FILED
Aug 31 2026, 9:11 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
IN THE
Court of Appeals of Indiana Preston Pratt, Individually and on behalf of Wanda Pratt, Deceased,
Appellant-Respondent/Plaintiff
v.
Anonymous Physician 1,
Appellee-Petitioner/Defendant
and
Anonymous Hospital, Anonymous Facility, Anonymous Physician 2, Michele Bryant, as Panel Chair, and Holly Williams Lambert, in her capacity as Commissioner of the Indiana Department of Insurance, Appellees-Third-Party Respondents
August 31, 2026
Court of Appeals Case No.
26A-MI-189
Appeal from the Tippecanoe Circuit Court The Honorable Sean M. Persin, Judge Trial Court Cause No.
79C01-2505-MI-111
Opinion by Judge Mathias
Judges Kenworthy and DeBoer concur.
Mathias, Judge.
[1] Preston Pratt, individually and on behalf of Wanda Pratt, deceased (“Wanda”) (collectively, “Pratt”), appeals the trial court’s entry of summary judgment for Anonymous Physician 1 (“Pulmonologist”), Anonymous Hospital (“the Hospital”), Anonymous Facility (“the Facility”), and Anonymous Physician 2 (“Family Doctor”), on Pratt’s proposed complaint alleging medical malpractice. Pratt presents three issues for our review, which we consolidate and restate as:
1. Whether the trial court erred when it entered summary judgment for Pulmonologist, the Hospital, and the Facility.
2. Whether the trial court erred when it entered summary judgment for Family Doctor.
[2] We affirm in part and reverse and remand in part for further proceedings.
Facts and Procedural History [3] In November 2013, Wanda, a heavy smoker, was diagnosed with pulmonary
nodules after undergoing a CT scan of her lungs. Wanda knew that the nodules were “not good,” and she worried that they might be cancerous. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2, p. 51. In September 2014, Wanda first consulted with Pulmonologist, who ordered a repeat CT scan of Wanda’s lungs. Pulmonologist found that there was “no significant change” in the nodules since 2013. Id. at 12. During follow-up visits in 2015 and 2016, Pulmonologist ordered additional CT scans, which continued to show no significant change in the nodules in Wanda’s lungs.
[4] During a follow-up visit in March 2017, Pulmonologist told Wanda that, “since there had been no change in the nodules from November 2013 to March 2016, she did not require continued CT imaging of the chest.” Id. at 42. And during a follow-up visit in March 2018, Pulmonologist told Wanda that she was “not recommending repeat CT scans of the chest because her pulmonary nodules had been stable for more than twenty-four months.” Id. Pulmonologist instructed Wanda to follow up in the pulmonary clinic in one year. Wanda did not return to the clinic as instructed.
[5] On September 12, 2018, Wanda first saw Family Doctor, who noted that Wanda was a smoker and had previously been diagnosed with pulmonary nodules and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (“COPD”). Wanda saw Family Doctor on two other occasions: in March 2020 for an upper respiratory infection and in early February 2022 for neck pain. On February 18, 2022,
Family Doctor and Wanda spoke on the telephone about the results of an MRI of her neck. Id. at 13. In April 2022, Family Doctor refilled a prescription for an anti-inflammatory medication. None of Wanda’s treatment with Family Doctor appears to have been related to her pulmonary nodules or screening for lung cancer. 1 In May 2022, Wanda moved to Alabama.
[6] On May 26, Wanda sought emergency medical care at an Alabama hospital for a “severe headache, visual changes, and nausea.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 6, p. 84. A CT scan of her brain showed a “partially calcified mass,” and a CT of her chest showed “[m]ultiple pulmonary nodules as well as mediastinal lymphadenopathy suspicious for metastatic disease.” Id. at 87. After additional diagnostic testing, Wanda was diagnosed with stage IV squamous cell lung cancer. The following year, on September 9, 2023, Wanda died from “acute respiratory failure and lung cancer.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2, p. 13.
[7] On March 13, 2024, Pratt filed a proposed complaint against Pulmonologist, Family Doctor, the Hospital, and the Facility alleging that Wanda had died as a result of the physicians’ “substandard care. . . .” 2 Id. at 123. On May 1, 2025, before a medical review panel had been convened, Pulmonologist filed a motion for summary judgment with the trial court supported by designated evidence including: Pulmonologist’s affidavit; Pratt’s answer to one
1 To the extent Pratt contends that Family Doctor treated Wanda for any of her lung conditions, he does not cite any designated evidence in support of that contention. 2 Pratt filed an amended proposed complaint for damages two months later to correct a typographical error.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-MI-189 | August 31, 2026 Page 4 of 27 interrogatory; and portions of Pratt’s deposition testimony. Pulmonologist alleged that Pratt’s proposed complaint was barred by Indiana’s Medical Malpractice Act’s occurrence-based two-year statute of limitations. On May 23, Family Doctor moved to join Pulmonologist’s summary judgment motion and filed a memorandum and designated evidence in support thereof. And, in June, the Hospital and the Facility moved to join the pending summary judgment motions. 3
[8] In his brief in opposition to summary judgment, Pratt argued that his proposed complaint was timely with respect to Pulmonologist pursuant to an exception to the occurrence-based two-year statute of limitations recognized by our Supreme Court in Martin v. Richey, 711 N.E.2d 1273 (Ind. 1999), and Van Dusen v. Stotts, 712 N.E.2d 491 (Ind. 1999) (“the Martin/Van Dusen exception”). And Pratt argued that his proposed complaint was timely with respect to Family Doctor pursuant to the doctrine of continuing wrong.
