecting carrier on the line of which the goods were lost or the injury occurred might make.’ And in the case of
Lord v. Goodhall, supra,
it was held, among other things, that ‘A party using for the transportation of his goods, an instrument of commerce which is subject to the regulating power of Congress must use it subject to all the limitations imposed upon its use by Congress.’ Both of these causes were affirmed, on writ of error, in Supreme Court of the United States; the first in
R. R. v. Riverside Mills, supra,
and the second in
Lord v. Goodhall,
102 U. S., 541. The deliverance of the higher Court, however, dealt with other, chiefly constitutional, questions, and the precise point we- are discussing was not directly presented; but, as stated, from the language of the statute and the fact that recovery over is allowed the initial carrier, and from the reason and justice of the position we are well assured that the lower Federal courts have taken the correct view, and that in case of loss by sea the initial carrier may avail itself of these Federal statutes where the same properly apply.” It was further held, in the decision, that in cases coming properly under these provisions of the Federal laws, 3 Compiled Statutes, 1901, ch. 6. sec. 4283-4289 (erroneously printed in
Brinson's case
as 5 Compiled Stat., 1913), where there was a total loss of vessel, cargo, and freight, “without privity or knowledge of the owner or owners,” that ordinarily no recovery could be had, the statute in such cases limiting liability to the owners to the amount or value of their interest in the vessel. On this subject it was said: “These laws, being chapter 5, Laws 1913 (correct by 3 Laws 1901, ch. 6), classified in United States Compiled Statutes under section 4289, p. 2946, by which the owner of a vessel is relieved of responsibility, under certain conditions, by reason of faulty navigation and other specified causes, and section 4283 of the same volume, by which the liability of the owner is restricted to the “value of his interest in the vessel and its freight then pending, for any embezzlement, loss, or destruction, by any person, of any property, goods, or merchandise shipped or put on board of such vessel, or for any loss, damage, or injury by collision, or for any act, matter, or thing, loss, damage, or forfeiture done, occasioned, or incurred without the privity or knowledge of such owner or owners,” etc., have been many times
construed by the Supreme Court of the United States, and it is very generally recognized that defenses existent by reason of the statutes may be made available in a State court having cognizance and jurisdiction of the cause of action,
R. R. v. Wallace, 223
U. S., 481;
Riverside Mills v. R. R.,
168 Fed., 1987; and in reference to the last mentioned section, that on limitation of liability, it is held, in
Norwich v. Transportation Co.,
118 U. S., 468;
Norwich v. Wright,
13
Wallace,
104, and other cases, the value of the vessel must be estimated after the collision, and in case the vessel is then sunk and no freight earned, there is usually an end of liability on the part of the owners.” In the case to which we have referred a recovery by plaintiff was sustained, but this was for the reason that, on a “case agreed,” it was not made to appear that the vessel in question was seaworthy or properly manned or equipped,” a condition required for the operation of the Federal statutes in question ; but, in the present suit the defendant, assuming the burden of this position, as required by the law, has alleged and proved that the ship in this instance was both seaworthy and properly equipped, and that the vessel with the cargo was an entire loss,” and, under the principles approved in our former decision, we must hold that no recovery by plaintiff can be had for this loss.
It was objected for plaintiff that there was conflict in the findings of the jury and, on that account, the verdict should be set aside and a new trial allowed. “It is the recognized position with us that a conflict in a verdict on essential and determinative issues will vitiate it”; but it is also held that a verdict should be liberally and favorably construed with a view of sustaining it if possible, and that to this end it may be interpreted and allowed significance by reference to the pleading’s, the testimony, and the charge of the court.”
Reynolds v. Express Co.,
172 N. C., 487. Considering the present verdict in the light of these principles, we do not discover any material conflict in the findings of the jury. As to the verdict on the fifth issue, though in the form of an indebtedness, it was only entered for the purpose of ascertaining the amount in case the court should rule with plaintiff on the question of liability. "We do not understand that plaintiff’s exception was addressed to that issue. And in reference to the alleged conflict in the responses to the first and second and third issues, the Federal statute, limiting liability to the value of the ship or the owner’s interest therein, applies to all loss, damage, or injury, by collision, etc., “without the privity or knowledge of the owner.” While this qualification includes the. owner’s default in not supplying a seaworthy vessel in the first instance, this being a primary and nondelegable duty, it does not extend to errors in navigation or other negligence on the part of the crew that may be
committed on tbe voyage and in wbicb tbe owner does not share and of wbicb be is necessarily ignorant. In
Lord v. Goodhall,
4 Sawyer supra, tbe correct principle, we tbink, is stated as follows: “Tbe owner is bound to exercise tbe utmost care in tbe selection of a competent master and crew, and in providing a vessel in all respects seaworthy; and if by reason of any neglect or fault in these particulars a loss occurs, tbe owner is in privity within tbe meaning of tbe statute. If tbe owner exercises due care in tbe selection of tbe master and crew, and in providing a seaworthy vessel, and a loss afterwards occurs, without bis privity or knowledge, through tbe negligence of tbe master or crew, or from some secret defect in tbe ship or its equipments, wbicb could not have been discovered or avoided by tbe exercise of proper care on bis part, the owner’s liability is within tbe limitation of tbe statute. "Where a vessel is properly officered and manned, and in all respects seaworthy, when she leaves port, and a loss occurs from the subsequent negligence of tbe master or crew, or from other causes arising during tbe voyage, without tbe privity or knowledge of the owner, tbe owner’s liability is within the limitations prescribed by tbe statute.”
Interpreting tbe verdict in reference to these positions, it is clear that tbe steamship
Monroe,
on wbicb these goods were shipped, was a 'seaworthy vessel, properly manned and equipped for tbe voyage, and tbe default established by tbe response to first issue refers to errors in navigation or neglect on tbe part of tbe crew while tbe voyage was in tbe course of performance. This is not only tbe permissible and natural interpretation of tbe verdict as rendered, but it was admitted on tbe argument that tbe only evidence offered or claimed on tbe trial was of default in tbe way tbe vessel was managed or navigated at tbe time of tbe collision.
. There is,- therefore, no necessary conflict in tbe issues, and in tbe verdict in response to tbe second and third issues tbe judgment for defendant must be affirmed.
No error.