[Cite as Price v. Price, 2024-Ohio-5253.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT LOGAN COUNTY
DANA R. PRICE,
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, CASE NO. 8-24-06
v.
LAWRENCE E. PRICE,
DEFENDANT-APPELLEE. OPINION
[TIM STEINHELFER - APPELLANT]
Appeal from Logan County Common Pleas Court Family Court Division Trial Court No. DR23-05-0040
Judgment Reversed
Date of Decision: November 4, 2024
APPEARANCES:
Tim Steinhelfer, Appellant Case No. 8-24-06
WILLAMOWSKI, P.J.
{¶1} Appellant Tim Steinhelfer (“Appellant”) brings this appeal from the
judgment of the Common Pleas Court of Logan County, Family Court Division
finding him guilty of direct criminal contempt of court. On appeal, Appellant claims
that the trial court erred by finding him to be in contempt of court. For the reasons
set forth below, the judgment is reversed and vacated.
{¶2} This case arises from a divorce filed in the trial court. Appellant
represented the defendant in that case. Throughout the proceedings, numerous
pretrial motions were filed by plaintiff’s counsel and granted by the magistrate.
These motions resulted in temporary orders issued by the magistrate granting
plaintiff spousal support, exclusive use of the home, and a $20,000 deposit to cover
attorney fees in favor of plaintiff.1 Appellant filed motions to set aside these
judgments. These motions were denied by the trial court.
{¶3} On December 19, 2023, a pretrial hearing was held before the
magistrate. At some point in time, Appellant “demanded” that they go on the record.
During the hearing, the following dialogue occurred.
The Court: This was not set for necessarily an on-the record pretrial; however, Mr. Steinhelfer has demanded, in fact, instructed the Court on how the Court will conduct business today and has instructed the Court that we will go on the record.
1 No request for attorney fees was made in the pretrial motion filed by the plaintiff.
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So for purposes of preserving any further issue with Mr. Steinhelfer and his incredible disrespect and disregard for this Court’s authority, we will go on the record.
We will also have a security officer present to ensure that if Mr. Steinhelfer takes one further step over the line that he has already crossed, both in writing and verbally, before this Court today prior to going onto the record, the officer will immediately place him in handcuffs and allow Mr. Steinhelfer to spend the rest of his day in the jailhouse.
Is that understood, Mr. Steinhelfer?
Mr. Steinhelfer: It is. Certainly, um - -
The Court: Do you wish to take any further steps over the line of what is appropriate in this courtroom?
Mr. Steinhelfer: I’m not going to ever take any steps over the line of what’s appropriate.
The Court: That was a yes or no question, sir. Do you wish to take any further steps over the line?
Mr. Steinhelfer: I think I answered your question. It was a no.
The Court: It’s a yes or no question. So it requires a yes or a no, and that is the only thing you will say from here on.
Mr. Steinhelfer: The answer was - -
The Court: Yes or no, sir?
Mr. Steinhelfer: - - a no. The answer was a no.
The Court: Thank you.
From now on, do not speak unless I ask you to speak.
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Tr. 2-3. The magistrate then addressed some issues with plaintiff’s counsel before
turning back to Appellant. Appellant asked for clarification as to the order that his
client write a check for $20,000 to make funds available to the plaintiff for attorney
fees and proceeded to make arguments, which included some which had previously
been made in the motions to set aside the judgment and were denied by the trial
court. Following the argument, the following dialogue occurred.
The Court: Well, that’s wonderful, sir. And you have certainly had an opportunity to argue your case in writing. You have been denied by this Court, not only by myself, but also by the reviewing judge on two occasions.[2]
So I think that your insistence to continue to come in here and make those accusations in this courtroom, accuse this Court of violating due process, accuse this Court of violating its own Local Rules, accuse this Court of abusing your client through this process is disrespectful to the Court, not to mention the fact that everything else that you’ve stated is basically disingenuous and argumentative without any evidence that has been presented.
So, um, you have had a hearing. You’ve had an opportunity to request a hearing. The temporary orders have been set. They’ve been issued.
You can preserve your arguments for appeal, and you’re certainly welcome to do that, and that’s well within your discretion and your client’s discretion to do that, but when you are in this courtroom, you will treat this Court with respect, and you will talk to me respectfully or you will not practice in this courtroom.
Mr. Steinhelfer: That’s not for you to decide.
