Price v. People

66 P.3d 778, 2002 Colo. Discipl. LEXIS 91, 2002 WL 32078938
Supreme Court of Colorado·Decided November 22, 2002·No. No. 02PDJ003·Published

Opinion

OPINION AND ORDER READMITTING GEORGE C. PRICE TO THE PRACTICE OF LAW

ATTORNEY - REINSTATED TO THE PRACTICE OF LAW

On September 20, 2002, a reinstatement hearing was held pursuant to C.R.C.P. 251.29(b) before a Hearing Board consisting of the Presiding Disciplinary Judge ("PDJ") and two Hearing Board members, Marilyn L. Robertson and Robert M. Maes, both members of the Bar. Alexander R. Rothrock appeared on behalf of George S. Price. James S. Sudler, Assistant Attorney Regulation Counsel, represented the People of the State of Colorado (the "People"). Sarah Cline, Lebsack, Richard B. Wagner, Sandra G. Ja-quith, and Howard V. Selinger, Ph.D testified on behalf of Price, who testified on his own behalf. Price's exhibits 1 through 9 were offered and admitted into evidence.

The Hearing Board considered the testimony and exhibits admitted, assessed the credibility of the witnesses, and made the following findings of fact which were established by clear and convincing evidence.

I. FINDINGS OF FACT

George Case Price ("Price") took the oath of admission and was admitted to the bar on October 17, 1980, attorney registration number 10652. As a result of a Conditional Admission of Misconduct submitted by the parties, the Colorado Supreme Court suspended Price from the practice of law on December 16, 1996 for a period of one year and one day. The effective date of the period of suspension was January 15, 1997. People v. Price, 929 P.2d 1816 (Colo.1996).

[779]*779The facts giving rise to the suspension arose in part from conduct involving five separate client matters. In the first matter,1 Price represented a client in a dispute with a school district involving the client's termination of employment and the employer's failure to retain her following the termination. Price agreed to represent her on a contingent fee basis without executing a written fee agreement. When the matter settled, Price deposited the settlement check in his trust account. Price attempted to send the client her share two months thereafter, but she did not receive the check. After Price deposited the settlement check into his trust account, the account dropped below the amount owed to the client. Two months later, when the client filed a request for investigation, Price tendered payment in the form of a cashier's check to the client. Price's misappropriation of client funds was due to inattention and neglect rather than knowing conversion.

In a second matter, Price entered into a settlement agreement on behalf of a client, and the client tendered funds to Price to pay the agreed-upon sum pursuant to the agreement by wiring the funds to Price's trust account. Price wrote a check the same day to opposing counsel. When the check was presented for payment five days later, it was returned due to insufficient funds. Price did not maintain all of the client's funds in the trust account due to an accounting error.

In a third matter, Price represented a client in an employment dispute. The parties entered into a settlement agreement, and Price failed to timely deliver the settlement documents to opposing counsel. Price's conduct constituted neglect of the client's matter. Thereafter, during the period of time he was immediately suspended, when a problem arose with the settlement, Price attempted to resolve the problem on behalf of his. client, and admitted that his conduct constituted the practice of law while under suspension.

In a fourth matter, Price represented a client concerning an employment dispute, sent a letter on behalf of the client to the employer with an offer to settle the matter, and when no agreement was reached, Price advised the client to commence a lawsuit. The client provided funds to Price to be used for costs incurred in the action and Price agreed to file a complaint. For an eight-month périod thereafter, the client attempted to reach Price and was unable to do so. During that time frame, Price did not file a complaint. Following the client's filing a request for investigation with the then Office of Disciplinary Counsel,2 Price provided the client with a draft copy of the, complaint, which was subsequently filed. Price's conduct amounted to neglect of the client's matter.

In a fifth matter, Price entered his appearance on behalf of a client in an employment dispute. Price failed to provide opposing counsel with discovery and failed to respond to a summary judgment motion or advise the client that the motion had been filed. The motion was granted. Price attempted to move for reconsideration of the ruling, but did so, in part, while under suspension, and on these grounds the court denied Price's motion. Price's conduct constituted neglect, engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice and conduct adversely reflecting on fitness to practice law.

In addition to the misconduct involving client matters, from January 1994 through August 1994, Price wrote thirty checks on his business account that were returned for insufficient funds, and twenty-five checks that were paid by the bank even though there were insufficient funds on deposit to cover the checks. During the same time frame, nine checks written on Price's trust account were returned for insufficient funds.

In February 1998, Price petitioned for reinstatement. By Order dated January 16, 2001, Price was denied reinstatement because he had failed to file an affidavit con[780]*780taining a list of all pending matters, failed to notify all of his clients and opposing counsel that he had been suspended, and failed to file a list of pending matters with the court after being suspended. Additionally, with regard to several clients, Price took action on their behalf when he was suspended. See generalty In the Matter of George Case Price, 18 P.3d 185 (Colo.2001).

The misconduct giving rise to the disciplinary proceeding occurred within the time frame 1991 through 1998.3 Throughout those seven years, Price was distracted by marital difficulties and became increasingly depressed, manifesting a short attention span, an inability to concentrate and a failure to focus on the details of any given matter. Throughout that period, however, he remained close to his two sons. Price sought marital counseling in 1997, but it did not resolve the marital difficulties In 1997, at the zenith of the depression, in an attempt to stop the downward spiral of his personal and professional life, Price sought individual therapy with Dr. Selinger, a behavioral psychologist, who continued to treat Price through March, 2002, and intermittently thereafter. A divorcee was later finalized on May 28, 2002.

Throughout this time period, Dr. Selinger treated Price for dysthymic disorder involy-ing moderate depression. Based on his assessment of Price over a five-year period, Dr. Selinger opined that the primary cause of Price's depression has been resolved, and that he no longer manifests the behavior which gave rise to the prior disciplinary action. Currently, Price shows no sign of depression, and enjoys a positive outlook on his life.

In 1999, Price sought and obtained employment with the Federal Emergency Management Administration ("F.E.M.A."), where he is presently part of the Project Impact/Corporate Team dealing directly with the victims of disasters. The team is respon-gible for contacting roughly three hundred businesses seeking private sector and government cooperation in preventing disasters.

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Price v. People, 66 P.3d 778, 2002 Colo. Discipl. LEXIS 91, 2002 WL 32078938 (Colo. 2002).

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