Preswood v. State

50 Tenn. 468
Tennessee Supreme Court·Decided March 9, 1872·Published·Cited by 1 cases

Opinion

McFarland, J.,

delivered tlie opinion of tbe Court.

Tbe prisoner was indicted in tbe Circuit Court of De-Kalb county, for the murder of Eacbel H. Billings. At [469] the July Terra, 1871, he was tried by a jury, who found him guilty of murder in the first degree. His motions for a new trial and in arrest of judgment, were overruled, and the judgment of death pronounced upon him, from which he has appealed to this Court.

The first ground relied upon for a new trial, is: The bill of exceptions states, that, “In the selection of the jury, nine of those selected as jurors, stated upon their examination, that they had formed or expressed an opinion concerning the guilt or innocence of the prisoner, upon rumor, and flying reports, and that they had never heard any of the witnesses speak of the case, or heard any one detail the facts or evidence in the case, and had formed their opinion merely from general rumor.” The defendant’s counsel excepted to the competency of these jurors, but the court held them competent.

In the case of Alfred and Anthony v. The State, 2 Swan, it was held, that an opinion formed from rumor or report, does not disqualify the juror. The same doctrine is held in the case of Moses v. The State, 11 Hum., 232, and in the case of Payne v. The State, 3 Hum., 375. In the first named case, Judge Caruthers says: “That it is not the existence of an opinion either way, which constitutes the disqualification, but the grounds upon which it is formed; or it might be speaking more correctly to say, that the law does not regard it as an opinion at all, unless it is based upon a knowledge, or reliable information of the facts.”

We do not deem it necessary in this case to enquire into the correctness of these authorities quoted. The bill of exceptions does not show that the prisoner exhausted [470] bis peremptory challenges. It was held, in the case of McGowan v. The State, 9 Yer., 184, that if a juror, incompetent on account of opinion, was selected upon the jury, and the prisoner fails to exhaust his peremptory challenges, that the objection is waived. The correctness of this rule seems to be recognized in the cases of Moses v. The State, 10 Hum., 456, and in Alfred and Anthony v. The State, 2 Swan, 581. The principle seems to be, that as the prisoner does not exhaust his challenges, he voluntarily accepts the jurors, with a knowledge of their opinions; and upon this latter ground, we hold that the objection to the jurors can not now be made. Upon these authorities, we do not feel authorized to grant the prisoner a new trial upon this ground.

The State proved by Sarah Eigsby and Lucinda Billings, statements made to them, shortly after the murder, by Inez Certain, the daughter of the deceased, some twelve or thirteen years old, as to the facts attending the murder, and as to who did the killing. This, it is admitted, was illegal evidence, but the bill of exceptions shows that no objection was made to the testimony, by the prisoner, at the time of its introduction, but afterwards his counsel moved the court to exclude the evidence, which his Honor the Circuit Judge, promptly did, remarking that had the objection been made sooner, the evidence would not have been heard.

We can not now hold this to be error. It is true that in'a case involving the life of a citizen, the court would not be disposed to hold the prisoner bound by his acts in the conduct of his trial with the same strictness that would apply in a civil case. We would not suffer [471] injustice to be done bim on account of any mere inadvertence of himself or bis counsel; but we think the prisoner might, if he chose, agree to admit the illegal testi» mony. He might have been advised that it was better to waive exception to this testimony and admit it. Inez, the little girl whose statements are proven, was a witness. The object of the prisoner’s counsel, doubtless, was to allow these statements to be proven, with a view to contradicting them. The testimony being admitted in this manner, all that the prisoner could ask would be to have it excluded whenever he moved the court to do so. This was done. And as we can not see that the prisoner has been prejudiced by the testimony, we can not reverse upon this ground.

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Preswood v. State, 50 Tenn. 468 (Tenn. 1872).

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