IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA25-274
Filed 6 May 2026
Henderson County, No. 20CVD000268-440
SAMANTHA LYNN PRICE, Plaintiff,
v.
NATHAN BRECKENRIDGE PRICE, Defendant.
Appeal by plaintiff from order entered 30 April 2024 by Judge Gene B. Johnson
in District Court, Henderson County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 18 November
2025.
Schiller & Schiller, PLLC, by David G. Schiller, for plaintiff-appellant.
No brief filed for defendant-appellee.
Blue Ridge Family Law Group, by Krista S. Peace, for intervenor-appellees Susan Anna Price and Rustin Edwards Price.
STROUD, Judge.
Plaintiff Samantha Price (Mother) appeals from a permanent custody order
awarding sole legal and primary physical custody of her two minor children to the
children’s paternal grandparents, intervenors Susan Price and Rustin Price
(Grandparents). The trial court found by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that
both Mother and Defendant Nathan Price (Father) had neglected the children and
acted inconsistently with their constitutionally-protected status as parents. PRICE V. PRICE
Opinion of the Court
Mother challenges several of the trial court’s findings as unsupported by the
evidence, its conclusion that she is an unfit parent, its failure to find a change of
circumstances from a prior temporary order, and prejudice from the two-year delay
in entry of the order. But she provided transcripts for only three of the seven hearing
days and excluded every exhibit admitted at trial. The record is insufficient for this
Court to review most of her arguments, and we accept the court’s findings as
supported by the evidence. Mother’s remaining arguments are without merit. We
therefore affirm.
I. Background
Mother and Father are the parents of two children. On 7 February 2020,
Mother filed a complaint against Father seeking custody of the children. Mother and
Father entered into a Temporary Child Custody Memorandum of Order
(Memorandum or Memorandum of Order) on 30 September 2020, which allowed the
children’s Grandparents to intervene as parties. The Memorandum granted joint
legal custody to Mother, Father, and the Grandparents and provided that the
children would “reside primarily” with their Grandparents. It also granted Mother
visitation with the children on specified days and required her to “obtain a mental
health assessment from a licensed mental health professional” and provide the report
to Grandparents. The court entered the order as “a temporary child custody order,
. . . without prejudice to either party.”
The trial court held a hearing on Mother’s custody complaint and “Intervenor-
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Grandparents’ Motion to Intervene and Intervenor Child Custody Complaint filed
February 17, 2020,” over several dates from 4 April 2022 through 17 May 2022. On
30 April 2024, the court entered a Permanent Child Custody Order (Order) containing
fifty-five detailed findings of fact. The court determined by clear, cogent, and
convincing evidence that both Mother and Father had neglected the children, were
“not . . . fit and proper person[s]” to have custody and had acted inconsistently with
their constitutionally protected status as parents. It further found that
Grandparents were “fit and proper persons to have sole legal and primary physical
custody” of them and that the children’s best interests required Mother and Father
to have “some limited visitation.” The court made seventeen detailed conclusions of
law and awarded Grandparents sole legal and primary physical custody. It also
ordered specific secondary custodial time in the form of visitation for each parent.
On 29 May 2024, Mother timely appealed.
II. Jurisdiction
This Court has jurisdiction to review Mother’s appeal from the trial court’s
Order under North Carolina General Statute Section 7A-27(b). See N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 7A-27(b)(2) (2023) (“[A]ppeal lies of right directly to the Court of Appeals . . . [f]rom
any final judgment of a district court in a civil action.”).