[9] Following a hearing on the summary judgment motions, the trial court found and concluded in relevant part that
[Wanda] saw [Pulmonologist] for a known medical condition, pulmonary nodules. In March of 2017, [Pulmonologist] and [Wanda] discussed the recommendation to not order additional CT scans at that time after two years of no significant changes, despite [Wanda’s] ongoing concerns about cancer. Pratt’s
3 Pratt’s claims against the Hospital and the Facility are derivative of his claims against Pulmonologist and Family Doctor.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-MI-189 | August 31, 2026 Page 5 of 27 argument that it was impossible to discover a potential malpractice claim within two years is not persuasive. Nothing prevented [Wanda] from seeking a second opinion or further medical advice. In fact, [Pulmonologist] directed [Wanda] to return to the pulmonology clinic within 12 months of the March 6, 2018 visit, but [Wanda] did not return. At the very latest, the last alleged occurrence of malpractice would have been March 6, 2018, which means the proposed complaint should have been filed no later than March 6, 2020.
[Pratt’s] proposed complaint against [Pulmonologist] was not filed until March 13, 2024, and it is untimely.
Id. at 14. The trial court also concluded that the doctrine of continuing wrong did not operate to render Pratt’s proposed complaint against Family Doctor timely. This appeal ensued.4
Discussion and Decision Standard of Review
[10] Our standard of review is well established:
In its review of a summary judgment, an appellate court applies the same standard as the trial court. Overton v. Grillo, 896 N.E.2d 499, 502 (Ind. 2008). Summary judgment may be granted, or affirmed on appeal, only “if the designated evidentiary matter shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Ind. Trial Rule 56(C). All facts and reasonable inferences established by the designated evidence are to be construed in
4 Notably, this case has not yet been submitted to a medical review panel.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-MI-189 | August 31, 2026 Page 6 of 27 favor of the non-moving party. Overton, 896 N.E.2d at 502. When a medical malpractice defendant asserts the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense, that defendant “bears the burden of establishing that the action was commenced beyond that statutory period.” Id. If established, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to establish “an issue of fact material to a theory that avoids the defense.” Id. (quoting Boggs v. Tri-State Radiology, Inc., 730 N.E.2d 692, 695 (Ind. 2000)).
David v. Kleckner, 9 N.E.3d 147, 149 (Ind. 2014).
Occurrence-based Statute of Limitations [11] The trial court found that Pratt’s proposed complaint was not filed within the time prescribed by the applicable statute of limitations. Indiana’s Medical Malpractice Act (“the Act”) provides that
[a] claim, whether in contract or tort, may not be brought against a health care provider based upon professional services or health care that was provided or that should have been provided unless the claim is filed within two (2) years after the date of the alleged act, omission, or neglect. . . .
Ind. Code § 34-18-7-1(b). As our Supreme Court has explained, this statute of limitations is an “occurrence” rather than a “discovery” statute. See Martin, 711 N.E.2d at 1278. “As such, an action for medical malpractice generally must be filed within two years from the date the alleged negligent act occurred rather than from the date it was discovered.” Id. However, our courts have held that Indiana Code section 34-18-7-1(b) is unconstitutional as applied in some circumstances. See, e.g., id.; see also Van Dusen, 712 N.E.2d at 495.
[12] In Martin, on March 13, 1991, Martin saw a nurse practitioner (“NP”) in Dr. Richey’s office for a painful lump in her right breast. 711 N.E.2d at 1274. Dr. Richey was out of town at the time. The NP ordered a mammogram which revealed a benign cyst and a solid mass in Martin’s breast. The radiologist who read the mammogram stated that a biopsy of the solid mass “may be indicated,” and the NP instructed Martin to schedule an excisional biopsy with a general surgeon. Id. at 1275. The next day, Martin told the NP that she had scheduled the excisional biopsy for March 19. And Martin asked the NP to have Dr. Richey call her when he returned to the office.
