IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION
JESSICA P.,1 ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) No. 24 C 9632 v. ) ) Magistrate Judge FRANK BISIGNANO, ) Maria Valdez Commissioner of Social Security, ) 2 ) ) ) Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER This action was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to review the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying Plaintiff Jessica P.’s claims for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”). The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). For the reasons that follow, Plaintiff’s request to reverse the Commissioner’s decision [Doc. No. 25] is denied.
1 In accordance with Internal Operating Procedure 22 – Privacy in Social Security Opinions, the Court refers to Plaintiff only by her first name and the first initial of her last name.
2 Frank Bisignano is substituted for his predecessor pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d). BACKGROUND I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY On March 25, 2022, Plaintiff filed applications for DIB and SSI, alleging
disability since June 25, 2018. The claim was denied initially and upon reconsideration, after which she timely requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), which was held on March 7, 2024. Plaintiff personally appeared and testified at the hearing via video and was represented by counsel. Vocational expert (“VE”) Tobey Andre also testified. On April 16, 2024, the ALJ denied Plaintiff’s claim for benefits, finding her
not disabled under the Social Security Act. The Social Security Administration Appeals Council then denied Plaintiff’s request for review, leaving the ALJ’s decision as the final decision of the Commissioner and, therefore, reviewable by the District Court under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). See Haynes v. Barnhart, 416 F.3d 621, 626 (7th Cir. 2005). II. ALJ DECISION Plaintiff’s claim was analyzed in accordance with the five-step sequential
evaluation process established under the Social Security Act. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). The ALJ found at step one that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since her alleged onset date of June 15, 2018. At step two, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: major depressive disorder, anxiety, obsessive compulsive disorder (“OCD”), and personality disorder. The ALJ concluded at step three that her impairments, alone or in combination, do not meet or medically equal a listed impairment. Before step four, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff retained the Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”) to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels with the following
additional limitations: she is capable of simple, routine tasks within normal break periods.3 At step four, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had no past relevant work. At step five, based upon the VE’s testimony and Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and RFC, the ALJ found that Plaintiff can perform jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy, leading to a finding that she is not
disabled under the Social Security Act. DISCUSSION I. ALJ LEGAL STANDARD Under the Social Security Act, a person is disabled if they have an “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not
less than twelve months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(a). In order to determine whether a Plaintiff is disabled, the ALJ considers the following five questions in order: (1) Is the Plaintiff presently unemployed? (2) Does the Plaintiff have a severe impairment? (3) Does the impairment meet or medically equal one of a list of specific impairments enumerated in the regulations? (4) Is the Plaintiff unable to
3 As Plaintiff notes in her opening brief, the ALJ almost certainly meant “with normal break periods,” not “within normal break periods.” perform her former occupation? and (5) Is the Plaintiff unable to perform any other work? 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4). An affirmative answer at either step three or step five leads to a finding that
the Plaintiff is disabled. Young v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 957 F.2d 386, 389 (7th Cir. 1992). A negative answer at any step, other than at step three, precludes a finding of disability. Id. The Plaintiff bears the burden of proof at steps one through four. Id. Once the Plaintiff shows an inability to perform past work, the burden then shifts to the Commissioner to show the Plaintiff’s ability to engage in other work existing in significant numbers in the national economy. Id.
II. JUDICIAL REVIEW Section 405(g) provides in relevant part that “[t]he findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Judicial review of the ALJ’s decision is thus “limited to ensuring that substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s decision and that the ALJ applied the correct legal standards.” Morales v. O’Malley, 103 F.4th 469, 472 (7th Cir. 2024); see Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 869 (7th Cir. 2000);
Stevenson v. Chater, 105 F.3d 1151, 1153 (7th Cir. 1997). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Skinner v. Astrue, 478 F.3d 836, 841 (7th Cir. 2007). An ALJ’s decision should be affirmed even in the absence of overwhelming evidence in support: “whatever the meaning of ‘substantial’ in other contexts, the threshold for such evidentiary sufficiency is not high. Substantial evidence . . . ‘more than a mere scintilla.’ . . . It means – and means only – ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019)
(citations omitted); see Warnell v. O’Malley, 97 F.4th 1050, 1051 (7th Cir. 2024) (“[S]ubstantial evidence [is] a standard that the Supreme Court has emphasized is light.”).