The Court: Well, I think that that’s questionable depending on the circumstances. It is for me to decide what is respectful and what is
2 There had been two prior rulings by the magistrate that Appellant had filed motions to set aside the orders. The matters were heard by the trial judge and were overruled.
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not respectful. And you are being disrespectful, and you’re being argumentative.
Mr. Steinhelfer: I’m just creating a record for my client. We all know what track this case is on.
The Court: Would you like to apologize for your behavior before this Court?
Mr. Steinhelfer: Which part of it?
The Court: The way that you have been speaking to me throughout this proceeding and prior to the hearing beginning.
Mr. Steinhelfer: If you felt there was a tone, I apologize for that. Nothing in the substance of what I said was disrespectful. I’m entitled to advocate for my client, and I did not cross a line.
The Court: You’re entitled to advocate in (sic) your client in the way that the Procedural Rules allow you to advocate, and you were stepping over those lines.
Mr. Steinhelfer: We’ll see about that.
The Court: Deputy, will you place handcuffs on Mr. Steinhelfer and remove him to the office.
Tr. 10-12. Later, Appellant was returned to the courtroom where the magistrate
notified him that she was summarily finding him to be in contempt of court and that
he was required to give the “proper respect” due to judicial officers. The magistrate
issued her order of direct contempt on January 8, 2024. The basis for the finding of
contempt was the magistrate’s determination that Appellant had violated the Ohio
Rules of Professional Conduct and that his behavior was disrespectful to the court.
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{¶4} On February 6, 2024, Appellant filed a motion to vacate the finding of
direct contempt and attached a video recording of the proceedings. The trial court
subsequently denied the motion to vacate, finding that the magistrate acted within
her inherent power and her decision to remove counsel in handcuffs allowed counsel
time to “calm down”. Appellant appeals from this judgment and on appeal alleges
the following:
The court below abused its discretion in finding Appellant in direct criminal contempt.
{¶5} Here, the judgment of the trial court indicates that Appellant was found
in direct criminal contempt of the trial court. Contempt of court is a disregard of or
disobedience to the orders or commands of a court. Roberts v. Farrell, 2023-Ohio-
1109 (3d Dist.). “Direct contempt occurs in the presence of the court in its judicial
function.” Fidler v. Fidler, 2008-Ohio-4688, ¶ 11 (10th Dist.). “Criminal contempt
sanctions are not coercive in nature, but act as ‘punishment for the completed act of
disobedience, and to vindicate the authority of the law and the court.’” Heinrichs
v. 356 Registry, Inc., 2016-Ohio-4646, ¶ 54 (10th Dist.). Direct criminal contempt
is an act of misbehavior in the presence of the court that obstructs the administration
of justice. In re Lodico, 2005-Ohio-172 (5th Dist.). “It is conduct which brings the
administration of justice into disrespect, or which tends to embarrass, impede or
obstruct a court in the performance of its functions.” Windham Bank v. Tomaszczyk,
27 Ohio St.2d 55 (1971), paragraph one of the syllabus.
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{¶6} If a court finds one to be in direct criminal contempt, a court may
summarily punish the guilty party. R.C. 2705.01. The United States Supreme Court
has defined summary contempt as “a procedure which dispenses with the formality,
delay and digression that would result from the issuance of process, service of
complaint and answer, holding hearings, taking evidence, listening to arguments,
awaiting briefs, submission of findings, and all that goes with a conventional court
trial.” Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 9 (1952). “The invocation of the court’s
summary power for direct contempt is an awesome power that the court must be
cautious in using [that] should be restricted to activity that threatens the integrity or
the very functioning of the judicial process.” City of Cincinnati v. Dist. Council 51,
35 Ohio St.2d 197 (1973). Before a court may exercise its summary power for direct
criminal contempt of court, two conditions must be met. State v. Adams, 2014-
Ohio-2728 (1st Dist.). First, the trial court must have observed the disruptive
conduct. Id. Second, the conduct must present a threat to the orderly court
proceedings and be such a brazen defiance of the judge before the public that “if not
instantly suppressed and punished, demoralization of the court’s authority will
follow.” Id. at ¶ 13 quoting In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 275 (1948). If both of these
conditions are not met, the summary sanction is not justified and a hearing must be
held to protect the due process rights of the contemnor. In re Chambers, 2019-Ohio-
3596, ¶ 26 (1st Dist.). The contempt authority is generally limited to the least
possible power needed to end the disrupting misconduct. State v. Dean, 2007-Ohio-
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1031 (2d Dist.) citing Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517 (1925). “The reason for
authorizing the court to summarily punish direct contempt without the necessity of
notice and an opportunity to be heard is that unless such an open threat to the orderly
procedure of the court is not instantly suppressed and punished, demoralization of
the court’s authority may follow.” State v. Conliff 61 Ohio App.2d 185, 188 (10th
Dist. 1978).