[13] On March 18, Dr. Richey returned to his office, and the NP reported the circumstances regarding the lump in Martin’s breast. Without consulting the radiologist, Dr. Richey called Martin that night and told her to cancel the excisional biopsy. Dr. Richey told Martin that he would perform a needle aspiration instead. After the needle aspiration on March 20, “Dr. Richey informed [Martin] that he was able to aspirate a small amount of fluid from the solid mass and did not tell her that the aspirate could have come from the surrounding tissue rather than the mass itself.” Id. at 1276. “The pathology report indicated that no malignant tumor cells were present in the specimen drawn by Dr. Richey.” Id. The evidence was disputed whether Dr. Richey had told Martin to follow up with the general surgeon regarding the need for an excisional biopsy, but there was no record of any such instruction, and Martin did not seek any further treatment for the breast lump at that time.
[14] In April 1994, Martin experienced increased pain in the breast lump as well as pain under her arm. She was diagnosed with breast cancer and underwent a mastectomy of the right breast. Martin also underwent five months of chemotherapy. In October, Martin filed a proposed complaint against Dr. Richey alleging medical malpractice. Dr. Richey filed a motion for summary judgment 5 arguing that Martin’s claim was barred by the two-year occurrence- based statute of limitations in Indiana Code section 34-18-7-1(b). Martin argued in relevant part that the statute of limitations was an unconstitutional violation of the Indiana and federal due process clauses and Indiana’s privileges and immunities clause.
[15] The trial court entered summary judgment for Dr. Richey. On appeal, this Court held that “the statute of limitations contained in the Medical Malpractice Act violated Article I, Section 23 and Section 12 of the Indiana Constitution,” and our Supreme Court granted transfer “to address the constitutionality of [the Act’s statute of limitations] in a case where the plaintiff alleging malpractice suffers from a medical condition with a long latency period which prevents her from discovering the alleged malpractice within the two-year medical malpractice statutory period.” Id. at 1277.
5 Dr. Richey filed a “Motion for Preliminary Determination of a Question of Law and Motion to Dismiss,” but our Supreme Court refers to the trial court’s entry of “summary judgment” for Dr. Richey, and we do the same. Martin, 711 N.E.2d at 1277.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-MI-189 | August 31, 2026 Page 9 of 27
[16] The Court described “the asserted negligence” as Dr. Richey’s “failure to diagnose and treat plaintiff’s breast cancer” and described the “relevant negligent acts” as “his advice to cancel the scheduled biopsy, his decision to aspirate the solid mass, and his failure to inform her of the importance of following up with a general surgeon for a biopsy even if the results of the needle aspiration were negative for malignancy.” Id. at 1278 (emphases added). Notably, there is nothing in the opinion showing that there was any evidence that the breast lump was cancerous in 1991.6 Rather, Martin merely alleged that Dr. Richey had failed to diagnose and treat her breast cancer.
[17] In any event, the Court held that
the statute of limitations as applied to [Martin] is unconstitutional under Section 23 because it is not “uniformly applicable” to all medical malpractice victims within the meaning of Collins v. Day, 644 N.E.2d 72 (Ind. 1994). Simply put, the statute precludes Melody Martin from pursuing a claim against her doctor because she has a disease which has a long latency period and which may not manifest significant pain or symptoms until several years after the asserted malpractice. The statute of limitations is also unconstitutional under Section 12 because it requires plaintiff to file a claim before she is able to discover the alleged malpractice and her
6 Here, at the summary judgment hearing, Pulmonologist stated that Wanda’s cancer was “extremely aggressive” and asserted, without evidence, that “everyone would agree it’s not possible it was present at the time” Pulmonologist last saw Wanda in March 2018. Tr. p. 10. Thus, Pulmonologist argued that the absence of cancer as of March 2018 took Pratt’s proposed complaint out of the realm of an alleged failure to diagnose cancer as in Martin and Van Dusen. As we explain below, however, the Martin/Van Dusen exception has been applied to cases alleging malpractice that do not allege a failure to diagnose cancer.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-MI-189 | August 31, 2026 Page 10 of 27 resulting injury, and, therefore, it imposes an impossible condition on her access to the courts and pursuit of her tort remedy.
Id. at 1279 (emphases added). Thus, the Court reversed the grant of summary judgment for Dr. Richey.
[18] In Van Dusen, which was handed down the same day as Martin, William Stotts underwent a needle biopsy of a small prostate tumor in July 1992. 712 N.E.2d at 494. Drs. Van Dusen and O’Brien analyzed the biopsy, and both concluded that “the tissue was benign.” Id. Stotts’s family doctor reported those findings to Stotts, who was “relieved.” Id. More than two years later, in November 1994, “Stotts experienced pain and swelling in his groin area and his lower back.” Id. After Stotts underwent diagnostic tests, his family doctor informed him that he had “incurable prostate cancer.” Id. Stotts underwent aggressive treatment, but the cancer began to “spread again” in December 1995. Id.
