COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Huff, Athey and Fulton UNPUBLISHED
Argued by videoconference
PRESTON GILES EDWARDS MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY v. Record No. 0091-21-2 JUDGE GLEN A. HUFF APRIL 26, 2022 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF COLONIAL HEIGHTS Timothy J. Hauler, Judge Designate
Todd M. Ritter (Hill & Rainey, on brief), for appellant.
Timothy J. Huffstutter, Assistant Attorney General (Jason S. Miyares, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
After a bench trial in the Colonial Heights Circuit Court (the “trial court”), Preston Giles
Edwards (“appellant”) was convicted of one count of malicious wounding in violation of Code
§ 18.2-51. On appeal, appellant argues that the Commonwealth’s evidence was insufficient to
prove two elements required under the statute: malice and the specific intent to maim, disfigure,
disable, or kill. This Court disagrees and affirms the trial court’s judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
On appeal, this Court reviews the facts “in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth, the prevailing party at trial.” Gerald v. Commonwealth, 295 Va. 469, 472
(2018) (quoting Scott v. Commonwealth, 292 Va. 380, 381 (2016)). Further, this Court
disregards “the evidence of the accused in conflict with that of the Commonwealth, and regard[s]
as true all the credible evidence favorable to the Commonwealth and all fair inferences to be
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication. drawn therefrom.” Kelley v. Commonwealth, 289 Va. 463, 467-68 (2015) (quoting Parks v.
Commonwealth, 221 Va. 492, 498 (1980)). So viewed, the evidence is as follows:
At the time of the incident at issue, appellant and Deborah Miller (“Miller”) had dated for
approximately four years. On March 24, 2020, after drinking alcohol and discussing an
upcoming trip to Florida, appellant and Miller got into an argument over the trip. Suddenly,
appellant got on top of Miller and began pushing her down on the bed with both hands over her
mouth. Miller described appellant as a “big man”—heavier than her and approximately one foot
taller. Unable to breathe, Miller bit appellant’s hand covering her mouth. Appellant exclaimed,
“Oh, you wanna bite,” and retaliated by biting Miller on her right arm. Miller got up from the
bed and felt a “jolt” on the back of her head. Miller believed appellant struck the back of her
head with his open hand. Miller next remembered waking up later that night and sending a
picture of her bruised face to a friend.
The following morning, on March 25, 2020, Miller contacted the same friend, telling her
she worried about being alone with appellant. She stayed at appellant’s apartment for the day
and slept in bed. She felt dizzy when standing, and her head “felt weird.” Appellant apologized
to Miller but made her promise not to contact law enforcement. That evening, Miller’s sister
picked her up.
On March 26, 2020, Miller went to the hospital to receive an x-ray of her head. After
Miller recounted the incident, the hospital staff contacted the police. Officer Davis, with the
Colonial Heights Police Department, arrived at the hospital to investigate. At trial, Officer Davis
testified to Miller’s injuries, noting “visible bruising and swelling to her face.” Miller’s right eye
was “purple and swollen shut,” while her left eye suffered from “obvious hemorrhaging.” Miller
had bite marks and bruising on her right arm. According to Miller, it took two months for her
injuries to heal.
-2- Appellant’s version of the facts diverges entirely from Miller’s. According to him, on
March 24, 2020, Miller became intoxicated while the couple argued over the Florida trip.
Appellant suggested that, because of her drinking problem, Miller should not go on the trip.
Miller responded by threatening to invite other men over to appellant’s house if he left on the trip
without her. She continued to drink that evening and eventually put the liquor bottle up to
appellant’s mouth. When appellant refused to drink, Miller became physically aggressive and
attacked him. Miller got on top of appellant and bit down on his finger. To get Miller to release
his finger, appellant bit her arm. Miller began following appellant “around the house drunk,
falling through things.” Appellant claimed she fell on his video game console and tripped over
her own feet, denting a wall. When questioned at trial whether he injured Miller in any way,
other than biting her arm, appellant replied, “Nothing else.” The trial court found appellant’s
testimony about the March 24, 2020 incident “utterly, utterly without credibility.”
