Price v. Melons

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Price v. Melons

265 A.D.2d 316, 696 N.Y.S.2d 185

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedOctober 4, 1999

StatusPublished

This text of 265 A.D.2d 316 (Price v. Melons) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Price v. Melons, 265 A.D.2d 316, 696 N.Y.S.2d 185 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1999).

Pincite

Opinion

—In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (McCabe, J.), entered October 7, 1998, which granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d).

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The submissions of the defendant, including, inter alia, the affirmed reports of two physicians who examined the plaintiff on behalf of the defendant, established a prima facie case (see, CPLR 3212 [b]) that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see, Hewan v Callozzo, 223 AD2d 425; Zuckerman v Karagjozi, 247 AD2d 536). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Mangano, P. J., Santucci, Krausman, Florio and H. Miller, JJ., concur.

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—In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (McCabe, J.), entered October 7, 1998, which granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d).

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The submissions of the defendant, including, inter alia, the affirmed reports of two physicians who examined the plaintiff on behalf of the defendant, established a prima facie case (see, CPLR 3212 [b]) that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see, Hewan v Callozzo, 223 AD2d 425; Zuckerman v Karagjozi, 247 AD2d 536). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Mangano, P. J., Santucci, Krausman, Florio and H. Miller, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

265 A.D.2d 316, 696 N.Y.S.2d 185, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/price-v-melons-nyappdiv-1999.

Opinion

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