[19] In January 1996, Stotts’s urologist “had the 1992 biopsy reread by a pathologist,” who “read the biopsy as malignant.” Id. Stotts learned of the error in February, and, in April, he and his wife filed a proposed complaint against Drs. Van Dusen and O’Brien. The trial court found that the two-year statute of limitations was unconstitutional as applied to the Stottses and entered summary judgment for them. On transfer, our Supreme Court held as follows:
In Part I, we conclude that section 34-18-7-1(b) should be construed to permit plaintiffs like Martin and the Stottses to file their claims within two years of the date when they discover the malpractice and the resulting injury or facts that, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should lead to the discovery of the malpractice and the resulting injury. In Part II, we apply this general rule and conclude that, in this case, the two-year period was triggered when, in January of 1995, Dr. Allen informed Stotts that he had incurable cancer and that the biopsy slides may have been misread in 1992. Plaintiffs’ claim of medical malpractice, therefore, was timely filed within the two-year statutory period.
Id. at 495.
[20] In 2005, in Booth v. Wiley, 839 N.E.2d 1168 (Ind. 2005), our Supreme Court “synthesiz[ed]” the holdings in Martin and Van Dusen with Boggs v. Tri-State Radiology, Inc., where the Court had “upheld application of the medical malpractice two-year statute of limitations ‘to bar a claim that was discovered several months before the limitations period expired and well within two years of its occurrence.’” Booth, 839 N.E.2d at 1172 (quoting Boggs, 730 N.E.2d at 694). The Court then proceeded to establish a “methodology” to “guide[] the application of the medical malpractice statute of limitations.” Id.
Initially, a court must determine the date the alleged malpractice occurred and determine the discovery date—the date when the claimant discovered the alleged malpractice and resulting injury, or possessed enough information that would have led a reasonably diligent person to make such discovery. If the discovery date is more than two years beyond the date the malpractice occurred, the claimant has two years after discovery within which to initiate a malpractice action.
Id. (emphasis added).
Issue One: Pulmonologist 7 [21] Pratt contends that the trial court erred when it found that his proposed complaint against Pulmonologist was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Pratt correctly asserts that the Martin/Van Dusen exception “applies if a plaintiff is unaware of either the physician’s negligence or the resulting injury during the applicable two-year period because of the nature of the medical condition.” Appellant’s Br. at 18 (emphasis removed). And Pratt maintains that the designated evidence supports the application of that exception here as a matter of law. In short, Pratt argues that Wanda had no way to know that Pulmonologist’s March 2018 advice to forego additional CT scans was negligent advice until she learned of her cancer in May 2022, and Pratt filed his proposed complaint within two years of that date. We agree with Pratt’s analysis under the Martin/Van Dusen exception.
[22] The undisputed designated evidence shows that Pulmonologist provided ongoing care for Wanda’s pulmonary nodules from September 2014 until March 6, 2018. Wanda had annual CT scans to monitor the nodules in 2013, 2014, 2015, and 2016. In her affidavit, Pulmonologist stated that she had ordered the CT scans “to confirm that the nodules were not increasing in size” because “[a]n increase in size could reflect a malignant process.” Appellant’s App.
7 Again, Pratt’s claims against the Hospital and the Facility are solely derivative of his claims against Pulmonologist. Accordingly, for ease of discussion, we refer only to “Pulmonologist” in this section.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-MI-189 | August 31, 2026 Page 13 of 27
Vol. 2, p. 42 (emphasis added). In other words, Pulmonologist ordered the annual CT scans to screen for lung cancer.
[23] In March 2017, Pulmonologist “told [Wanda] that since there had been no change in the nodules from November 2013 to March 2016, she did not require continued CT imaging of the chest.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2, p. 42. And in March 2018, Pulmonologist told Wanda that she was “not recommending repeat CT scans of the chest because her pulmonary nodules had been stable for more than twenty-four months.” Id. Thus, Pulmonologist did not merely skip additional CT scans in 2017 and 2018, but she explicitly advised Wanda that additional CT scans were neither “require[d]” nor “recommend[ed].” Id.
[24] Pulmonologist instructed Wanda to “follow-up in the pulmonary clinic again in twelve months.” Id. Wanda did not follow up in the clinic, but she continued to follow Pulmonologist’s advice to not get additional CT scans of the chest. 8 Wanda had no indication that anything had changed with her pulmonary nodules until May 2022, when she experienced symptoms that sent her to an emergency room, and she was diagnosed with lung cancer. Pratt filed his proposed complaint in March 2024, within two years of May 2022.