Following a bench trial on October 20, 2020, appellant was convicted of malicious
wounding in violation of Code § 18.2-51. The trial court subsequently sentenced appellant to
five years in prison with three years suspended. This appeal followed.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction,
. . . [t]his Court will only reverse the judgment of the trial court if the judgment is plainly wrong
or without evidence to support it.” Burkeen v. Commonwealth, 286 Va. 255, 258 (2013)
(alterations in original) (quoting Clark v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 636, 640 (2010)). Thus, this
Court need only determine whether “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Wilson v. Commonwealth, 53 Va. App. 599,
605 (2009) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). If so, the conviction stands.
-3- III. ANALYSIS
Appellant was convicted of malicious wounding in violation of Code § 18.2-51. To
convict a person of malicious wounding, the Commonwealth must prove malice and the specific
intent to “permanently” injure, or more specifically, “the intent to maim, disfigure, disable, or
kill.” Johnson v. Commonwealth, 53 Va. App. 79, 99 (2008); Code § 18.2-51. Appellant argues
the Commonwealth failed to prove either of these elements and his actions amounted to nothing
more than misdemeanor domestic assault and battery. This Court disagrees.
Appellant first contends that he lacked the malice required to be convicted of malicious
wounding. “Malice inheres in the doing of a wrongful act intentionally, or without just cause or
excuse, or as a result of ill will.” Ramos v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. App. 150, 162 (2019)
(quoting Burkeen, 286 Va. at 259). A factfinder may infer malice from “words[] or . . . acts and
conduct which necessarily result in injury.” Id. Ultimately, the existence of malice “is a
question of fact to be determined by [the factfinder].” Fletcher v. Commonwealth, 72 Va. App.
493, 507 (2020) (quoting Long v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 194, 198 (1989)).
A reasonable factfinder could infer appellant acted maliciously. He purposefully assailed
Miller, pinning her to the bed with both hands over her mouth. Because Miller was unable to
breathe, she bit appellant’s hand. In retaliation, appellant made the conscious decision to bite
Miller’s arm and said, “Oh, you wanna bite,” evincing his intent to harm her. On brief, appellant
even acknowledges that he struck Miller with an open hand on the back of the head. The
Commonwealth provided ample evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could conclude
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COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Huff, Athey and Fulton UNPUBLISHED
Argued by videoconference
PRESTON GILES EDWARDS MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY v. Record No. 0091-21-2 JUDGE GLEN A. HUFF APRIL 26, 2022 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF COLONIAL HEIGHTS Timothy J. Hauler, Judge Designate
Todd M. Ritter (Hill & Rainey, on brief), for appellant.
Timothy J. Huffstutter, Assistant Attorney General (Jason S. Miyares, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
After a bench trial in the Colonial Heights Circuit Court (the “trial court”), Preston Giles
Edwards (“appellant”) was convicted of one count of malicious wounding in violation of Code
§ 18.2-51. On appeal, appellant argues that the Commonwealth’s evidence was insufficient to
prove two elements required under the statute: malice and the specific intent to maim, disfigure,
disable, or kill. This Court disagrees and affirms the trial court’s judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
On appeal, this Court reviews the facts “in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth, the prevailing party at trial.” Gerald v. Commonwealth, 295 Va. 469, 472
(2018) (quoting Scott v. Commonwealth, 292 Va. 380, 381 (2016)). Further, this Court
disregards “the evidence of the accused in conflict with that of the Commonwealth, and regard[s]
as true all the credible evidence favorable to the Commonwealth and all fair inferences to be
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication. drawn therefrom.” Kelley v. Commonwealth, 289 Va. 463, 467-68 (2015) (quoting Parks v.
Commonwealth, 221 Va. 492, 498 (1980)). So viewed, the evidence is as follows:
At the time of the incident at issue, appellant and Deborah Miller (“Miller”) had dated for
approximately four years. On March 24, 2020, after drinking alcohol and discussing an
upcoming trip to Florida, appellant and Miller got into an argument over the trip. Suddenly,
appellant got on top of Miller and began pushing her down on the bed with both hands over her
mouth. Miller described appellant as a “big man”—heavier than her and approximately one foot
taller. Unable to breathe, Miller bit appellant’s hand covering her mouth. Appellant exclaimed,
“Oh, you wanna bite,” and retaliated by biting Miller on her right arm. Miller got up from the
bed and felt a “jolt” on the back of her head. Miller believed appellant struck the back of her
head with his open hand. Miller next remembered waking up later that night and sending a
picture of her bruised face to a friend.
