Preston National Bank v. Michigan Mutual Fire Insurance

73 N.W. 815, 115 Mich. 511, 1898 Mich. LEXIS 584
CourtMichigan Supreme Court
DecidedJanuary 18, 1898
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 73 N.W. 815 (Preston National Bank v. Michigan Mutual Fire Insurance) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Preston National Bank v. Michigan Mutual Fire Insurance, 73 N.W. 815, 115 Mich. 511, 1898 Mich. LEXIS 584 (Mich. 1898).

Opinion

Moore, J.

Plaintiff recovered a judgment for a fire loss upon a policy of insurance issued by defendant, from which judgment defendant appeals. It is claimed by defendant that the policy of insurance was issued upon an application signed by the Preston National Bank, applicant, by O. J. Watkins, and that the application stated that the building insured was upon a brick foundation, when in fact it stood upon posts. When the policy was issued, there was a mortgage, owned by Mrs. Cochrane, upon the property, and the loss was made payable to the [513]*513mortgagee as her mortgage interest was made to appear. This mortgage was afterwards foreclosed, and the property was bought at the, foreclosure sale by Mr. Parsons, who borrowed $2,000 of the bank, and gave a mortgage for that amount to the bank upon the same property. The bank delivered the policy of insurance to Mr. Parsons for the purpose of enabling him to have the property insured for his benefit. Mr. Parsons took the policy, with others, to Mr. Watkins, and claims that he told Mr. Watkins about the foreclosure of the mortgage* his purchase of the property, of his giving the $2,000 mortgage to the bank, and that the bank was willing to have the mortgage slip taken off the mortgage; and that Mr. Watkins [514]*514procured the assignment to Mr. Parsons of the policy by the bank, and the consent of the company to the assignment. Afterwards the property was burned, the policy was assigned by Mr. Parsons to the bank, and it brought the suit. It is the claim of the plaintiff that it knew nothing of the making of the application purporting to be signed by it; that Mr. Watkins was the agént of the defendant, and that his knowledge was the defendant’s knowledge.

On the pajt of the defendant, it is claimed that Mr. Watkins was not its agent, but was an insurance broker; that in procuring the insurance he was acting for the bank, and in procuring the assignment of the policy and [515]*515the consent of the company he was acting for Mr. Parsons. The defendant claims further that, when the company consented to the assignment of the policy, it had no knowledge of the' $2,000 mortgage, but was told by Mr. Watkins that Mr. Parsons owned the property free of incumbrances, and would not have consented to the assignment to Mr. Parsons if it had known the bank held a $2,000 mortgage on the property. Defendant urges that there was no testimony which should have been submitted to the jury that Mr. Watkins was acting for the company, and the court should have directed a verdict in favor of the defendant. We think there is some testimony tending to show agency, and the case was a proper one for the jury. • »

[516]*516It will be seen by the statement already made that the important question in the case is, For whom was Mr. Watkins acting, — for the insured, or for the insurer? That was a question that should have been submitted to the jury under proper instructions, free from any intimation by the judge as to what his opinion was of the fact. Cronkhite v. Dickerson, 51 Mich. 177. Certain requests to charge were offered on the part of the defendant, which will be found in the margin. The judge modified these requests by adding thereto the words printed in italics. The defendant was strenuously insisting that there was no testimony tending to show that Mr. Watkins was acting for it. We think these statements of the judge were well calculated to give the jury an impression of the opinion he entertained of the disputed question, and were prejudicial to the defendant. Letts v. Letts, 91 Mich. 596; Valin v. McKerreghan, 104 Mich. 313.

[517]*517The other assignments of error have been considered. They are either not well taken, or are not likely to occur again on the new trial, and it will not be necessary to discuss them.

Judgment is reversed, and new trial ordered.

Montgomery, Hooker, and Long, JJ.,-concurred. Grant, C. J., did not sit.

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Bluebook (online)
73 N.W. 815, 115 Mich. 511, 1898 Mich. LEXIS 584, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/preston-national-bank-v-michigan-mutual-fire-insurance-mich-1898.