{¶7} The standard of review for a contempt finding is whether the trial court
abused its discretion. Lodico, 2005-Ohio-172 at ¶ 40. An abuse of discretion occurs
when the trial court’s attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. In re
E.M., 2022-Ohio-2091, ¶ 7 (3d Dist.). Although a finding of criminal contempt is
within the discretion of the trial court, “to sustain a conviction of criminal contempt
the elements of the offense must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Lodico at
¶ 39. “To constitute contempt, the alleged misbehavior must require immediate
punishment to preserve the court’s authority, take place in the presence of the judge
and obstruct the administration of justice by delaying, hindering or influencing a
pending case.” State v. Schiewe, 110 Ohio App.3d 170, 173 (6th Dist. 1996). “[T]o
uphold a contempt, the record must affirmatively show that the conduct constituted
an imminent threat to the administration of justice.” Id. The appellate court
reviewing the conviction does not presume, in the absence of evidence to the
contrary, that the trial court’s actions were correct. Id.
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{¶8} Numerous courts have reviewed whether various behavior is sufficient
to constitute contempt of court. In Adams, 2014-Ohio-2728, a defense attorney was
found in direct contempt of court based upon his conduct at a hearing for his client’s
DUI. During a hearing, the contemnor accused the prosecutor of not knowing the
law and acting vindictively. A week later, at a pretrial hearing the trial court scolded
the contemnor on the record and indicated that the contemnor had engaged in
“disrespectful behavior to counsel and to the Court.” Id. at ¶ 4. The trial court then
set a hearing date on the conduct of the contemnor. At the hearing, the trial court
stated as follows:
My review of your conduct was that it was in addition to being overly aggressive, very loud, aggressive towards the city prosecutor in such a way that it stimulated a – I think what I would call an overreaction [by counsel] at the end of the hearing in defense of herself. I was actually shocked by your behavior, by how loud and aggressive you were.
I was here in the courtroom so I could – I could sense it. It was my courtroom. I had the impression that the level of tension was raised much, much higher than it ought to have been by you. I believe there was a lack of civility on your part, and I didn’t understand it.
Id. at ¶ 6. The trial court then found the contemnor in direct contempt. On appeal,
the First District Court of Appeals held that although the contemnor “did not display
exemplary conduct befitting an officer of the court; [contemnor’s] conduct did not
constitute an immediate threat to the administration of justice. Id. at ¶ 17. The
Court found that the record did not affirmatively demonstrate that direct criminal
contempt occurred beyond a reasonable doubt and vacated the trial court’s order.
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{¶9} In Schiewe, 110 Ohio App.3d 170, the trial court issued an order
prohibiting repetitious and cumulative testimony of police officers who had
interviewed the defendant. The prosecutor apparently continued to ask similar
questions of multiple officers. The trial court then found that the prosecutor had
intentionally violated the order and found the prosecutor to be in contempt of court.
On appeal, the Sixth District Court of Appeals found that the prosecutor had a
professional responsibility to present sufficient evidence. The order of the court
“prohibiting ‘repetitious testimony’ placed [the prosecutor] in an untenable
position” of having to choose between presenting the best case for his client as is
his professional responsibility or to obey the trial court’s order. Id. at 177. The
Court held that “an attorney should not be required to violate his duty to his client
as the price of avoiding punishment of contempt.” Id. The Court then reversed the
judgment.
{¶10} In Lodico, 2005-Ohio-172, counsel was found in contempt of court for
statements he made during his representation of criminal defendants. During a
hearing, the trial court and one of the defendants were discussing whether counsel
still represented him. The trial court asked counsel if he was still representing the
defendant, and the following dialogue occurred.
Mr. Lodico: No sir. He’s got to get another lawyer; in other words, I don’t know what’s going on. I was told just to shut up a few minutes ago, so I’m going to keep my mouth shut.
The Court: I asked you a question.
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Mr. Lodico: And I told the Court I have no clue what’s going on.
The Court: Are you representing this man?
Mr. Lodico: I haven’t been retained by this man.