III. Analysis
A. Deficiencies in the Record on Appeal
Mother challenges many of the trial court’s findings of fact as unsupported by
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the evidence. But she filed transcripts for only three of the seven hearing days,
contending that the omitted testimony was “duplicative and did not merit inclusion
in the [r]ecord.” She also excluded every exhibit admitted at the hearing, deeming
them “unnecessary to an understanding of the issues on appeal.” Grandparents
maintain that the record on appeal does not comply with Rule 9 of the North Carolina
Rules of Appellate Procedure and is insufficient to permit appellate review of most or
all of Mother’s arguments. See N.C. R. App. P. 9(a) (“In appeals from the trial division
of the General Court of Justice, review is solely upon the record on appeal. The
components of the record . . . include: the printed record, transcripts, exhibits and
other items included in the record on appeal pursuant to Rule 9(d) . . . .”). We agree.
Mother relies on Scott v. Scott, 293 N.C. App. 639, 901 S.E.2d 846 (2024),
insisting that the record is adequate and that she did not need to provide a full
transcript. She notes that the appellant in Scott “did not provide a transcript” yet
still received appellate review. True enough—but the appellant in Scott, like Mother,
challenged several findings of fact as unsupported by the evidence. See id. at 646,
901 S.E.2d at 851. Our response to that argument in Scott applies with equal force
here. There, we explained that “without a transcript, we must accept the trial court’s
findings of fact as supported by the evidence” because “the appellant—not the
appellee—has the duty to ensure that the record is complete.” Id. at 646, 901 S.E.2d
at 851-52. We pointed to Hicks v. Alford, where this Court confronted the same
deficiency:
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[The p]laintiff failed to include in her appeal a transcript of the evidence presented to the trial court. . . . “If the appellant intends to urge on appeal that a finding or conclusion of the trial court is unsupported by the evidence or is contrary to the evidence, the appellant shall file with the record on appeal a transcript of all evidence relevant to such finding or conclusion.” . . . Similarly, Rule 9 of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure requires the appellant to include in the record on appeal “so much of the evidence . . . as is necessary for an understanding of all errors assigned.” . . . It is the duty of the appellant to ensure that the record is complete. . . . “An appellate court is not required to, and should not, assume error by the trial judge when none appears on the record before the appellate court.” . . . Without the transcript, we are unable to review [the] plaintiff's argument that the trial court erred in making findings of fact that are unsupported by the evidence.
Id. at 646-47, 901 S.E.2d at 52 (emphasis added) (quoting 156 N.C. App. 384, 389-90,
576 S.E.2d 410, 414 (2003)).
Mother also inexplicably cites Thompson v. Rock Barn, 299 N.C. App. 143, 918
S.E.2d 24 (2025). She attempts to distinguish Thompson because the appellant there
“selectively picked out favorable testimony,” whereas she included “the testimony of
the people who are in effect the true parties to this dispute (the mother and paternal
grandmother) and a social worker.”
The analysis in Thompson undercuts rather than supports Mother’s position.
To begin, the deficiency there was not limited to selective portions of the testimony.
We held that providing “only a portion of the transcript” from a long trial—with some
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days entirely absent and only fragments of certain witnesses’ testimony—did not
satisfy Rule 9’s requirement to provide enough of the record to permit appellate
review. Id. at 145-46, 918 S.E.2d at 26. And in Thompson, this Court assessed—and
rejected—the appellants’ attempt to recast Scott as placing the burden on “each
respective party” to include evidence sufficient to prevail, calling it “a blatant
misstatement of our caselaw regarding the burden of creating and settling the
record.” Id. at 146, 918 S.E.2d at 26. We made clear that the burden “rests squarely
on the appellant, not on either ‘respective party.’ ” Id. And we warned that “[a]ny
appellant’s failure to properly prepare the record pursuant to Rule 9 or any attempts
to present a record which only support materials favorable to the appellant is a
certain path to failure.” Id. at 147, 918 S.E.2d at 27. Mother’s record suffers from
the same fundamental defect: transcripts for only three of seven hearing days and
not a single exhibit.