[25] During the summary judgment hearing in the trial court, Pulmonologist argued that the Martin/Van Dusen exception does not apply here because Pratt is not
8 Nothing in the designated evidence, including Pulmonologist’s affidavit, suggests that, had Wanda followed up as instructed, Pulmonologist would have ordered any additional CT scans.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-MI-189 | August 31, 2026 Page 14 of 27 alleging a “failure to diagnose” cancer, as alleged in those cases, but rather a “failure to monitor” Wanda’s pulmonary nodules. See Tr. p. 7. In support, Pulmonologist argued that there is no evidence that Wanda had cancer when Pulmonologist last saw her in March 20189 and that Wanda’s “lung nodules were not a latent condition. . . .” Id. at 9.
[26] In its order entering summary judgment for Pulmonologist, the trial court adopted Pulmonologist’s reasoning and found the analysis in Brinkman v. Bueter, 879 N.E.2d 549 (Ind. 2008), dispositive. In Brinkman, the plaintiff was “immediately diagnosed with and treated for eclampsia” following the birth of her daughter in 1995. Id. at 554. Dr. Bueter advised the Brinkmans that another pregnancy would put Mrs. Brinkman’s “life in danger” and that they should not have any more children. Id. at 551. Accordingly, despite their desire for more children, the Brinkmans used birth control to avoid future pregnancies. But Mrs. Brinkman became pregnant again in January 2000, and she saw a new obstetrician, Dr. Zimmer, who told her that: Dr. Bueter had not properly treated her pre-eclampsia, which had caused it to become eclampsia; and that there was no reason that she should have avoided becoming pregnant since 1995.
9 Again, there is no evidence that the plaintiff in Martin had cancer at the time Dr. Richey last treated her for the breast lump in March 1991. While the alleged medical negligence was characterized as a “failure to diagnose” cancer, the opinion omits any reference to evidence that the breast lump was cancerous in March 1991. Cf., Van Dusen, 712 N.E.2d at 494 (evidence showed that the original biopsy was misread as benign). Thus, the lack of any such evidence here is likewise of no moment for purposes of this appeal, which does not go to the merits of Pratt’s claims.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-MI-189 | August 31, 2026 Page 15 of 27
[27] In December 2000, the Brinkmans filed a proposed complaint against Dr. Bueter alleging that he had failed to diagnose and treat Mrs. Brinkman’s pre- eclampsia and eclampsia and that he had “failed to appropriately counsel” the Brinkmans about the potential risks of future pregnancies. Id. at 552. Dr. Bueter argued that their claims were barred by the two-year statute of limitations. The trial court granted summary judgment for Dr. Bueter in part, and this Court held that all of their claims were timely under the Martin/Van Dusen exception.
[28] On transfer, our Supreme Court held that,
[u]nlike the plaintiffs in Martin and Van Dusen, however, Mrs.
Brinkman did not suffer from a disease or medical condition with a long latency period. When a physician fails to diagnose cancer, the patient may continue without symptoms for years. It is impossible for these patients to claim failure to diagnose cancer before they know they are suffering from the disease. The Brinkmans did not face this challenge. Instead, Mrs. Brinkman suffered eclamptic seizures on January 30, 1995, and was immediately diagnosed with and treated for eclampsia.[] All of these events occurred in 1995, and nothing prevented the Brinkmans from bringing a claim about faulty diagnosis or treatment within the two-year statutory period. The statute of limitations on the Brinkmans’ failure to diagnose and treat claims thus began to run in 1995 and expired in 1997. The trial court was correct to grant summary judgment to defendants on these claims.
The Brinkmans similarly argue that they did not have sufficient facts to support their negligent counseling claim until 2000, when Dr. Zimmer contradicted some of the advice given to them at the 1995 post-partum exam. This argument lacks merit. A plaintiff does not need to be told malpractice occurred to trigger the statute of limitations. Van Dusen, 712 N.E.2d at 499. The
Brinkmans were equipped with a correct diagnosis in 1995, and the alleged negligent counseling occurred in 1995. Nothing prevented the Brinkmans from seeking further medical or legal advice. Thus, the two-year statute of limitations also bars this claim.
Id. at 554-55.
[29] Citing our Supreme Court’s opinion in Brinkman, the trial court here observed:
When a physician fails to diagnose cancer, it is impossible for the patient to claim failure to diagnose until they are actually diagnosed with the disease. However, the same is not necessarily true when the allegation is a failure to provide competent medical advice regarding a known medical condition. In other words, a plaintiff does not need to be told medical malpractice has occurred to trigger the statute of limitations under these circumstances. This is particularly [true] where nothing prevents the patient from seeking a second opinion or further medical advice regarding the proper course of treatment.
Appellant’s App. Vol. 2, p. 14 (citations omitted). And the court found that “Pratt’s argument that it was impossible to discover a potential malpractice claim within two years is not persuasive. Nothing prevented [Wanda] from seeking a second opinion or further medical advice.” Id.
