IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
LARRY PRICE, Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 3:25-cv-03134-JEH
MANTON, et al., Defendants.
Merit Review Order
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed a Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his constitutional rights while he was incarcerated at Western Illinois Correctional Center (“Western”). (Doc. 1). This case is before the Court for a merit review of Plaintiff’s Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The Court must “screen” Plaintiff’s Complaint and dismiss any legally insufficient claim or the entire action if warranted. § 1915A. A claim is legally insufficient if it “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” Id. In reviewing the Complaint, the Court accepts the factual allegations as true, liberally construing them in the Plaintiff’s favor. Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 2013). However, conclusory statements and labels are insufficient. Enough facts must be provided to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Alexander v. United States, 721 F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). I Plaintiff files suit against Lieutenant Manton, Correctional Counselor Eric Wohlfeil, Administrative Review Board (“ARB”) member Jeremy Bonnett, and Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”) Acting Director LaToya Hughes. During medication pass on July 13, 2023, Plaintiff requested medical attention because he felt severely ill and dizzy. Later that day, Plaintiff showed Nurse Glover that he was vomiting blood. She immediately informed security staff that Plaintiff needed to be taken to the healthcare unit, but Defendant Manton allegedly refused to allow Plaintiff to go to the healthcare unit. As a result, Plaintiff was later rushed to St. John’s Hospital in Springfield, Illinois, diagnosed with keto acidosis, and placed in intensive care. Plaintiff claims he lost a hundred pounds and suffered from depression. Plaintiff alleges he filed a grievance about Defendant Manton’s conduct, but Defendant Wohlfeil denied the grievance as moot and did not consider his supporting evidence. When Plaintiff appealed, Defendant Bonnett allegedly denied the grievance as untimely and refused to address the issue. Plaintiff alleges Defendant Hughes failed to correct Defendant Bonnett’s actions and concurred with his decision. II It is well established that deliberate indifference to a serious medical need is actionable as a violation of the Eighth Amendment. Hayes v. Snyder, 546 F.3d 516, 522 (7th Cir. 2008). A claim of deliberate indifference contains both an objective and a subjective component. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). To satisfy the objective component, a prisoner must demonstrate that his medical condition is “objectively, sufficiently serious.” Id. An objectively serious medical condition is one that “has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would perceive the need for a doctor’s attention.” Hayes, 546 F.3d at 522. To satisfy the subjective component, the inmate must demonstrate that the prison official acted with a “sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. The official must know of and disregard an excessive risk to the inmate’s health; “the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837. The prisoner must show that the defendant engaged in more than negligence and that the defendant’s conduct approached intentional wrongdoing or criminal recklessness. Holloway v. Delaware Cnty. Sheriff, 700 F.3d 1063, 1073 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). The Court finds that Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to proceed on an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against Defendant Manton for allegedly refusing to allow Plaintiff to be taken to the healthcare unit for medical care after Plaintiff began vomiting blood on July 13, 2023. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Wohlfeil, Bonnett, and Hughes mishandled his grievance regarding Defendant Manton’s conduct. “[T]he Constitution does not obligate prisons to provide a grievance process, nor does the existence of a grievance process itself create a protected interest.” Montanez v. Feinerman, 439 F. App'x 545, 547-48 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing Owens v. Hinsley, 635 F.3d 950, 953-54 (7th Cir. 2011)); Grieveson v. Anderson, 538 F.3d 763, 772-73 (7th Cir. 2008). “[T]he mishandling of an inmate grievance alone cannot be a basis for liability under § 1983.” Montanez, 439 F. App’x at 547 (citing Owens, 635 F.3d at 953-54); George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 609-10 (7th Cir. 2007). Plaintiff fails to state a deliberate indifference claim based solely on Defendants’ alleged mishandling of his grievance. Defendants Wohlfeil, Bonnett, and Hughes are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and § 1915A. III Plaintiff filed a Motion to Request Counsel asking the Court to appoint an attorney to represent him. (Doc. 4). "There is no right to court-appointed counsel in federal civil litigation." Olson v. Morgan, 750 F.3d 708, 711 (7th Cir. 2014). When evaluating a Motion to Request Counsel, the Court must consider: "(1) has the indigent plaintiff made a reasonable attempt to obtain counsel or been effectively precluded from doing so; and if so, (2) given the difficulty of the case, does the plaintiff appear competent to litigate it himself?" Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 655 (7th Cir. 2007). "When evaluating a plaintiff's competence, district courts should normally consider the plaintiff's literacy, communication skills, education level, and litigation experience." Bracey v. Grondin, 712 F.3d 1012, 1018 n.3 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing Pruitt, 503 F.3d at 655). The inquiry is individualized, taking all the relevant facts into consideration, including the stage of the litigation. Navejar v. Igiola, 718 F.3d 692, 696 (7th Cir. 2013). The Court may also consider "the perceived merits of–or likelihood of success on–an indigent plaintiff's claims in its decision whether to allocate scarce pro bono counsel resources to the case before it." Watts v. Kidman, 42 F.4th 755, 764 (7th Cir. 2022). Plaintiff attached three letters from attorneys who declined to represent him. (Doc. 4 at pp. 3-5). The Court finds Plaintiff has made a reasonable attempt to secure counsel on his own.