Mother offers several additional justifications for these omissions. She argues
that “[p]roviding all of the hearing testimony would have risked running afoul of
[Rule] 9(b)(2)” because some witnesses “had very little to say that had any bearing on
the best interests of the children.” See N.C. R. App. P 9(b)(2) (“It shall be the duty of
counsel for all parties to an appeal to avoid including in the printed record matter not
necessary for an understanding of the issues presented on appeal.”). She also
contends that Grandparents “failed to point to evidence that was not included in the
[r]ecord that would make a difference to this Court’s review.”
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Neither argument has merit. Mother’s characterization of the omitted
testimony is inappropriate—for she did not include it, so we have no way of knowing
what those witnesses said. And her suggestion that Grandparents bear some
obligation to identify specific omissions from the record “that would make a difference
to this Court’s review” is baffling: if the testimony or evidence is not in the record, no
party can “point to” it. Even so, Grandparents have identified several obvious and
relevant gaps revealed by the limited transcripts before us—most notably, the
absence of all exhibits. For example, Mother called Mr. Garret as a witness—a
clinical worker who had conducted a “child/family” investigation for the Polk County
Department of Social Services (DSS) based on a report of the children’s abuse and
neglect while in Mother’s and Father’s care. During his testimony, Mother offered as
“Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1” Mr. Garret’s report, which was “based on [thirty-three]
interviews” and contained “conclusions and recommendations.” The transcript
reveals many questions and answers referring to that exhibit’s contents, making
much of the testimony unintelligible without it. Yet Mother did not include Plaintiff’s
Exhibit 1—or any other exhibit—in the record.
Because Mother has failed to provide full transcripts and the exhibits admitted
at trial, “we must assume the trial court’s findings are supported by the evidence.”
Scott, 293 N.C. App. at 646, 901 S.E.2d at 852. We therefore decline to assess
Mother’s challenges to the trial court’s findings of fact.
B. Children’s Best Interests
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Mother also argues, relying on Steele v. Steele, 36 N.C. App. 601, 604, 244
S.E.2d 466, 468 (1978), that the trial court failed to make sufficient findings to
address the children’s best interests because the findings “do not disclose facts that
‘concern [the] physical, mental, or financial fitness or any other factors brought out
by the evidence and relevant to the issue of the welfare of the child[ren].’ ” In Steele,
the appellant argued that the trial court’s order lacked sufficient findings of fact or
conclusions of law, the appellee “concur[red] in [the appellant’s] request for remand,”
and this Court remanded for entry of an order with findings of fact. Id. at 602, 244
S.E.2d at 468.
This case bears no resemblance to Steele. Here, the trial court made fifty-five
detailed findings about various factors relevant to the children’s welfare. To mention
just a few, the court found that Mother “maintained a dirty and unsanitary home”
with food left out “until it practically rotted.” The children’s diapers were “often
overfilled with urine and feces,” and they often “smelled bad.” Mother did not feed
the children properly, and one child was “in the bottom 5th percentile for growth.”
Mother refused “suggestions to improve” or “constructive criticism” about her care.
At one point, Mother and Father lived in a camper, which lacked “running water, a
kitchen, a shower, and other amenities,” and was “unsuitable” for the children. By
contrast, Grandparents—with whom the children had lived since January 2018—
provided a suitable home, enrolled the children in school, arranged therapy to address
their “anxiety and behavioral issues,” and supported them financially without
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assistance from either parent.
The trial court’s findings are sufficient to show its consideration of the
children’s best interests. Mother’s argument to the contrary is without merit.
C. Failure to Find Change of Circumstances
Mother argues that the trial court erred by entering the Order without finding
a change of circumstances to support modification of the Memorandum of Order. In
her view, the passage of time between the Memorandum and the hearing was
sufficient to transform the temporary order into a permanent order. Grandparents
note that the handwritten Memorandum was a “bare-bones agreement” with a “clear
statement” that it was entered as a temporary order and without prejudice. They
also assert that the record fails to include sufficient information for this Court to tell
what occurred between the Memorandum’s entry and the custody trial—no notices of
hearing, no continuance orders, and no records of continuances related to the DSS
investigation referenced in the Order.