The Court: Answer the question. Are you representing him or are you not representing him?
Mr. Lodico: I’m not representing him.
***
The Court: Because Mr. Lodico, are you officially withdrawing from this case Mr. Lodico?
Mr. Lodico: I’m saying that I can’t be effective in representing [the defendant]. So however the Court wants to view that, the Court can view that.
The Court: Mr. Lodico, you have just stepped over the line of insubordination, insolent, rudeness and overreacting, and I find you in contempt of court.
Id. at ¶ 9-22. On appeal, the Fifth District Court of Appeals held that trial judges
“must be careful to guard against confusing actions or words which are
contemptuous to the judge’s personal feelings or sensibilities and actions or words
which constitute punishable, criminal contempt of a summary nature because of
posing an actual or imminent threat to the administration of justice.” Id. at 47.
“Trial courts . . . must be on guard against confusing offenses to their sensibilities
with obstruction to the administration of justice.” Brown v. United States, 356 U.S.
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148, 153 (1958). The Court then reversed the judgment and vacated the finding of
contempt.
{¶11} The Eighth District Court of Appeals also dealt with a contentious
exchange between the trial court and counsel in In re Gonzalez, 2003-Ohio-1960
(8th Dist.). In Gonzalez, the following dialogue occurred.
Court: He can sign it or I can hold him until he signs it, your choice.
Appellant: We’ll sign it over objection, and I would like that on the record also.
Court: And it is on it.
Court: Don’t write on that. Don’t you dare write on that. If you write on there, I’m going to hold you in contempt. He can sign it or he can stay, your choice Mr. Gonzalez. But you’re not writing on the order. You don’t write on other orders of the Court and you don’t write on this one. Did you understand?
Appellant: I understand, your Honor. Your Honor –
Court: That’s as far as you get. One more word – sign it.
Appellant: I’ll get my client to sign it. Yes, your honor.
Court: I have nothing to say, that’s right.
Appellant: I thought we were still in America, apparently we’re not.
Court: All right, now you’re in contempt.
Id. at ¶ 17-31. The Court reversed the judgment holding that “[a]lthough the
conduct of counsel was arguably improper, it did not pose an imminent threat to the
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administration of justice sufficient to warrant a finding of direct contempt.” Id. at
52.
{¶12} In In re Brannon, 2003-Ohio-4423 (2d Dist.), defense counsel was
held in contempt of court for twice interrupting the prosecutor, expressing
disagreement with the trial judge’s ruling and requesting that the judge hold her
voice down when the judge spoke loudly while admonishing the attorneys to stop
bickering.
The Court: Ladies, gentlemen, I’m not going to listen to you bicker. I will not put up with this conduct from either of you throughout this case, or one or both of you is going to the county jail.
Mr. Brannon: Would you hold your voice down, Judge.
The Court: Mr. Brannon, you do not tell me to hold my voice down. This is my courtroom.
Id. at ¶ 15-17. The Court determined that although the trial court may have been
offended by Brannon’s comment, it presented no threat to the administration of
justice and it did not rise to the level of contemptuous conduct.
{¶13} In Camburn v. Camburn, 2005-Ohio-6502 (10th Dist.), counsel for the
defendant was found to be in contempt of court for not following a trial court’s order
to stop talking. The day before the incident, counsel had attempted to make a proffer
of evidence, but due to the late time, the trial court instructed counsel she could
make the proffer at 8:00 the next morning. At 8:00 a.m., counsel attempted to make
her proffer on the record when the bailiff told her to stop talking because the judge
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wanted to speak. Counsel continued to make her proffer. The judge then told
counsel “this is not your opportunity to speak.” Id. at ¶ 4. When counsel indicated
that she wished to continue to make her proffer, the trial court went off the record.
Upon returning to the record, the trial court found counsel to be in contempt of court.
Counsel appealed to the Tenth District Court of Appeals. On appeal, the Court
found that the trial court had abused its discretion because there was no actual or
imminent threat to the administration of justice. The Court noted that any doubts as
to whether conduct constitute vigorous advocacy and actual obstruction should be
resolved in favor of advocacy. Id. at ¶ 15 quoting In re Contempt of Greenburg,
849 F.2d 1251, 1255 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that counsel’s loud voice, failure to
obey court’s order to sit down, and slamming of his hand on the table does not pose
an immediate threat to the judicial process). The Court held that counsel’s conduct
in this case, although possibly ill-advised, did not cross the line from vigorous
advocacy to disrupting the proceedings.
