Preston v. Preston, No. Fa 02-0124865s (Mar. 17, 2003)

2003 Conn. Super. Ct. 3607
Connecticut Superior Court·Decided March 17, 2003·No. No. FA 02-0124865S·Unpublished

Opinion

[EDITOR'S NOTE: This case is unpublished as indicated by the issuing court.]

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
Review of the File

This matter first came to the court by virtue of summons and complaint dated April 11, 2002 and returnable April 30, 2002, in which complaint the plaintiff, Carol Preston, by way of prayer for relief, requested custody for the three minor children pendente lite, child support for the three minor children pendente lite, alimony pendente lite, conveyance of the family home and a fair and just property settlement. Accompanying the complaint was a motion for support pendente lite, custody pendente lite, alimony pendente lite and exclusive possession of the family home.

There was an order attached to the motion. The papers served on the defendant, Ward Preston, included the usual automatic orders. The marshal's return accompanied the papers returned to court.

On May 16, 2002, counsel appeared for the defendant and on May 20, 2002, a certain stipulation was entered into by and between the parties whereby the defendant would pay child support to the plaintiff in the amount of $470.00 per week effective May 27, 2002. The order went on to state while the defendant is receiving unemployment benefits, he shall pay child support at the rate of $175.00 per week. The shortfall on the child support order shall accumulate as an arrearage. Upon resuming regular employment, he shall pay the accumulated arrearage at the rate of $94.00 per week in addition to the amount ordered above. This order was by the court, Robaina, J.

The parties on May 20, 2002 submitted an agreement whereby the parties were to share joint legal custody of the three minor children and granting the defendant husband reasonable rights of visitation. The plaintiff, at the time of the entry of the aforementioned order, filed a financial affidavit with the court indicating the nature of her employment as a bank cashier at Foxwoods Resort and Casino. In addition, a supplement to the financial affidavit was attached thereto setting CT Page 3608 forth the plaintiff's assets. The defendant, at the time of the aforementioned order, filed a financial affidavit indicating that he was at that time an unemployed operator associated with the International Union of Operating Engineers.

On June 6, 2002, the defendant filed a motion to reargue the support order as well as a motion for extension of time to file an appeal incident thereto.

On June 10, 2002, the defendant filed a motion claiming that the plaintiff was in contempt of certain automatic orders. It does not appear that that motion was acted upon.

On June 18, 2002, the defendant filed an appeal to the appellate court as concerns the child support formerly entered by the court, Robaina, J.

On July 25, 2002, the defendant filed a request for reconciliation. This motion was granted.

On August 21, 2002, new counsel appeared for the defendant and the appeal that had been filed with the appellate court as concerns the order of support was withdrawn.

On October 1, 2002, the plaintiff filed an application for relief from abuse with statement of conditions attached thereto. This subsequently resulted in a restraining order being entered by the court, Devine, J., on October 15, 2002.

On October 23, 2002, the defendant filed a motion to reopen and modify child support pendente lite with current financial affidavit of the defendant attached thereto.

On December 11, 2002, the plaintiff filed a motion for contempt. It does not appear that this motion was acted upon.

On February 28, 2003, the plaintiff and the defendant with their respective counsel appeared before the court and the matter was heard to a conclusion.

The court makes the following findings of fact.

The plaintiff and the defendant were joined in marriage on May 31, 1986 in the town of Ledyard. The complaint indicated that the marriage was performed in the town of Preston but counsel made an oral motion to the court to correct the location which the court CT Page 3609 granted.

The plaintiff's maiden name was Lane. Both of the parties have resided in the state of Connecticut for more than one year prior to the initiation of the pending petition.

The marriage between the plaintiff and the defendant has irretrievably broken down with no reasonable prospect for reconciliation.

The plaintiff and the defendant have three minor children issue of this union. The child Nicole born April 13, 1988; Michelle, born April 16, 1991; and Kyle born May 25, 1993. No other children have been born to the plaintiff petitioner from the time of the marriage to the present time except those noted herein.

The parties have not been the recipient of welfare from the State of Connecticut or any town, city or municipality or subdivision thereof.

The plaintiff testified that one of the reasons for the breakdown of the marriage was the immoderate or excessive use of alcohol by the defendant. In addition, the plaintiff testified that she was verbally abused by the defendant and that there was at least one instance of physical abuse. The plaintiff's testimony indicated that she had sought several restraining orders against the defendant predicated upon her representations as to physical abuse.

The plaintiff has been employed at the Foxwoods Casino for 10-1/2 years. Her position is entitled "bank cashier." Plaintiff testified that her health was, in her words, fine; that her work at the casino involved the satellite bank there where non-gaming activities or funds were handled. The plaintiff has a 401K incident to her work at the casino.

The defendant, according to the plaintiff, is a heavy equipment operator usually working under direction of his union; that the defendant would work most all of the year except for two months in the winter and some time off at Christmas. The plaintiff acknowledged that the defendant was a steady worker.

The plaintiff testified as concerns the home of the parties and the manner in which it was acquired, which in part resulted from the sale of an earlier home that the parties had resided in.

In addition, the plaintiff claims that a portion of the equity in the present home was made possible by virtue of funds that she received from the estate of her late parent father. The plaintiff indicated that she CT Page 3610 has at the present time assets amounting to approximately $35,000.00. This as a result of recent declines in the stock market.

The plaintiff's testimony was to the effect that she put as much as $7,000.00 from assets from her late father into the home at the time that it was purchased.

It was apparently the hope of the plaintiff's late father that funds which had been given or willed to her should be used for the benefit of the children's education. There is no indication of any separate educational funds set aside specifically for that purpose.

According to the plaintiff, while unemployed the defendant has received unemployment compensation of anywhere between $125.00 and $175.00 a week.

The plaintiff, incident to her testimony, requests that she have the entire equity of the family home and sole custody of the children.

The plaintiff's testimony was to the effect that the defendant concerns himself pretty much solely to the middle child Michelle and that he has not seen the children at all as concerns this last Christmas and that the children felt saddened by virtue of the defendant's failure to participate in the Christmas holidays. The testimony did indicate that the defendant left presents in the driveway of the home but did not enter the same. The presents being for the children.

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Preston v. Preston, No. Fa 02-0124865s (Mar. 17, 2003), 2003 Conn. Super. Ct. 3607 (Colo. Ct. App. 2003).

2003 Conn. Super. Ct. 3607 (Preston v. Preston, No. Fa 02-0124865s (Mar. 17, 2003)) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

§ 46b-40
Connecticut § 46b-40