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION
JESSICA P.,1 ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) No. 24 C 9632 v. ) ) Magistrate Judge FRANK BISIGNANO, ) Maria Valdez Commissioner of Social Security, ) 2 ) ) ) Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER This action was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to review the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying Plaintiff Jessica P.’s claims for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”). The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). For the reasons that follow, Plaintiff’s request to reverse the Commissioner’s decision [Doc. No. 25] is denied.
1 In accordance with Internal Operating Procedure 22 – Privacy in Social Security Opinions, the Court refers to Plaintiff only by her first name and the first initial of her last name.
2 Frank Bisignano is substituted for his predecessor pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d). BACKGROUND I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY On March 25, 2022, Plaintiff filed applications for DIB and SSI, alleging
disability since June 25, 2018. The claim was denied initially and upon reconsideration, after which she timely requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), which was held on March 7, 2024. Plaintiff personally appeared and testified at the hearing via video and was represented by counsel. Vocational expert (“VE”) Tobey Andre also testified. On April 16, 2024, the ALJ denied Plaintiff’s claim for benefits, finding her
not disabled under the Social Security Act. The Social Security Administration Appeals Council then denied Plaintiff’s request for review, leaving the ALJ’s decision as the final decision of the Commissioner and, therefore, reviewable by the District Court under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). See Haynes v. Barnhart, 416 F.3d 621, 626 (7th Cir. 2005). II. ALJ DECISION Plaintiff’s claim was analyzed in accordance with the five-step sequential
evaluation process established under the Social Security Act. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). The ALJ found at step one that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since her alleged onset date of June 15, 2018. At step two, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: major depressive disorder, anxiety, obsessive compulsive disorder (“OCD”), and personality disorder. The ALJ concluded at step three that her impairments, alone or in combination, do not meet or medically equal a listed impairment. Before step four, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff retained the Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”) to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels with the following
additional limitations: she is capable of simple, routine tasks within normal break periods.3 At step four, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had no past relevant work. At step five, based upon the VE’s testimony and Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and RFC, the ALJ found that Plaintiff can perform jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy, leading to a finding that she is not
disabled under the Social Security Act. DISCUSSION I. ALJ LEGAL STANDARD Under the Social Security Act, a person is disabled if they have an “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not
less than twelve months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(a). In order to determine whether a Plaintiff is disabled, the ALJ considers the following five questions in order: (1) Is the Plaintiff presently unemployed? (2) Does the Plaintiff have a severe impairment? (3) Does the impairment meet or medically equal one of a list of specific impairments enumerated in the regulations? (4) Is the Plaintiff unable to
3 As Plaintiff notes in her opening brief, the ALJ almost certainly meant “with normal break periods,” not “within normal break periods.” perform her former occupation? and (5) Is the Plaintiff unable to perform any other work? 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4). An affirmative answer at either step three or step five leads to a finding that
the Plaintiff is disabled. Young v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 957 F.2d 386, 389 (7th Cir. 1992). A negative answer at any step, other than at step three, precludes a finding of disability. Id. The Plaintiff bears the burden of proof at steps one through four. Id. Once the Plaintiff shows an inability to perform past work, the burden then shifts to the Commissioner to show the Plaintiff’s ability to engage in other work existing in significant numbers in the national economy. Id.