{¶14} Recently, the Supreme Court of Ohio has also addressed questions of
contempt in cases where magistrates and judges have had disciplinary proceedings
started due to findings of contempt. In Disciplinary Counsel v. Bachman, 2020-
Ohio-6732, a magistrate was holding a trial when it was disrupted by a woman
screaming in the hallway. Bachman left the bench to have the woman brought into
the courtroom, where she was summarily held in direct contempt and sentenced to
three days in jail. When the woman protested, the sentence was increased to ten
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days. A complaint was filed with the disciplinary counsel who found that Bachman
had engaged in the charged misconduct and recommended a six-month suspension,
fully stayed. The Court when it reviewed the matter adopted the findings of
misconduct and the six-month suspension, but declined to stay it.3 In reaching its
conclusion, the Court held that while the scream may have interrupted the trial, “it
was a far cry from obstructing the trial.” Id. at 24 (emphasis in original). “The
record must demonstrate that the contemnor had an intent to obstruct the
administration of justice or disobey an order of the court.” Id. Although the scream
likely frustrated or angered the magistrate, the Court felt that it did not rise to the
level of presenting an imminent threat to the administration of justice. The Court
noted that the contempt power “is not to be invoked for actions that offend one’s
sensibilities or when a judicial officer feels personally affronted or disrespected.”
Id. at ¶ 33. “Sending someone to jail is not the adult equivalent to sending a child
to his or her room for a time-out.” Id. at ¶ 35. Specifically, the Court noted that
judges and magistrates have a duty to “be patient, dignified, and courteous to
litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers, court staff, court officials and others with whom
the judge deals in an official capacity”. Jud.Con.R. 2.8(B). See also Disciplinary
Counsel v. Carr, 2022-Ohio-3633 (holding that contempt was not appropriate when
defendant did not act out physically, refuse to follow a lawful order, fail to cooperate
3 This was the only allegation of misconduct in the case before the Court.
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or engage in any conduct that required a contempt citation to alleviate an immediate
threat to the administration of justice) and Disciplinary Counsel v. Gaul, 2023-Ohio-
4751 (holding that defendant’s statement to the judge that raising the amount of
bond made the judge look stupid did not warrant a contempt finding and that judges
have a duty to treat people with patience, courtesy and dignity, even those who are
difficult).
{¶15} Here, the magistrate in her order based the contempt finding on
Appellant’s alleged violations of the rules of Professional Conduct. Specifically,
the magistrate found that counsel’s repeating of arguments already ruled upon and
consisting of matters likely to be appealed was contemptuous behavior. The
magistrate noted that she took offense to Appellant stating that she was not
following the local rules in his motions to set aside her orders that had been
previously filed. Although the magistrate’s personal feelings or sensibilities may
have been aroused, our review of the pleadings filed by Appellant does not reveal
an imminent threat to the administration of justice warranting a criminal contempt
finding. See Lodico, 2005-Ohio-172 at ¶ 47. This Court notes that although matters
submitted in written filings may reach the level of contempt, they do not create a
matter that requires immediate punishment to maintain the court’s authority. As a
result, any alleged contempt arising from Appellant’s pleadings was not subject to
a summary contempt proceeding and should have been handled through a separate
hearing where due process rights were provided to Appellant. See Pheils v. Palmer,
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1999 WL 739696 (6th Dist. Mar. 19, 1999) (holding that statements in a motion for
reconsideration did not present an imminent threat to orderly proceedings and thus
should not be subject to a summary contempt finding) and Dean, 2007-Ohio-1031
at ¶ 22 (absent a need for immediate suppression of misbehavior, an evidentiary
hearing is required even if the contempt is direct). It is also evident that had
Appellant employed a greater level of tactfulness accompanied by a cogent
argument to explain his allegations against the court, the situation may well have
been avoided.
{¶16} Next, the magistrate claimed that Appellant behaved contemptuously
by arguing “that the Court was acting beyond its authority, acting contrary to the
Constitution of the United States, and abusing the process all the while” and then
telling the magistrate that “you need to go on the record.” Doc. 69. The magistrate
noted that she warned Appellant about his tone and that “his arguments were
crossing the line from advocacy to abuse of the Court”. Doc. 69. The magistrate
also notes that Appellant was “warned multiple times about his tone and
demeanor”.4 Doc. 69. The magistrate, and the judge via the denial of the motion to
vacate, determined that Appellant’s tone and demeanor justified summary contempt
proceedings. However, the only thing placed on the record was that Appellant was
4 Appellant reports a different version of what happened in chambers in his motion to vacate the contempt finding.
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making arguments that could later be argued on appeal5, had a “tone”, and insisted
that they go on the record6.