[30] The trial court’s reliance on Brinkman is misplaced. Pratt’s proposed complaint does not allege a failure to monitor a known condition. 10 Rather, it alleges that
10 In an answer to an interrogatory, Pratt, who is not an expert, stated that “[Wanda] should have undergone additional CTs to monitor her pulmonary nodules.” Id. at 46. Regardless, the crux of Pratt’s medical
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Pulmonologist’s negligence resulted in Wanda’s death, and the undisputed designated evidence shows that her death was caused by lung cancer, not pulmonary nodules. Wanda’s lung cancer was a latent disease that went undetected until her first symptoms appeared in May 2022. Accordingly, the facts of this case are analogous to Martin, not Brinkman.
[31] On appeal, Pratt argues: “Pulmonologist told [Wanda] she did not need to undergo annual screening for lung cancer, and [Wanda] relied on her advice. The law—and common sense—dictate that she was entitled to rely on Pulmonologist’s advice.” Appellant’s Br. at 22. Indeed, nothing in Martin or Van Dusen required that the plaintiffs in those cases, whose cancers were allegedly misdiagnosed, had to seek second opinions. One of the claims in Martin was that Dr. Richey was negligent in advising Martin to forego an excisional biopsy to screen for cancer, and the Court did not require a second opinion on that issue. That claim is closely analogous to Pratt’s claim that Pulmonologist was negligent in advising Wanda that she did not need additional CT scans to screen for lung cancer. Brinkman is inapposite here.
[32] Moreover, Pulmonologist is simply incorrect that the Martin/Van Dusen exception only applies to cases involving an alleged failure to diagnose a latent disease. In Booth, the plaintiff alleged permanent injuries as a result of Lasik surgery he underwent in 1998. 839 N.E.2d at 1173. Booth did not file a
malpractice allegation is that Pulmonologist’s negligent advice to forego additional CT scans led to her cancer going undetected until irrevocable symptoms appeared. See Appellant’s Br. at 5.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-MI-189 | August 31, 2026 Page 18 of 27 proposed complaint alleging medical malpractice until July 2001, after another physician told him that he had not been a candidate for Lasik surgery when it was performed by Dr. Wiley. The trial court entered summary judgment for Dr. Wiley because the court found that Booth had learned of injuries related to the Lasik surgery in October 1999 and could have filed his proposed complaint within two years after the alleged occurrence of malpractice. Id. at 1173-74.
[33] On transfer in Booth, our Supreme Court held:
The evidence does not indisputably establish that Mr. Booth discovered the malpractice and resulting injury, or acquired knowledge sufficient to lead a reasonably diligent person to discover the malpractice and resulting injury, until December 4, 2000, when Dr. Parent advised him that the Lasik surgery should not have been performed because of his preexisting cataracts and glaucoma. Therefore, as to alleged malpractice occurring more than two years earlier, the discovery occurred outside the two-
year occurrence-based statute of limitations, authorizing the plaintiffs to initiate their action within two years after discovery, with which they complied by initiating this action on July 24, 2001, or September 18, 2001.[] Thus, the statute of limitations does not preclude any claims arising out of Dr. Norlund’s evaluation, advice, and referral of October 1998 and those arising from Dr. Wiley’s surgery on November 2, 1998. As to these claims, it was error to grant the defendants’ motions for summary judgment.
Id. at 1176. Thus, even though Booth knew “within the period prescribed by the statute of limitations that he had serious vision problems and probable permanent vision impairment” after the Lasik surgery, the Court determined that the evidence did “not necessarily establish as an undisputed issue of fact that this amount[ed] to discovery of ‘facts which, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should [have led] to the discovery of the medical malpractice.’” Id. at 1175 (quoting Van Dusen, 712 N.E.2d at 497) (emphasis added); see also, Halbe v. Weinberg, 717 N.E.2d 876, 882 (Ind. 1999) (applying Martin to hold that plaintiff’s proposed complaint alleging that surgeon had implanted the wrong breast implants was timely filed more than two years after surgery where plaintiff had no reason to know of the alleged malpractice any sooner).
[34] Likewise, here, Pratt need not have alleged a failure to diagnose cancer to bring his proposed complaint under the Martin/Van Dusen exception. See Booth, 839 N.E.2d at 1175. And, considering only the limited designated evidence at this early stage of the litigation, we cannot say that Wanda did not have a right to rely on Pulmonologist’s advice to forgo additional CT scans of her chest. While the record on appeal is devoid of evidence regarding the date of onset of Wanda’s cancer, it was a latent disease, and it is undisputed that she did not know that she had cancer until May 2022. There is no designated evidence showing that she had discovered facts which, in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have led to the discovery of the alleged medical malpractice (Pulmonologist’s advice that she did not need additional CT scans) and the resulting injury (delayed diagnosis of lung cancer) prior to May 2022. Id. Thus, Pratt’s proposed complaint filed on March 13, 2024, was timely under the Martin/Van Dusen exception to Indiana Code section 34-18-7-1(b), and we reverse the trial court’s entry of summary judgment for Pulmonologist, the Hospital, and the Facility. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-MI-189 | August 31, 2026 Page 20 of 27
Issue Two: Family Doctor [35] Pratt also contends that the trial court erred when it entered summary judgment for Family Doctor. Pratt argues that Family Doctor “was aware of [Wanda’s] risk factors for developing cancer during their first encounter,” and Pratt alleges that Family Doctor was negligent when he did not “order screening or refer her to a specialist” during the course of their physician-patient relationship. Appellant’s Br. at 27. And Pratt maintains that his proposed complaint was timely under the doctrine of continuing wrong. We do not agree.