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
LARRY PRICE, Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 3:25-cv-03134-JEH
MANTON, et al., Defendants.
Merit Review Order
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed a Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his constitutional rights while he was incarcerated at Western Illinois Correctional Center (“Western”). (Doc. 1). This case is before the Court for a merit review of Plaintiff’s Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The Court must “screen” Plaintiff’s Complaint and dismiss any legally insufficient claim or the entire action if warranted. § 1915A. A claim is legally insufficient if it “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” Id. In reviewing the Complaint, the Court accepts the factual allegations as true, liberally construing them in the Plaintiff’s favor. Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 2013). However, conclusory statements and labels are insufficient. Enough facts must be provided to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Alexander v. United States, 721 F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). I Plaintiff files suit against Lieutenant Manton, Correctional Counselor Eric Wohlfeil, Administrative Review Board (“ARB”) member Jeremy Bonnett, and Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”) Acting Director LaToya Hughes. During medication pass on July 13, 2023, Plaintiff requested medical attention because he felt severely ill and dizzy. Later that day, Plaintiff showed Nurse Glover that he was vomiting blood. She immediately informed security staff that Plaintiff needed to be taken to the healthcare unit, but Defendant Manton allegedly refused to allow Plaintiff to go to the healthcare unit. As a result, Plaintiff was later rushed to St. John’s Hospital in Springfield, Illinois, diagnosed with keto acidosis, and placed in intensive care. Plaintiff claims he lost a hundred pounds and suffered from depression. Plaintiff alleges he filed a grievance about Defendant Manton’s conduct, but Defendant Wohlfeil denied the grievance as moot and did not consider his supporting evidence. When Plaintiff appealed, Defendant Bonnett allegedly denied the grievance as untimely and refused to address the issue. Plaintiff alleges Defendant Hughes failed to correct Defendant Bonnett’s actions and concurred with his decision. II It is well established that deliberate indifference to a serious medical need is actionable as a violation of the Eighth Amendment. Hayes v. Snyder, 546 F.3d 516, 522 (7th Cir. 2008). A claim of deliberate indifference contains both an objective and a subjective component. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). To satisfy the objective component, a prisoner must demonstrate that his medical condition is “objectively, sufficiently serious.” Id. An objectively serious medical condition is one that “has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would perceive the need for a doctor’s attention.” Hayes, 546 F.3d at 522. To satisfy the subjective component, the inmate must demonstrate that the prison official acted with a “sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. The official must know of and disregard an excessive risk to the inmate’s health; “the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837. The prisoner must show that the defendant engaged in more than negligence and that the defendant’s conduct approached intentional wrongdoing or criminal recklessness. Holloway v. Delaware Cnty. Sheriff, 700 F.3d 1063, 1073 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). The Court finds that Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to proceed on an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against Defendant Manton for allegedly refusing to allow Plaintiff to be taken to the healthcare unit for medical care after Plaintiff began vomiting blood on July 13, 2023. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Wohlfeil, Bonnett, and Hughes mishandled his grievance regarding Defendant Manton’s conduct. “[T]he Constitution does not obligate prisons to provide a grievance process, nor does the existence of a grievance process itself create a protected interest.” Montanez v. Feinerman, 439 F. App'x 545, 547-48 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing Owens v. Hinsley, 635 F.3d 950, 953-54 (7th Cir. 2011)); Grieveson v. Anderson, 538 F.3d 763, 772-73 (7th Cir. 2008). “[T]he mishandling of an inmate grievance alone cannot be a basis for liability under § 1983.” Montanez, 439 F. App’x at 547 (citing Owens, 635 F.3d at 953-54); George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 609-10 (7th Cir. 2007). Plaintiff fails to state a deliberate indifference claim based solely on Defendants’ alleged mishandling of his grievance. Defendants Wohlfeil, Bonnett, and Hughes are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and § 1915A. III Plaintiff filed a Motion to Request Counsel asking the Court to appoint an attorney to represent him. (Doc. 4). "There is no right to court-appointed counsel in federal civil litigation." Olson v. Morgan, 750 F.3d 708, 711 (7th Cir. 2014). When evaluating a Motion to Request Counsel, the Court must consider: "(1) has the indigent plaintiff made a reasonable attempt to obtain counsel or been effectively precluded from doing so; and if so, (2) given the difficulty of the case, does the plaintiff appear competent to litigate it himself?" Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 655 (7th Cir. 2007). "When evaluating a plaintiff's competence, district courts should normally consider the plaintiff's literacy, communication skills, education level, and litigation experience." Bracey v. Grondin, 712 F.3d 1012, 1018 n.3 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing Pruitt, 503 F.3d at 655). The inquiry is individualized, taking all the relevant facts into consideration, including the stage of the litigation. Navejar v. Igiola, 718 F.3d 692, 696 (7th Cir. 2013). The Court may also consider "the perceived merits of–or likelihood of success on–an indigent plaintiff's claims in its decision whether to allocate scarce pro bono counsel resources to the case before it." Watts v. Kidman, 42 F.4th 755, 764 (7th Cir. 2022). Plaintiff attached three letters from attorneys who declined to represent him. (Doc. 4 at pp. 3-5). The Court finds Plaintiff has made a reasonable attempt to secure counsel on his own. Regarding his competency, Plaintiff states he only completed grammar school. However, his pleadings thus far have been coherent and supported by accompanying exhibits. The Court finds that Plaintiff appears competent to litigate the case himself, especially at this early stage in the litigation process. Plaintiff’s Motion is denied. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED: 1) According to the Court's merit review of Plaintiff's Complaint under § 1915A, this case shall proceed an Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Manton based on his alleged deliberate indifference to Plaintiff's serious medical needs on July 13, 2023. Additional claims shall not be included in the case above, except in the Court's discretion on motion by a party for good cause shown under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15. 2) Defendants Eric Wohlfeil, Jeremy Bonnett, and LaToya Hughes are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and § 1915A. The Clerk is directed to TERMINATE them as parties. 3) Plaintiff's Motion to Request Counsel [4] is DENIED. 4) This case is now in the process of service. The Court advises Plaintiff to wait until counsel has appeared for Defendant before filing any motions to give Defendant notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed before Defendant’s counsel has filed an appearance will generally be denied as premature. Plaintiff need not submit any evidence to the Court at this time unless otherwise directed by the Court. 5) The Court will attempt service on Defendant by mailing a waiver of service. If Defendant fails to sign and return a waiver of service to the Clerk within 30 days after the waiver is sent, the Court will take appropriate steps to effect formal service through the U.S. Marshals Service on Defendant and will require Defendant to pay the full costs of formal service pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d)(2). 6) Defendant shall file an answer within 60 days of the date the Clerk sends the waiver of service. A motion to dismiss is not an answer. The answer should include all defenses appropriate under the Federal Rules. The answer and subsequent pleadings shall be to the issues and claims stated in this Order. In general, an answer sets forth Defendant’s positions. The Court does not rule on the merits of those positions unless and until Defendant files a motion. Therefore, no response to the answer is necessary or will be considered. If Defendant has not filed an answer or appeared through counsel within 90 days of the entry of this Order, Plaintiff may file a motion requesting the status of service. After Defendant has been served, the Court will enter a scheduling order setting discovery and dispositive motion deadlines. 7) If Defendant no longer works at the address Plaintiff provided, the entity for whom Defendant worked while at that address shall submit to the Clerk Defendant’s current work address, or, if not known, Defendant’s forwarding address. This information shall be used only for effectuating service. Documentation of Defendant’s forwarding address shall be retained only by the Clerk and shall not be maintained in the public docket nor disclosed by the Clerk. 8) This District uses electronic filing, which means that after Defendant’s counsel has filed an appearance, Defendant’s counsel will automatically receive electronic notice of any motion or other paper filed by Plaintiff with the Clerk. Plaintiff does not need to mail to Defendant’s counsel copies of motions and other documents that Plaintiff has filed with the Clerk. However, this does not apply to discovery requests and responses. Discovery requests and responses are not filed with the Clerk. Plaintiff must mail his discovery requests and responses directly to Defendant’s counsel. Discovery requests or responses sent to the Clerk will be returned unfiled unless they are attached to and the subject of a motion to compel. Discovery does not begin until Defendant’s counsel has filed an appearance and the Court has entered a scheduling order, which will explain the discovery process in more detail. 9) Defendant’s counsel is hereby granted leave to depose Plaintiff at Plaintiff’s place of confinement. Defendant’s counsel shall arrange the time for the deposition. 10) Plaintiff shall immediately inform the Court, in writing, of any change in his mailing address and telephone number. Plaintiff’s failure to notify the Court of a change in mailing address or phone number will result in dismissal of this lawsuit, with prejudice. 11) Plaintiff shall be provided a copy of all pertinent medical records upon request. 12) Within 10 days of receiving from defense counsel an authorization to release medical records, Plaintiff is directed to sign and return the authorization to Defendant’s counsel. The Clerk is directed to enter the standard qualified protective order pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act. 13) The Clerk is directed to set an internal court deadline 60 days from the entry of this Order for the Court to check on the status of service and enter scheduling deadlines. It is so ordered.
Entered: July 21, 2025
s/Jonathan E. Hawley U.S. District Judge