By not placing the court’s reasons for finding an individual in direct, summary contempt of court on the contemporaneously recorded record in the presence of the accused, a potential for abuse, whether real or imagined, is created. A judge reviewing the transcript of the hearing in which the accused was held in contempt of court, sensing that the record does not show the accused guilty of contempt beyond a reasonable doubt, could literally “invent” supporting facts by simply stating that the offending occurrences took place in chambers or “off the record”. In such a situation where the court needs to place additional facts in the record to support the contempt finding[,] fundamental fairness, if not due process of law, would favor a hearing in which the accused is permitted to present his or her answer to all the allegations and factual findings of the court.
Lodico at ¶ 81. Although the magistrate made these conclusions, the record does
not affirmatively show such conduct as it did not occur on the record. In summary
proceedings, the record must affirmatively show the conduct was an imminent threat
to the administration of justice. Conclusory statements that the behavior was
unprofessional is not sufficient to meet this burden. See Schiewe, 110 Ohio App.3d
170.
{¶17} The magistrate also took issue as to what happened while on the
record. This Court notes that in addition to a transcript, we were presented with a
video of the hearing at issue, which allowed the Court to hear the tone of Appellant’s
5 This Court notes that magistrate orders and rulings denying the motions to vacate are not final orders subject to immediate appeal as they can be modified at any time by the trial court. The appeal may only be taken from the final order and then the issues can be reviewed if they are not made moot by the final ruling. 6 Having arguments and discussions placed on the record is the only way they can be reviewed by the appellate court at a later date as appellate review is limited to the record made in the trial court. Salpietro. Salpietro, 2023-Ohio-169 (6th Dist.).
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speech and to observe his demeanor. Although the magistrate described Appellant’s
behavior and arguments as “disrespectful”, the video does not show this to be the
case. Appellant made arguments on behalf of his client. While some of his word
choices could have been more diplomatic, they did not cross the line to being
contemptuous. This court did not observe or hear anything from Appellant that
could be classified as an imminent threat to the orderly court proceedings that
needed to be instantly suppressed. This Court notes that only the magistrate,
Appellant, opposing counsel, and the deputy were in the room. At no time did
Appellant raise his voice, leave his seat, or impede the proceedings. The magistrate
took offense to him repeating the arguments previously made for the record.
However, when the magistrate pointed out that these arguments had already been
ruled upon, Appellant agreed.
{¶18} Additionally, there was a point in the proceedings where Appellant
told the magistrate he was seeking clarification of an order and the magistrate
provided it. Appellant then stated, “I think that clears it up then.” Tr. 8. That could
have ended the whole discussion and they could have moved on to other matters.
The Supreme Court of Ohio held that when a judge encounters a difficult person
who irritates them, the judge should not allow a bad situation to become worse by
continuing unnecessarily to engage the person. Gaul, 2023-Ohio-4751 at ¶ 56-57.
“Judges – especially trial-court judges – deal with people of varying tempers on a
near-daily basis, and a judge’s encountering a difficult person does not excuse the
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judge’s duty to exercise fair and impartial judgment and to treat that person with
patience, courtesy, and dignity.” Id. at ¶ 56. The Court then determined that the
unnecessary interaction prejudiced the defendant and led to the finding of contempt.
Id. at ¶ 57. Without the judge’s continued engagement, the contempt finding would
not have occurred. Id. at ¶ 57. The Court went on to state that although courts of
law are “often a place for disagreement and argument” including between the judge
and others, “judges must recognize when they need to control such a situation and
take the high road.” Id. at 58.
{¶19} Having reviewed the record in full, including the video tape of the
proceedings, we do not find that the record affirmatively demonstrates that
Appellant’s conduct was contemptuous beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial court
abused its discretion in denying the motion to vacate the contempt order against
Appellant. The assignment of error is sustained.
{¶20} Having found error prejudicial to Appellant in the particulars assigned
and argued, the judgment of the Common Pleas Court of Logan County, Family
Court Division is reversed and is vacated.
Judgment Reversed And Vacated
ZIMMERMAN and MILLER, J.J., concur.
/hls
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