[36] The doctrine of continuing wrong is applicable where an entire course of conduct combines to produce an injury. Boggs, 730 N.E.2d at 699. The doctrine of continuing wrong is not an equitable doctrine; rather, it defines when an act, omission, or neglect took place. Id. When this doctrine attaches, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the wrongful act ceases, and at that point the plaintiff may bring the claim within the normal statutory period. Id.
[37] Pratt argues that, during the course of the physician-patient relationship with Wanda, Family Doctor “had access to [Wanda’s] medical history that forms the basis of her allegation of negligence” including “her long smoking history, lung nodules, and COPD.” Appellant’s Br. at 26. And Pratt contends that the designated evidence shows that Family Doctor’s physician-patient relationship with Wanda existed through April 9, 2022, when he refilled a prescription for an anti-inflammatory medication to treat neck pain. Thus, Pratt maintains that Family Doctor could have ordered lung cancer screens for Wanda as late as April 2022, and his proposed complaint was timely filed in March 2024.
[38] In support of his contentions on appeal, Pratt relies on Ferrell v. Geisler, 505 N.E.2d 137 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987), and Frady v. Hedgcock, 497 N.E.2d 620 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986). In Ferrell, the plaintiff saw her OB/GYN, Dr. Geisler, and his partner Dr. Everetts several times from 1979 to late 1981 regarding lumps in her breasts. Despite the “ominous tone” of a diagnostic report in February 1981, Dr. Geisler did not order a biopsy, and he told Ferrell that she had “no reason to be concerned.” 505 N.E.2d at 138. Ferrell returned to see Dr. Geisler in September 1981 and reported lumps under her arm. A biopsy showed that she had breast cancer, and Dr. Geisler performed a mastectomy in October.
[39] On September 1, 1983, Ferrell filed a proposed complaint against Dr. Geisler. Dr. Geisler argued that Ferrell’s proposed complaint was untimely, and the trial court entered summary judgment for Dr. Geisler. On appeal, this Court held in relevant part that,
under the continuing wrong theory, a factual situation is presented as to whether Geisler’s failure to diagnose was a continuing wrong up to and including September 21, 1981.
Under the continuing wrong theory the full two-year statute of limitations would commence to run at the end of the continuing wrong, . . . and Ferrell’s action would have been timely. It is our opinion that a physician’s responsibility to a regular patient, who continued under his care for a specified ailment, is not limited, as a matter of law, to the periods of time the patient is in his presence. It is a factual matter. This is especially true where, as here, reports, histories, laboratory tests (which is a basis for the negligence alleged) are relevant and existent in the physician’s file. Additionally, Geisler had prescribed medication to Ferrell on July 31 and had told her to return in six months.
Id. at 140.
[40] And in Frady, the plaintiff saw Dr. Hedgcock for four years until June 1980. During the course of their physician-patient relationship, Dr. Hedgcock prescribed “over thirty medications” for Frady, and he ignored symptoms of renal failure, which was finally diagnosed by another doctor on July 3, 1980. Frady, 497 N.E.2d at 621. Frady died July 22, 1980, and her husband filed a proposed complaint on July 21, 1982. The trial court entered summary judgment for Dr. Hedgcock.
[41] On appeal, this Court reversed the grant of summary judgment and held as follows:
Dr. Hedgcock had treated [Frady] for four years and had prescribed many medications for her during that period. Between April 12, 1980 and June 17, 1980, the doctor had written six (6)
prescriptions for [Frady]. It is not clear from the record how many, if any, of the prescriptions were still in effect at July 22, 1980, the date of [Frady’s] death. Thus, a material issue of fact existed as to whether Dr. Hedgcock’s treatment and prescriptions could be considered a continuing wrong as late as July 22, 1980, the last day for which the cause of action could have accrued.
Id. at 622.
[42] While we agree with Pratt that some of the facts here are analogous to those in Ferrell and Frady, there are crucial distinctions, namely, Dr. Geisler was monitoring the very condition that led to Ferrell’s death, and Frady’s renal failure was allegedly caused by the many prescriptions Dr. Hedgcock had ordered for her. In contrast, here, Family Doctor treated Wanda for an upper respiratory infection and neck pain. There is no designated evidence that Family Doctor ever discussed Wanda’s pulmonary nodules or risk factors for cancer, let alone treated her for those conditions. Indeed, in Ferrell, the Court emphasized that “a physician’s responsibility to a regular patient, who continued under his care for a specified ailment, is not limited, as a matter of law, to the periods of time the patient is in his presence.” 505 N.E.2d at 140 (emphasis added). And the Court stated that “[t]his is especially true where . . . reports, histories, [and] laboratory tests (which is a basis for the negligence alleged) are relevant and existent in the physician’s file.” Id.
