Price v. Porter (In Re Porter)
Opinion
MEMORANDUM
On June 23, 1980, plaintiff filed a complaint objecting to the discharge of the debtors under § 727 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 727 (1979). Defendant-debtors have filed an answer denying the salient allegations of the complaint; in addition, defendants have moved for judgment on the pleadings. For reasons hereinafter given, we shall grant defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings. 1
The complaint alleges and defendants’ answer admits that plaintiff is a co-signer with the defendants on a judgment note held by Union Bank and Trust Company. Plaintiff’s Complaint, ¶ IV. The complaint further alleges that defendants have defaulted on the note, thereby placing plaintiff’s residence “in jeopardy.” Id., ¶¶ V, VI. Paragraphs VII and VIII of the complaint set forth the alleged legal basis for objection to discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 727. 2
We conclude that no paragraph of plaintiff’s complaint sets forth circumstances which would bar defendants’ discharge under any of the grounds stated in § 727 of the Bankruptcy Code.
Section 727 of the Code, derived from § 14 of the old Bankruptcy Act (11 U.S.C. § 32 (repealed 1979)), is designed to prevent the discharge of persons who are not individuals (§ 727(a)(1)); who have committed wrongdoing in connection with the administration of the bankruptcy case itself (§ 727(a)(2), (3), (4)); who fail to explain satisfactorily loss or deficiency of assets (§ 727(a)(5)); who refuse to testify (§ 727(a)(6)); and who are involved in other conduct not pertinent here (see § 727(a)(7)-(10)).
The defendants contend, and it appears, that the plaintiff is, in reality, alleging *356 facts which may more properly be averred in an action to except from discharge a particular debt under § 523 of the Bankruptcy Code. 3 Plaintiff responds that, even if this is so, the liberal notice pleading philosophy of the federal rules of civil procedure permit the plaintiff to go to trial on the complaint under § 523 as it now stands, or, in the alternative,, affords a basis for permitting amendment of the complaint to permit her to proceed pursuant to § 523 (see footnote 3, supra).
Counsel for plaintiff has apparently failed to perceive the clear and important distinction between the provisions of and differing purposes behind § 523 and § 727 of the Code. 4 Furthermore, plaintiff has misconstrued the meaning of notice pleading principles. Plaintiff’s complaint demands, in the prayer for relief, bar of discharge under § 727 of the Code. After review of the factual allegations as well, the most “liberal” reading of this complaint does not yield the plaintiff any legal basis for proceeding under § 727 to bar discharge of the debtors.
However, under the circumstances of this case, we conclude that it would not be unfair to either party to permit plaintiff to file a complaint, if she so desires, instituting a new adversary proceeding, to determine the dischargeability of a debt pursuant to § 523 of the Code. 5
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7 B.R. 354 (Price v. Porter (In Re Porter)) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.