We agree with Grandparents and emphasize that the record’s deficiencies go
further than the absence of documents filed with the trial court. Because Mother
provided only “excerpts” of witness testimony and none of the parties’ arguments
below, nothing before us indicates that she argued to the trial court that the
Memorandum had transformed into a permanent order. And nothing shows she
requested that the court determine whether there had been a change in
circumstances since the Memorandum’s entry. Once again, the record is insufficient
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for us to review Mother’s argument, and we will not presume error where the record
shows none. See Hicks, 156 N.C. App. at 390, 576 S.E.2d at 414 (“An appellate court
is not required to, and should not, assume error by the trial judge when none appears
on the record before the appellate court.” (citation omitted)).
D. Unfitness of Parent
Mother argues that the trial court “erred in concluding that [she] was an unfit
parent.” Citing Perdue v. Fuqua, 195 N.C. App. 583, 673 S.E.2d 145 (2009), she
contends that the trial court erred because “[a]n examination of a parent’s unfitness
or acts inconsistent with constitutionally-protected status do not include
socioeconomic factors, such as the condition of the parent’s home.”
Perdue does not stand for this proposition. In that case, a grandmother sought
to intervene in a custody proceeding, and the trial court denied her motion for lack of
standing. Id. at 584-85, 673 S.E.2d at 147. The grandmother had not alleged that
the parents were unfit, had neglected the child, or had acted “in a manner
inconsistent with the paramount status provided by the Constitution.” Id. at 586-87,
673 S.E.2d at 148. So she lacked standing to intervene. Id. The only mention of
socioeconomic factors in Perdue came in response to the grandmother’s argument that
she would be a better caregiver than the parents. We stated that an “assertion that
[the intervenor] would be able to afford the minor child a higher standard of living is
not relevant to the issue of [the parents’] constitutionally protected parental interest.”
Id. at 588, 673 S.E.2d at 149 (citation omitted).
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Here, there was no issue raised about Grandparents’ intervention as parties.
And even the brief summary of the trial court’s findings set out above makes plain
that the court did not find Mother unfit based on Grandparents’ “higher standard of
living.”
Mother also argues that the trial court’s findings fail to “reflect the current
state of [her] home” or her employment and living circumstances. Certainly, the trial
court could address only the circumstances existing at the time of the hearing, but
we note that it did find that Mother was no longer living with Father in the camper
that lacked running water and was instead “living in a 3-bedroom house” with Terry,
a man she had begun dating after separating from Father, and Terry’s son. The court
also made findings regarding the DSS investigation and its involvement with the
parties, “particularly as it concern[ed] the treatment and alleged sexual abuse of the
minor children when left in the care of [Mother] and Terry.” The trial court’s findings
support its conclusion that Mother was unfit and had acted inconsistently with her
constitutionally protected parental rights.
E. Delay in Order Entry
Mother argues that the Order was entered two years after the hearing, and
that she has been unable to find a reported case where a trial court has taken a
custody case under advisement for so long. She claims that because there are no
findings as to her “current living situation,” it is “questionable whether a court can
make a fair and informed decision about a child’s best interest.”
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First, Mother has argued, but shown no prejudice, from the delay. The trial
court could consider only the circumstances existing at the time of the hearing, and
any future change of circumstances would be measured from that date—not from the
date the Order was entered. See Stern v. Stern, 264 N.C. App. 585, 593, 826 S.E.2d
490, 496 (2019) (noting that a trial court should consider changes of circumstances
from the date of the last custody hearing rather than from the date of the entry of the
order resulting from that hearing). The delay in the Order’s entry does not affect
Mother’s ability to seek a modification of the Order based on changed circumstances
arising after the hearing.