[43] Moreover, in Havens v. Ritchey, our Supreme Court observed that
[a] physician cannot be under a continuing duty to review all files daily to ensure that he did not misdiagnose a condition of a patient he may not have seen for months or even years. This duty would be completely overwhelming to health care providers, and cut against the purposes of the Medical Malpractice Act.
582 N.E.2d 792, 795 (Ind. 1991). Thus, the Court held that “when the sole claim of medical malpractice is a failure to diagnose, the omission cannot as a matter of law extend beyond the time the physician last rendered a diagnosis.” Id.
[44] Here, to the extent Pratt argues that Family Doctor should have ordered cancer screening, we agree with Family Doctor that his last opportunity to have done so would have been the conversation they had about her neck MRI on February 18, 2022. In support of that contention, Family Doctor cites Szamocki v. Anonymous Doctor and Anonymous Group, 70 N.E.3d 419 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied. In Szamocki, we followed our Supreme Court’s reasoning in Havens even though the plaintiff’s claim was a failure to monitor instead of a failure to diagnose. Id. at 425. We held that, for purposes of the continuing wrong doctrine, the last opportunity the physician had to assess the plaintiff’s renal function was the last appointment, and that was when the statute of limitations began to run. Id. at 425-26. We noted that the physician’s instruction to follow- up, which the plaintiff did not do, did not alter that determination. Id. at 426.
[45] Still, Pratt argues that, in April 2022, Family Doctor ordered a refill for a prescription for an anti-inflammatory medication, which shows that he still had a physician-patient relationship with Wanda on that date. In support, Pratt cites Ferrell, where this Court considered the last date Dr. Geisler had prescribed medication to Ferrell as a relevant factor to determine the date their physician- patient relationship ended. 505 N.E.2d at 140. And Pratt cites Frady, where this Court observed that it was “unclear as to whether [Frady] was still taking medications prescribed by Dr. Hedgcock” when she died. 497 N.E.2d at 623.
[46] We might be persuaded to agree with Pratt if the prescription medication related to any of Wanda’s cancer risk factors, but it did not. Under Havens and Szamocki, we hold that February 18, 2022, was the last time Family Doctor had an opportunity to order cancer screening for Wanda. 11 There is no designated evidence showing that Family Doctor would have had any occasion to assess Wanda’s cancer risk factors after that date. See Havens, 582 N.E.2d at 795. Thus, Pratt’s proposed complaint against Family Doctor, which was filed on March 13, 2024, was untimely. The trial court did not err when it entered summary judgment for Family Doctor. 12
Conclusion [47] Under the Martin/Van Dusen exception, Pratt’s proposed complaint against Pulmonologist, the Hospital, and the Facility was timely filed. But Pratt’s proposed complaint against Family Doctor was not saved by the continuing wrong doctrine. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s entry of summary judgment for Pulmonologist, and, to the extent Pratt’s claims against the Hospital and the Facility derive from his claims against Pulmonologist, we reverse the trial court’s entry of summary judgment for them too. We remand for further proceedings on those claims. However, we affirm the trial court’s entry of summary judgment for Family Doctor.
11 Pratt also suggests that Family Doctor’s instruction to his staff to contact Wanda in July 2023 about screening for breast cancer and colon cancer shows that he still considered her to be a patient at that late date. But Family Doctor also advised his staff that Wanda had not “re-established with [him]” since their February 2022 appointment. Appellant’s App. Vol. 3, p. 56. And Wanda was living in Alabama. Thus, clearly, Wanda did not consider Family Doctor to be her doctor at that time. 12 Likewise, we affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment with respect to any claims against the Hospital and the Facility that derive solely from Pratt’s claims against Family Doctor.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-MI-189 | August 31, 2026 Page 26 of 27
[48] Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings.
Kenworthy, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT Shan L. Bryant-Haase S. Reese Sobol II Garau Germano, P.C. Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE ANONYMOUS PHYSICIAN 1 Alyssa D. Stamatakos Samantha K. Downton Eichhorn & Eichhorn, LLP Hammond, Indiana
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE ANONYMOUS PHYSICIAN 2 Sean T. Devenney Drewry Simmons Vornehm, LLP Carmel, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES ANONYMOUS HOSPITAL AND ANONYMOUS FACILITY Bryan H. Babb Louise K. Conces Bose McKinney & Evans LLP Indianapolis, Indiana