II. JUDICIAL REVIEW Section 405(g) provides in relevant part that “[t]he findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Judicial review of the ALJ’s decision is thus “limited to ensuring that substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s decision and that the ALJ applied the correct legal standards.” Morales v. O’Malley, 103 F.4th 469, 472 (7th Cir. 2024); see Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 869 (7th Cir. 2000);
Stevenson v. Chater, 105 F.3d 1151, 1153 (7th Cir. 1997). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Skinner v. Astrue, 478 F.3d 836, 841 (7th Cir. 2007). An ALJ’s decision should be affirmed even in the absence of overwhelming evidence in support: “whatever the meaning of ‘substantial’ in other contexts, the threshold for such evidentiary sufficiency is not high. Substantial evidence . . . ‘more than a mere scintilla.’ . . . It means – and means only – ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019)
(citations omitted); see Warnell v. O’Malley, 97 F.4th 1050, 1051 (7th Cir. 2024) (“[S]ubstantial evidence [is] a standard that the Supreme Court has emphasized is light.”). Where conflicting evidence would allow reasonable minds to differ, the responsibility for determining whether Plaintiff is disabled falls upon the Commissioner, not the court. See Herr v. Sullivan, 912 F.2d 178, 181 (7th Cir.
1990). This Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner by reevaluating facts, reweighing evidence, resolving conflicts in evidence, or deciding questions of credibility. Skinner, 478 F.3d at 841. At all times, the burden of demonstrating disability remains on the claimant. See Summers v. Berryhill, 864 F.3d 523, 527 (7th Cir. 2017). “It is not enough to nitpick the ALJ’s order. To warrant reversal, [the claimant] must show that the ALJ’s determination was not supported by substantial evidence.” Morales, 103 F.4th at 471 (explaining further
that claimants “must demonstrate with references to evidence why the ALJ’s determinations lack substantial support in the administrative record”). ALJs therefore “are subject to only the most minimal of articulation requirements” and “need not address every piece or category of evidence . . . or cite support for every proposition or chain of reasoning.” Warnell, 97 F.4th at 1053. However, even under this relatively lenient standard, an ALJ is not absolved of her duty to support the decision with evidence. See Meuser v. Colvin, 838 F.3d 905, 910 (7th Cir. 2016) (“We will uphold an ALJ’s decision if it is supported by substantial evidence, but that standard is not satisfied unless the ALJ has adequately
supported his conclusions.”). ALJs must “provide an explanation for how the evidence leads to their conclusions that is ‘sufficient to allow us, as a reviewing court, to assess the validity of the agency’s ultimate findings and afford [the claimant] meaningful judicial review.” Warnell, 97 F.4th at 1054; see Murphy v. Astrue, 496 F.3d 630, 634 (7th Cir. 2007); Briscoe ex rel. Taylor v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 351 (7th Cir. 2005); Zurawski v. Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 889 (7th Cir. 2001).
Furthermore, an ALJ may not “select and discuss only that evidence that favors his ultimate conclusion” but must consider all relevant evidence. Herron v. Shalala, 19 F.3d 329, 333 (7th Cir. 1994). III. ANALYSIS Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s decision was in error because the ALJ failed to properly account for Plaintiff’s concentration, persistence, and pace (“CPP”) limitations at step five. Specifically, Plaintiff claims that the RFC accommodation
the ALJ provided “has nothing to do with [Plaintiff’s] particular impairment, and fail[s] to accommodate the time she is off-task as a result of her particular idiosyncratic symptoms, including obsessive handwashing.” In making the RFC determination, the ALJ relied on the agency’s psychological consultants, both of whom found that Plaintiff had moderate CPP limitations but still had sufficient attention/concentration for simple routine tasks. And neither of them recommended any further work limitations. This is the exact accommodation the ALJ provided. The ALJ also noted additional evidence supporting his conclusion throughout his decision. Most importantly, the ALJ specifically addressed Plaintiffs handwashing symptoms in his decision. Thus, the ALJ’s RFC finding was supported by substantial evidence. See Morales, 103 F.4th at 471. Moreover, “limiting a claimant to simple, repetitive tasks[] may properly account for moderate limitations in [CPP],” which is precisely what the ALJ did here. Urbanek v. Saul, 796 F. App’x 910, 914 (7th Cir. 2019). CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's request to reverse the Commissioner’s decision [Doc. No. 25] is denied.
SO ORDERED. ENTERED:
DATE: August 21, 2024 Ve Lu HON. MARIA VALDEZ United States Magistrate Judge