Preston v. Brown County Transport Service

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Wisconsin
DecidedJanuary 2, 2024
Docket2:23-cv-01588
StatusUnknown

This text of Preston v. Brown County Transport Service (Preston v. Brown County Transport Service) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Preston v. Brown County Transport Service, (E.D. Wis. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

HENRY ANTHONY PRESTON,

Plaintiff, v. Case No. 23-CV-1588-JPS

BROWN COUNTY TRANSPORT SERVICE, ORDER

Defendant.

Plaintiff Henry Anthony Preston, an inmate confined at the Oconto County Jail, filed a pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that the defendant violated his state and constitutional rights. ECF No. 1. This Order resolves Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee and screens his complaint. 1. MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED WITHOUT PREPAYING THE FILING FEE The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) applies to this case because Plaintiff was a prisoner when he filed his complaint. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h). The PLRA allows the Court to give a prisoner plaintiff the ability to proceed with his case without prepaying the civil case filing fee. Id. § 1915(a)(2). When funds exist, the prisoner must pay an initial partial filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). He must then pay the balance of the $350 filing fee over time, through deductions from his prisoner account. Id. On December 4, 2023, the Court ordered Plaintiff to pay an initial partial filing fee of $60.38. ECF No. 5. Plaintiff paid that fee on December 15, 2023. The Court will grant Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee. ECF No. 2. He must pay the remainder of the filing fee over time in the manner explained at the end of this Order. 2. SCREENING THE COMPLAINT 2.1 Federal Screening Standard Under the PLRA, the Court must screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief from a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint if the prisoner raises claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). In determining whether the complaint states a claim, the Court applies the same standard that applies to dismissals under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d 714, 720 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Booker-El v. Superintendent, Ind. State Prison, 668 F.3d 896, 899 (7th Cir. 2012)). A complaint must include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The complaint must contain enough facts, accepted as true, to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows a court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that someone deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States and that whoever deprived him of this right was acting under the color of state law. D.S. v. E. Porter Cnty. Sch. Corp., 799 F.3d 793, 798 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Buchanan–Moore v. County of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2009)). The Court construes pro se complaints liberally and holds them to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by lawyers. Cesal, 851 F.3d at 720 (citing Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 2015)). 2.2 Plaintiff’s Allegations On June 23, 2023, Plaintiff was transported from the Brown County Jail without a seatbelt and was seriously injured. ECF No. 1 at 2. Plaintiff names Brown County Transport Service as the defendant and notes that the jail would not provide with the names of the people who transported him. Id. at 2–3. Plaintiff was unable to put his own seatbelt on because he was in handcuffs during the transport. Id. at 4. Plaintiff indicates that he is suing under state law and that Plaintiff was sent to the hospital for over two months and is still in pain from his injuries. Id. at 5. 2.3 Analysis The Court finds that Plaintiff’s allegations fail to state a constitutional violation. “In general, failure to secure a seatbelt, although unwise, is not a substantial risk of harm that rises to the level of a constitutional violation.” Williams v. Wis. Lock & Load Prisoner Transports, LLC, No. 15 C 8090, 2016 WL 4124292, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 3, 2016). The Seventh Circuit has noted that “[n]either the Supreme Court nor [the Seventh Circuit] has ruled that transporting an inmate without a seatbelt creates an intolerable risk of harm.” Dale v. Agresta, 771 F. App'x 659, 661 (7th Cir. 2019). It further notes that other circuits have concluded that, “[w]ithout reckless driving or other exacerbating circumstances, failing to seat-belt a shackled inmate does not pose a substantial risk of serious harm.” Id; see also Jeffery v. Fuentez, No. 19-CV-1212-PP, 2020 WL 6149707, at *4 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 20, 2020). Here, Plaintiff’s allegations do not include any facts suggesting that anyone drove the transport van recklessly or that there were any exacerbating circumstances in his situation. Plaintiff’s complaint contains little detail and does not include any specifics regarding how he was injured. As such, the Court finds that Plaintiff fails to state a constitutional claim. Although Plaintiff makes clear that he wishes to pursue state law claims, in the absence of a federal claim, the Court cannot exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c); Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 639 (2009). Although Plaintiff suggests diversity jurisdiction by stating that his citizenship is different from the citizenship of defendants, Plaintiff’s factual allegations suggest otherwise. Plaintiff is a citizen of Wisconsin and the unidentified defendants allegedly live and work in Brown County, Wisconsin. The Court cannot say for certain that the parties are not diverse, however, Plaintiff’s allegations suggest that they are not.1 As such, the Court does not find that Plaintiff has adequately pled diversity jurisdiction. Plaintiff may choose to pursue his state claims in state court if he so chooses.

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Related

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Carlsbad Technology, Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc.
556 U.S. 635 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Booker-El v. Superintendent, Indiana State Prison
668 F.3d 896 (Seventh Circuit, 2012)
Buchanan-Moore v. County of Milwaukee
570 F.3d 824 (Seventh Circuit, 2009)
Miguel Perez v. James Fenoglio
792 F.3d 768 (Seventh Circuit, 2015)
D. S. v. East Porter County School Corp
799 F.3d 793 (Seventh Circuit, 2015)
Cesal v. Moats
851 F.3d 714 (Seventh Circuit, 2017)
Teresa Sykes v. Cook Incorporated
72 F.4th 195 (Seventh Circuit, 2023)

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Bluebook (online)
Preston v. Brown County Transport Service, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/preston-v-brown-county-transport-service-wied-2024.