The following morning, on March 25, 2020, Miller contacted the same friend, telling her
she worried about being alone with appellant. She stayed at appellant’s apartment for the day
and slept in bed. She felt dizzy when standing, and her head “felt weird.” Appellant apologized
to Miller but made her promise not to contact law enforcement. That evening, Miller’s sister
picked her up.
On March 26, 2020, Miller went to the hospital to receive an x-ray of her head. After
Miller recounted the incident, the hospital staff contacted the police. Officer Davis, with the
Colonial Heights Police Department, arrived at the hospital to investigate. At trial, Officer Davis
testified to Miller’s injuries, noting “visible bruising and swelling to her face.” Miller’s right eye
was “purple and swollen shut,” while her left eye suffered from “obvious hemorrhaging.” Miller
had bite marks and bruising on her right arm. According to Miller, it took two months for her
injuries to heal.
-2- Appellant’s version of the facts diverges entirely from Miller’s. According to him, on
March 24, 2020, Miller became intoxicated while the couple argued over the Florida trip.
Appellant suggested that, because of her drinking problem, Miller should not go on the trip.
Miller responded by threatening to invite other men over to appellant’s house if he left on the trip
without her. She continued to drink that evening and eventually put the liquor bottle up to
appellant’s mouth. When appellant refused to drink, Miller became physically aggressive and
attacked him. Miller got on top of appellant and bit down on his finger. To get Miller to release
his finger, appellant bit her arm. Miller began following appellant “around the house drunk,
falling through things.” Appellant claimed she fell on his video game console and tripped over
her own feet, denting a wall. When questioned at trial whether he injured Miller in any way,
other than biting her arm, appellant replied, “Nothing else.” The trial court found appellant’s
testimony about the March 24, 2020 incident “utterly, utterly without credibility.”
Following a bench trial on October 20, 2020, appellant was convicted of malicious
wounding in violation of Code § 18.2-51. The trial court subsequently sentenced appellant to
five years in prison with three years suspended. This appeal followed.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction,
. . . [t]his Court will only reverse the judgment of the trial court if the judgment is plainly wrong
or without evidence to support it.” Burkeen v. Commonwealth, 286 Va. 255, 258 (2013)
(alterations in original) (quoting Clark v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 636, 640 (2010)). Thus, this
Court need only determine whether “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Wilson v. Commonwealth, 53 Va. App. 599,
605 (2009) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). If so, the conviction stands.
-3- III. ANALYSIS
Appellant was convicted of malicious wounding in violation of Code § 18.2-51. To
convict a person of malicious wounding, the Commonwealth must prove malice and the specific
intent to “permanently” injure, or more specifically, “the intent to maim, disfigure, disable, or
kill.” Johnson v. Commonwealth, 53 Va. App. 79, 99 (2008); Code § 18.2-51. Appellant argues
the Commonwealth failed to prove either of these elements and his actions amounted to nothing
more than misdemeanor domestic assault and battery. This Court disagrees.
Appellant first contends that he lacked the malice required to be convicted of malicious
wounding. “Malice inheres in the doing of a wrongful act intentionally, or without just cause or
excuse, or as a result of ill will.” Ramos v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. App. 150, 162 (2019)
(quoting Burkeen, 286 Va. at 259). A factfinder may infer malice from “words[] or . . . acts and
conduct which necessarily result in injury.” Id. Ultimately, the existence of malice “is a
question of fact to be determined by [the factfinder].” Fletcher v. Commonwealth, 72 Va. App.
493, 507 (2020) (quoting Long v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 194, 198 (1989)).
A reasonable factfinder could infer appellant acted maliciously. He purposefully assailed
Miller, pinning her to the bed with both hands over her mouth. Because Miller was unable to
breathe, she bit appellant’s hand. In retaliation, appellant made the conscious decision to bite
Miller’s arm and said, “Oh, you wanna bite,” evincing his intent to harm her. On brief, appellant
even acknowledges that he struck Miller with an open hand on the back of the head. The
Commonwealth provided ample evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could conclude
that appellant purposefully harmed Miller.