Further, Mother has not demonstrated that she raised the issue of delay in the
Order’s entry with the trial court. In Ludack v. Ludack, this Court addressed a thirty-
eight-month delay in entry of a custody order under North Carolina General Statute
Section 50-13.2 and set out the governing framework on this issue.1 297 N.C. App.
72, 79-80, 910 S.E.2d 720, 725-26 (2024); see also N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.2 (2023)
(requiring, in relevant part, that custody orders include “written findings” reflecting
the court’s consideration of all relevant factors bearing on the child’s best interest).
Drawing on our Supreme Court’s analysis of delay in the analogous context of
termination-of-parental-rights proceedings, we held that vacating or reversing an
1 Although Mother argues that she could not find a custody case with a two-year delay in entry of the
order, this Court issued Ludack in December 2024, about six months before Mother filed her brief in June 2025.
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order only for delay is not a proper remedy. Id. at 80, 910 S.E.2d at 725 (citing In re
T.H.T., 362 N.C. 446, 452-53, 665 S.E.2d 54, 58-59 (2008)). As the Supreme Court
observed in T.H.T., “[w]hen the integrity of the trial court’s decision is not in question,
a new hearing serves no purpose, but only ‘compounds the delay.’ ” Id. at 79, 910
S.E.2d at 725 (quoting T.H.T., 362 N.C. at 453, 665 S.E.2d at 59).
We ultimately held that a party who wants the trial court “to enter its written
order in a timelier manner” must act at the trial court level—by moving “for a hearing
on entry of the order or fil[ing] a writ of mandamus”—rather than raising the issue
for the first time on appeal:
If a party would like to hold the court accountable to its statutory duty to enter a written order under [S]ection 50- 13.2(a), and impose timeliness, the proper remedy is not to argue prejudicial delay for the first time on appeal. Rather, the party should file a writ of mandamus, or employ another method of requesting the court act, in the trial court.
Id. at 80, 910 S.E.2d at 725, 726. The Court reasoned that because the legislature
chose not to mandate a timeliness requirement for written orders under Section 50-
13.2, “it would be illogical to implement a stricter standard of prejudicial delay in this
context.” Id. at 80, 910 S.E.2d at 726. We also observed that in Ludack itself, though
the record was “unclear specifically what proceedings and motions may have occurred
during the thirty-eight-month delay,” it at least showed that “the parties came before
the court multiple times.” Id. Yet “neither party addressed the court’s delay” until
the mother “finally moved for a hearing to request the trial court enter its written
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order after approximately thirty-six months.” Id. We stated that “[e]ither party could
have made this motion at an earlier time.” Id.
Here, the delay between the hearing and the Order’s entry was about two
years—shorter than the thirty-eight-month delay this Court found nonprejudicial in
Ludack. See id. And our record is even more unclear than the record in Ludack as
to what “may have occurred during” the delay; it does not show that the parties came
before the trial court at all. Mother did not move “for a hearing to request the trial
court enter its written order,” schedule a status conference, file a petition for writ of
mandamus, or take any other action to request the trial court enter its order. Id. She
raised the delay issue for the first time on appeal, the very approach this Court held
unavailing in Ludack. See id. at 80, 910 S.E.2d at 725-26. Mother’s argument is
without merit.2 The trial court’s order is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
Chief Judge DILLON and Judge TYSON concur.
2 Although Mother has not demonstrated any basis for appellate relief due to the delay in the Order’s
entry, this opinion should not be construed as approving a two-year delay. The current North Carolina Family Court Time Standards, as amended in 2025, provide that “[a]ll orders should be filed within [thirty] days following the conclusion of a hearing” and that “[a] judge may allow additional time to file an order in complex cases.” N.C. Judicial Branch, North Carolina Family Court Time Standards, https://www.nccourts.gov/courts/family-law (last visited April 15, 2026). The Time Standards also set a goal of entering a permanent child custody order “[w]ithin 360 days” of the filing of a custody complaint. Id.
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