Price v. Social Security Administration

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Arkansas
DecidedJune 9, 2023
Docket4:22-cv-00822
StatusUnknown

This text of Price v. Social Security Administration (Price v. Social Security Administration) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Arkansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Price v. Social Security Administration, (E.D. Ark. 2023).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS CENTRAL DIVISION

DINAH PRICE PLAINTIFF

V. No. 4:22-CV-00822-BSM-ERE

SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION DEFENDANT

RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION This Recommendation has been sent to United States District Judge Brian S. Miller. You may file written objections to all or part of this Recommendation. Any objections filed must: (1) specifically explain the factual and/or legal basis for the objection; and (2) be received by the Clerk of this Court within fourteen days of the date of this Recommendation. If you do not object, you risk waiving the right to appeal questions of fact and Judge Miller can adopt this Recommendation without independently reviewing the record. I. Background On May 19, 2020, Ms. Dinah Price protectively filed an application for benefits due to fibromyalgia, neuropathy, degenerative disc disease, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (“COPD”), anxiety, depression, high blood pressure, high cholesterol, chronic pain, and restless leg syndrome. Tr. 45, 356. Ms. Price’s claim was denied initially and upon reconsideration. At Ms.

Price’s request, an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) held a telephonic hearing on April 26, 2021, where she appeared with her lawyer, and the ALJ heard testimony from Ms. Price and a vocational expert (“VE”). Tr. 142-180. On September 1, 2021,

the ALJ issued a decision, finding that Ms. Price was not disabled. Tr. 42-63. The Appeals Council denied Ms. Price’s request for review, making the ALJ’s decision the Commissioner’s final decision. Tr. 1-6.

Ms. Price, who was fifty-eight years old at the time of the hearing, has her GED and past relevant work experience as a store manager, sales clerk, and receptionist. Tr. 148, 173-174. II. The ALJ’s Decision1

The ALJ found that Ms. Price had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since March 1, 2020, the alleged onset date. Tr. 48. The ALJ concluded that Ms. Price had the following severe impairments: adenosine sensitive supraventricular

tachycardia (“SVT”), status post-ablation; lumbar degenerative changes, status post- hemilaminotomy and discectomy; cervical degenerative changes; COPD; obesity; right hand Heberden’s nodes; and carotid artery disease. Id. However, the ALJ found that Ms. Price did not have an impairment or combination of impairments meeting

1 The ALJ followed the required sequential analysis to determine: (1) whether the claimant was engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) if not, whether the claimant had a severe impairment; (3) if so, whether the impairment (or combination of impairments) met or equaled a listed impairment; and (4) if not, whether the impairment (or combination of impairments) prevented the claimant from performing past relevant work; and (5) if so, whether the impairment (or combination of impairments) prevented the claimant from performing any other jobs available in significant numbers in the national economy. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)-(g); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)-(g). or equaling an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. Tr. 50.

According to the ALJ, Ms. Price had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform sedentary work, with the following limitations: (1) only occasional balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching, and crawling; (2) less than constant use of

the upper extremities, but frequent use of the upper extremities to reach, handle, finger, and feel; and (3) only occasional exposure to atmospheric conditions (such as fumes, noxious odors, dusts, mists, gases, and poor ventilation). Tr. 52. In response to hypothetical questions incorporating these limitations, the VE

testified that Ms. Price could perform her past relevant work as a receptionist, as that job is generally performed. Tr. 57, 173. Accordingly, the ALJ found that Ms. Price was not disabled.

III. Discussion A. Standard of Review In this appeal, the Court must review the Commissioner’s decision for legal error and determine whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence on the

record as a whole. Brown v. Colvin, 825 F.3d 936, 939 (8th Cir. 2016) (citing Halverson v. Astrue, 600 F.3d 922, 929 (8th Cir. 2010)). “Substantial evidence” in this context means “enough that a reasonable mind would find [the evidence]

adequate to support the ALJ’s decision.” Slusser v. Astrue, 557 F.3d 923, 925 (8th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). In making this determination, the Court must consider not only evidence that supports the Commissioner’s decision, but also evidence that

supports a contrary outcome. Milam v. Colvin, 794 F.3d 978, 983 (8th Cir. 2015). The Court will not reverse the Commissioner’s decision, however, “merely because substantial evidence exists for the opposite decision.” Long v. Chater, 108 F.3d 185,

187 (8th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). B. Ms. Price’s Argument for Reversal Ms. Price contends that the Commissioner’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence because the ALJ erred by not finding her fibromyalgia a

medically determinable impairment (“MDI”) and incorporating related limitations into the RFC. For the reasons explained below, the Commissioner’s decision should be

affirmed. In his written decision, the ALJ noted that Ms. Price “has been assessed with fibromyalgia” but “the record lacks the requisite findings required to establish it” as an MDI. Tr. 50. An MDI “may not be established solely on the basis of an

individual’s allegations regarding symptoms but must instead be established by medical evidence consisting of signs, symptoms, and laboratory findings.” Id.; see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1521, 416.921. “Fibromyalgia is an elusive diagnosis; its cause or

causes are unknown, there’s no cure, and, of greatest importance to disability law, its symptoms are entirely subjective.” Tilley v. Astrue, 580 F.3d 675, 681 (8th Cir. 2009) (cleaned up). To address these complications, the Commissioner has issued

specific guidance regarding the evidence needed to establish an MDI of fibromyalgia. See Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 12-2P; Evaluation of Fibromyalgia, 2012 WL 3104869.2 Citing SSR 12-2P, the ALJ noted an absence of

the requisite evidence demonstrating “at least 11 positive tender points on physical examination or of repeated manifestations of six or more fibromyalgia symptoms, signs, or co-occurring conditions.” Tr. 50. The ALJ also found that the record lacked evidence showing the “exclusion of other disorders that could cause the symptoms,

signs, or co-occurring conditions.” Id. Ms. Price contends “the record clearly demonstrates that an acceptable medical source has diagnosed the Plaintiff with fibromyalgia.” Doc. 19 at 15.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Halverson v. Astrue
600 F.3d 922 (Eighth Circuit, 2010)
Tilley v. Astrue
580 F.3d 675 (Eighth Circuit, 2009)
Slusser v. Astrue
557 F.3d 923 (Eighth Circuit, 2009)
Tracy Milam v. Carolyn W. Colvin
794 F.3d 978 (Eighth Circuit, 2015)
Timothy Brown v. Carolyn W. Colvin
825 F.3d 936 (Eighth Circuit, 2016)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Price v. Social Security Administration, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/price-v-social-security-administration-ared-2023.