Moreover, while appellant tries to argue that at least some of his actions were justified—
notably, his retaliatory bites—his argument rests solely on his own version of events, which the
trial court flatly rejected. And even if true, his version of events provides no justification for his
-4- other purposeful actions, including covering Miller’s mouth with his hands or striking the back
of her head. Accordingly, this Court rejects appellant’s argument that the evidence did not
establish malice.
As his second argument, appellant contends the evidence was insufficient to prove the
requisite intent for a malicious wounding. But, again, appellant’s argument fails. To convict a
person of malicious wounding, the Commonwealth must also prove “the intent to maim,
disfigure, disable, or kill.” Code § 18.2-51. The accused, then, must have intended to
“permanently, not merely temporarily, harm another person.” Commonwealth v. Perkins, 295
Va. 323, 330 (2018) (quoting Burkeen, 286 Va. at 259).1 “Intent is the purpose formed in a
person’s mind which may, and often must, be inferred from the facts and circumstances in a
particular case.” Id. (quoting Burton v. Commonwealth, 281 Va. 622, 626-27 (2011)). In
inferring intent, one may “infer that every person intends the natural, probable consequences of
his or her actions.” Ellis v. Commonwealth, 281 Va. 499, 507 (2011).
Here, several factors provided evidence that appellant, at the very least, intended to harm
Miller permanently. First, appellant attacked her repeatedly. He pinned her to the bed with his
hands blocking her mouth, bit her arm, and struck the back of her head hard enough for her to
lose her memory. Appellant would prefer the Court look at his case as one of a single slap and
retaliatory bite. Yet the facts accepted by the trial court show otherwise. Rather than a single
isolated act of retaliatory aggression, appellant’s actions consisted of consecutive attacks. See
Ramos, 71 Va. App. at 162-63 (holding that even a single blow can constitute malicious
wounding when the victim “had already been kicked multiple times and beaten with poles, a
board, and a shield”).
1 A resulting permanent injury is not required to satisfy the specific intent element under Code § 18.2-51, only the intent to inflict one. Perkins, 295 Va. at 330. -5- Second, appellant attacked vulnerable areas of Miller’s body where she was less capable
of defending herself. In Perkins, the Virginia Supreme Court found it significant that the
appellant struck the victim “in a vulnerable area (the occipital region of his skull on the back of
his head).” 295 Va. at 331. There, the appellant “delivered the blow while [the victim] was
defenseless with his back turned,” knocking him unconscious. Id. at 331-32. Similarly,
appellant here first pressed down on Miller’s mouth—which kept her from breathing—before
striking the back of her head with such force that it blacked out a portion of her memory and left
her dazed even into the next day.
Third, the size disparity between the parties represented a heightened threat to Miller.
See Dawkins v. Commonwealth, 186 Va. 55, 62 (1947) (“Considering the differen[ce] in the size
and strength of the two men, the method of attack was inexcusable.”). Being both heavier and
taller than Miller, appellant used his body to pin Miller to the bed and cover her mouth using
both hands until she struggled to breathe.
Finally, Miller’s resulting injuries are relevant to the analysis. See Burkeen, 286 Va. at
261 (referencing the serious nature of the injury when analyzing intent). She suffered bruising
and swelling to the face, swelling in one eye, and hemorrhaging to the other. And again,
appellant’s strike to her head blacked out a portion of her memory and left her dazed the
following day. Two days after the incident, Miller still had visible bite marks and bruising on
her right arm. Her injuries took approximately two months to heal. The magnitude of her
injuries evinces appellant’s intent to significantly—indeed, permanently—injure her.
Considering the consecutive nature of appellant’s attacks, the vulnerable areas of Miller’s
body he assaulted, the size disparity between them, and the significant injuries appellant
inflicted, the trial court’s conclusion that appellant intended to permanently injure her was
neither plainly wrong nor without evidence to support it.
-6- IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court holds that the evidence was sufficient to support
appellant’s conviction of malicious wounding and affirms the trial court’s judgment.
Affirmed.
-7-