Preston Mercedes Liddell v. the State of Texas
This text of Preston Mercedes Liddell v. the State of Texas (Preston Mercedes Liddell v. the State of Texas) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________
No. 02-25-00230-CR ___________________________
PRESTON MERCEDES LIDDELL, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS
On Appeal from County Criminal Court No. 3 Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 1850316
Before Sudderth, C.J.; Kerr and Birdwell, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Sudderth MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Preston Mercedes Liddell attempts to appeal from an interlocutory
order denying his motion to dismiss the criminal charges against him. But “in a
criminal case[, appeals] are permitted only when they are specifically authorized by
statute,” State ex rel. Lykos v. Fine, 330 S.W.3d 904, 915 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (orig.
proceedings), and no statute authorizes a defendant’s appeal from an interlocutory
order denying a motion to dismiss, Williams v. State, No. 02-23-00330-CR, 2024 WL
368947, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Feb. 1, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op., not
designated for publication) (“An order denying a motion to dismiss is neither a
judgment of conviction nor an interlocutory order made appealable by statute.”);
Awadalla v. State, No. 02-20-00102-CR, 2020 WL 5949918, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth Oct. 8, 2020, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op., not designated for publication)
(“No statute authorizes an interlocutory appeal from a motion to dismiss.”); see Abbott
v. State, 271 S.W.3d 694, 696–97 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (“The standard for
determining jurisdiction is not whether the appeal is precluded by law, but whether
the appeal is authorized by law.”).
Accordingly, we notified Appellant that we lacked jurisdiction over his appeal,
and we warned that we could dismiss the appeal unless he showed grounds for
continuing it. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(f), 44.3. Appellant responded by arguing the
merits of his dismissal complaint and by alleging that the trial court had handled his
motion in a “fundamentally unfair” manner. Even if Appellant’s contentions were
2 true, though, they would not confer the appellate jurisdiction needed for our review of
the challenged interlocutory order.
We therefore dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.1 Tex. R. App. P.
43.2(f); see Williams, 2024 WL 368947, at *1 (dismissing attempted appeal from
interlocutory denial of dismissal motion).
/s/ Bonnie Sudderth
Bonnie Sudderth Chief Justice
Do Not Publish Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
Delivered: July 31, 2025
1 All pending motions are denied as moot.
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